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Introduction 
Edward W. (Ned) Hill 
Cleveland State University 
For many years, members of the faculty and research staff in the 
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs at Cleveland State 
University have paid keen attention to the problems and issues faced 
by midwestern industrial cities. As part of a university community, we 
joined with colleagues across campus to think about how to respond to 
disruptive change in the regional economies of twentieth century indus-
trial cities and regions. 
There is no one, simple recipe for renewing prosperity in mid-
western industrial cities. But virtually all of the partial answers that 
emerged from our investigations recognize in one way or another that 
the greatest hopes and assets in these cities reside in the talent and 
energy of the people who live and work within them. In times of difﬁ-
culty, individuals and groups discover unsuspected strengths and reveal 
qualities and capabilities that had not previously been seen. How can 
the huge reserve of human possibilities within midwestern industrial 
cities be released? 
The chapters in this book do not contain a single, complete, and 
satisfying answer to the question of how to rekindle prosperity in these 
cities. They contain no silver bullets, but together they may be silver 
buckshot. They provide valuable ideas to generate prosperity. 
We commissioned chapters in which each author looks at the pros-
pects of renewal through the lens of his or her own specialty and experi-
ence. The chapters are all scholarly in nature, but they have been written 
for an audience that appreciates a style that is less formal than is usually 
found in purely academic writing. Some of the chapters are predicated 
upon the commonly shared point of view that the role of markets in 
these cities is often either misunderstood or insufﬁ ciently understood. 
Most share the perspective that one of the keys to renewed prosperity is 
1 
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2 Hill 
found in an increased appreciation of markets and the institutions that 
enable, support, and constrain them. 
Historically, most city leaders work in the here and now and with 
the expectation that change will be gradual. Today’s reality is vastly 
different; the pace of change has vastly accelerated. Changes that range 
from shorter product cycles and globalization of markets to the impact 
of transportation systems on sprawl require ideas and continual efforts 
to promote prosperity. 
The next chapter, by William M. Bowen and Kelly Kinahan, pro-
vides an overview of the book’s theme that we are in a time of economic 
transition. The world order that prevailed in the early-to-mid-twentieth 
century, during which time midwestern industrial cities were in their 
heyday, has been replaced by a different kind of global economy, one 
that is continuing to change. As the inﬂuence of China and India con-
tinues to grow, the U.S. economic system in general, and the regional 
economic systems of midwestern industrial cities in particular, will play 
a less dominant role. At the same time, however, much of the anxi-
ety this transition brings about is unnecessary. While the global market 
dominance of midwestern cities has eclipsed, new opportunities await. 
Urban and regional economies can attain high levels of prosperity with-
out economic dominance. 
This is followed by a chapter written by Benjamin Y. Clark, in 
which he asks the question: Why do some older industrial cities con-
tinue to thrive economically while others sputter and decline? In this 
context, are success and failure dependent on luck, or is there some-
thing more profound at play? While there are many ways to address the 
issue, and certainly many factors that contribute to the success or failure 
of cities, this chapter examines one part of that question: Can tax expen-
ditures play a role in stimulating the growth of these cities? The focus 
is on how and why state and local governments use tax expenditures to 
attempt to improve the conditions of their communities. The chapter 
seeks to demonstrate that tax expenditure policy is highly inconsistent. 
Local governments are at the mercy of a macroeconomic environment 
over which they have little inﬂuence. This lack of control leaves local 
governments with few tools at their disposal to create positive change 
in their communities. The devices that these governments often turn to 
are tax expenditures. Unfortunately, tax expenditures play little or no 
role in positive economic development. Despite the evidence, politi-
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Introduction 3 
cians continue to see tax expenditures as one of the most important 
options available to them. To understand this, and to act accordingly, is 
an important step in renewing prosperity in midwestern industrial cities. 
Haifeng Qian, in Chapter 4, starts by surveying the literature on 
the evolution of industrial clusters and explores its implications for the 
revival of U.S. cities such as Detroit, Michigan, and Cleveland, Ohio. 
These old industrial cities feature declining or declined clusters and are 
struggling to invigorate their economies. The chapter reviews various 
deﬁnitions and typologies of clusters. Next, it summarizes four streams 
of literature discussing the evolution of clusters, in the process identi-
fying some major forces behind the dynamics of clusters based on the 
limited research available. The chapter does not solely address clusters 
manifested in old industrial cities, since one type of cluster may evolve 
into another type. It examines cluster development in the industrial 
Midwest using Cleveland as an example, and explores the implications 
of clusters’ evolution paths for the restoration of old industrial cities. 
In the ﬁ fth chapter, Joel A. Elvery begins by describing a “bucket” 
or “shoveling” analogy for the labor force. The labor market for each 
skill group is a bucket. The bucket for the lowest skills is large, but it is 
completely full and shrinking relative to the other buckets. Elvery sug-
gests that workforce development policy over the last 45 years has been 
analogous to efforts to keep shoveling people into the lowest-skilled 
labor market. While a lucky few ﬁnd a way to stay in that labor market 
segment, most spill over the side. This discourages the unlucky who 
remain unemployed, and it wastes public workforce training resources. 
Thus, workforce development policies as presently constituted have 
had limited success. The chapter suggests that the workforce develop-
ment system needs to refocus on advancement and describes policies 
and programs that ﬁt this orientation. 
The sixth chapter is written by Gregory M. Sadlek and Joan Chase. 
Academics have not typically made a very good case that the arts and 
humanities have contributed tangibly to regional prosperity. This chap-
ter attempts to help remedy this shortcoming, largely through a focus 
on Cleveland as an example of cities throughout the Rust Belt in which 
the question of how to regain lost status and former success has become 
fundamental. For many, prosperity is linked only to strong and vital 
economic activity. This chapter takes a different view. While Sadlek 
and Chase recognize that wealth is fundamental to civic well-being, the 
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4 Hill 
arts and humanities also play a vital role. Their view is based upon the 
recognition that the word “prosperity,” derived from our verb “pros-
per,” ultimately comes from the Latin terms pro and spes, or, literally, 
“for the sake of hope.” It shows how the building blocks of prosperity 
suggest something more than just having a strong economy. Indeed, the 
road to prosperity for people in midwestern industrial cities may well 
be the path to a broad increase in hope in the prospects for a stronger 
regional economy, for clean, safe, and interesting places to live, for 
higher levels of personal fulﬁllment, and for a community that once 
again takes pride in itself and what it can offer to the world. This chap-
ter explores how Cleveland’s traditionally solid base in the arts and 
culture can be a major part of the journey. It argues that the road to 
prosperity must involve increased quality of life in all facets. 
Chapter 7 is written by Andrew R. Thomas, who has for many years 
worked as a geophysicist and attorney in the energy arena. Thomas 
draws on a wide range of sources to argue that some energy policies 
and practices have had a material and adverse impact on cities in gen-
eral and speciﬁcally on midwestern cities. Thomas argues for a range of 
energy policies that would help renew prosperity in these cities. Current 
energy policies that have had negative effects include low-cost gaso-
line, which has encouraged sprawl; public policies designed to encour-
age rural electriﬁcation, which have caused urban electric rates to be 
artiﬁcially high; public policies that have discouraged cogeneration and 
distributed generation, which have created an artiﬁcially high-cost elec-
trical energy grid in urban areas; promotion of trucking over railroads 
and waterways, which has decreased the natural advantage of Great 
Lakes cities as centers of transportation; and failure to adjust rapidly 
enough to changing technologies and circumstances. The general rea-
son given for this inertia is the mighty resistance to change put up by 
the trillion-dollar-a-year energy business. Alterations that may be good 
for society in general may not be good for this particularly inﬂuential 
industry. In a society where policy is set by competing advocacy groups, 
alignment with the status quo has a signiﬁcant advantage. Energy poli-
cies that can help to renew prosperity in these cities include those that 
encourage distributed generation. In addition, exploitation of natural 
gas from shale formations will enable near-term growth and provide a 
bridge to renewable generation, and policies that reﬂect the actual costs 
of producing and delivering energy will encourage development of the 
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traditional central city. Midwestern cities must also develop an energy 
infrastructure that makes urban life easier and more attractive, such as 
faster and more comfortable public transportation systems. 
Chapter 8, written by Chieh-Chen Bowen, begins by recogniz-
ing that, throughout the twentieth century, no single nation or block 
of nations had nearly as much economic power and inﬂuence as the 
United States. However, in the twenty-ﬁrst century, total U.S. world 
supremacy is ending. China is on the rise and will one day soon—prob-
ably in the next decade—become the largest economy in the world. 
Indeed, at current growth rates, China’s economy is doubling in real 
terms every seven or eight years. For industry in midwestern cities, this 
newly emerging economic power means, among other things, that the 
renewal of prosperity depends in essential ways on how well American 
entrepreneurs and ﬁrms can penetrate Chinese markets. This effort, in 
turn, demands knowledge and understanding of what Bowen calls “the 
basic Chinese social mechanism.” The old saw that one can buy in one’s 
own language and culture but must sell in the language and culture 
of the buyer is especially important when contemplating doing busi-
ness with Chinese customers. This chapter describes and gives practical 
advice regarding the environments one must know about in order to 
successfully export to and invest in Chinese markets. The implications 
of understanding these environments are illustrated by the failure of 
Google when it was forced to pull its operation out of mainland China 
in 2010, and by the success of Rupert Murdoch when the Chinese gov-
ernment granted him the ﬁrst “landing rights” to sell foreign programs 
to cable system prime-time slots, then later, rights to provide media 
content to its mobile users. 
Chapter 9, by Ziona Austrian and Merissa C. Piazza, links public 
policy with stimulating entrepreneurship in regions that, because of 
their industrial legacy, have fallen behind. Using examples, the authors 
discuss the role of the nonproﬁt and public sectors in encouraging the 
development of a locally based entrepreneurial culture to increase the 
number of private sector start-up companies that are a critical compo-
nent of the economic future of any region. 
In Chapter 10, William M. Bowen and Chang-Shik Song begin by 
deﬁning local economic development initiatives as public policies that 
involve the exercise of public authority to claim and allocate taxing 
power for social and economic purposes. These decisions are intended 
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6 Hill 
to affect consumer or ﬁrm behavior, or both. Generally, the policies 
involve tax abatements or public expenditures in order to provide pri-
vate beneﬁts within the urban or regional economic system. They cover 
a range of public subsidies and direct cash aid for businesses, such as 
ﬁnancial incentives for branch plant recruitment, capital market pro-
grams, information and education programs, export assistance, and 
centers for business-related research. The policies frequently consist of 
public ﬁnancial support with the goal of increasing levels of local con-
sumption spending on items such as tourism and art facilities, sports 
stadiums and teams, casinos, and outdoor recreation activities. The 
chapter considers some criticisms of these initiatives and the rationales 
behind them. The authors conclude that while it may be within the 
power of local governments to help stem the tide of decline in midwest-
ern industrial cities, the automatic and uncritical use of local economic 
development initiatives is not necessarily always the best way to do so. 
Finally, in Chapter 11, David R. Elkins investigates whether or 
not the widely held impression that the Great Lakes region has lost 
its entrepreneurial dynamic is based on any sort of empirical reality. 
The chapter ﬁrst explores the nature of entrepreneurship and what it 
means for an economy. Next, it presents descriptive evidence about the 
hypothesis that the Great Lakes region has lost its entrepreneurial vigor. 
Finally, statistical tests are performed to examine whether the Great 
Lakes region has, indeed, lost a step. The short answer is that it largely 
depends on how entrepreneurship is measured. In one sense, the Great 
Lakes region has, indeed, lost a step. However, like many seasoned 
athletes, it remains in the game and competitive. 
My hope is that this book can contribute to setting in motion pro-
cesses for renewal and energies that have been imprisoned by outdated 
ideas, policies, and habits of thought. 
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Midwestern Urban and 
Regional Responses to Global 
Economic Transition 
William M. Bowen 
Kelly L. Kinahan 
Cleveland State University 
Midwestern industrial cities continue to cede ground to low-cost, 
overseas competitors in the increasingly global economy. Yet tran-
sitions present opportunities and Rust Belt regions can experience 
prosperity despite losing the market dominance in manufacturing 
that they once enjoyed. 
Human urban and regional settlements have existed within a sys-
tem of economic expansion and contraction that may be traced back 
continuously at least to the development of Afro-Eurasian interregional 
trade in the Bronze Age (Frank and Thompson 2005; Smith 2009). The 
characteristic structure and cycles of this system have included core-
periphery divisions of labor, alternating periods of rivalry and hege-
mony, and economic periods of upswing and downswing. The charac-
teristics of the total system at any given time have strongly inﬂuenced 
local economic activities and overall levels of prosperity (Frank 1993). 
Today’s midwestern industrial cities are in some ways similar to 
other cities throughout history. Their local economies are parts of a 
larger, continuous system of economic expansion and contraction. They 
are driven by forces of innovation and entrepreneurship, capital accu-
mulation, division and specialization of labor, and changes in demand 
and market sizes. Yet they are somewhat different from many other cit-
ies in that they originated roughly during the latter part of the industrial 
revolution and came to economic preeminence during the ﬁrst half of the 
twentieth century, at which time the population not only in the United 
7 
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States but in the world was larger than ever. These cities developed 
when transportation and communication technologies were advancing 
to previously unimaginable power and inﬂuence. Today, midwestern 
industrial cities face a new economic world order, with more competi-
tion from around the globe than ever before (Bair 2005; Ducruet and 
Notteboom 2012; Gerefﬁ, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005; Henderson 
and Nadvi 2011; Henderson et al. 2002; Winters and Yusuf 2007). 
To understand any system, one must understand the larger one within 
which it is embedded. Thus, this chapter starts with a brief overview of 
the evolution of the economic world system within which midwestern 
industrial cities attained world-scale economic dominance in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This gives perspective on why 
these cities achieved such preeminence, and helps provide insight as 
to why they cannot reasonably expect to reclaim it today. Next, the 
chapter brieﬂy reviews some recent scholarly literature describing the 
technological, industrial, and political-economic changes during the 
early twenty-ﬁrst century. These shifts seem likely to continue and pos-
sibly even to accelerate the long-term evolutionary trends from smaller-
scale, simpler sociotechnical and trade systems to larger-scale and more 
complex ones. The chapter then considers some of the implications of 
these trends for the renewal of prosperity in midwestern industrial cit-
ies. We conclude by suggesting that the idea of prosperity needs to be 
reframed relative to the previous concept, which was centered on eco-
nomic world dominance. However, on the basis of the reframed idea, 
renewed prosperity is well within reach for large segments of the popu-
lation in midwestern industrial cities. 
MIDWESTERN INDUSTRIAL CITIES WITHIN THE 
ECONOMIC WORLD ORDER THROUGH THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
Trade and investment across borders began long before the rise of 
modern capitalism (Muller 2009). However, there is little doubt that 
global economic transition intensiﬁed during and after the Industrial 
Revolution (More 2000). Some of the major underlying factors included 
the use of fossil fuels, the development of textile technology, the factory 
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system, the growth of the human population and its concentration in 
urban areas, and the modernization of agricultural, mining, and metal-
lurgical production processes. Other factors driving intensiﬁcation and 
diffusion included the expansion of transportation through newly cre-
ated and developed railroads, canals, macadamized roads, steamships, 
and refrigerated railway cars. Much was also promoted institutionally 
by radically reduced tariffs, designed to induce international trade, and 
the practice of pegging national currencies to gold, so as to have a com-
mon unit of exchange, especially in Europe. 
Industrial Growth in the Midwest 
As the Industrial Revolution diffused from Great Britain and Europe 
to the United States, midwestern cities were well-poised to take advan-
tage of the newly developed methods of production. By the turn of the 
twentieth century, advantageous locations along prominent waterways, 
agricultural surplus, abundant and fertile land, availability of natural 
resources, and high levels of immigration resulted in ﬂ ourishing manu-
facturing sectors throughout midwestern industrial cities and helped 
catapult them to the ﬁrst rank of worldwide competitiveness. This dom-
inance was achieved through mass production driven by fossil fuels, 
blue-collar labor forces and mechanization, and national consumption 
of goods at historically unprecedented rates, allowing relatively large 
segments of the populations within midwestern industrial cities to enjoy 
great prosperity. 
These cities continued to grow through the early twentieth century, 
along with the entire American economy, arguably because of previ-
ously unparalleled opportunities to achieve scale economies offered by 
the exceptionally large U.S. domestic market (Hannah 2008). Between 
1900 and 1920, the U.S. population increased 40 percent, from 76.1 to 
106.5 million, while real gross domestic product rose 63 percent, from 
$422.8 to $687.7 billion.1 Midwestern industrial cities thrived primarily 
on trade with other U.S. markets, taking advantage of railroads, water-
ways, and Great Lakes shipping routes. Furthermore, labor needs con-
tinued to be met through great international in-migratory ﬂows, all but 
guaranteeing continued economic growth and development. 
The period between World War I and World War II brought further 
ascendency of midwestern industrial cities. Partially this was attribut-
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able to events in other parts of the world with respect to which nobody 
in these U.S. cities had much if any control. Russia became the Soviet 
Union and closed itself off economically from competing with the rest 
of the world. Similarly, amidst the turmoil of the Weimar Republic’s 
efforts to recover from the devastation of World War I, the Germans 
sought complete economic self-reliance. At least partially in conse-
quence of the rapidly diffusing European retreat from international 
trade along with the stock market crash of 1929, widespread bank 
failures, and a precipitous decrease in demand for manufactured and 
other products, the world economy went into a deep depression in the 
1930s. The closing of national borders to international trade contrib-
uted to mass unemployment, social upheaval, and the rise of fascism, 
all of which laid the foundation for World War II. The Great Depres-
sion induced widespread protectionism in an effort to shore up national 
economies around the world. For example, in the United States, the 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 was signed into law on June 17, 1930, 
with the purpose of raising U.S. tariffs to record levels on over 20,000 
imported goods. U.S. markets were generally large enough to consume 
the products coming out of midwestern industrial cities, and the wide-
spread retreat from international trade reduced supplier competition for 
such products, indirectly contributing to the success of these cities. 
At the end of World War II, the standing of midwestern industrial 
cities was nearing its peak. At the same time, American policymakers 
and most global leaders were convinced that the protectionist policies 
and trade policies in place after the First World War were an economic 
disaster and tended to result in antagonism and conﬂict. This led to 
efforts, spearheaded by the United States, to begin laying the institu-
tional groundwork necessary for expanding international trade (e.g., 
lower U.S. tariffs). The results of these initiatives were manifold: the 
World Bank was created to help fund infrastructure in war-ravaged 
Europe; the International Monetary Fund took on the task of stabilizing 
the currencies of troubled economies; and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established to reduce trade barriers and 
provide a forum for discussion of further reductions.2 
While the United States and most European countries were work-
ing to bolster international trade, the communist countries, led by the 
Soviet Union and China, remained inwardly focused and did not partic-
ipate. The centrally planned and controlled Soviet government’s policy 
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was to ensure that the bulk of the country’s production was traded and 
consumed exclusively within the Eastern European block of commu-
nist countries. International trade by the Chinese was largely precluded, 
not only by communist economic policies of centralized control, but 
because of the protracted civil war they had fought since the 1920s and 
the subsequent conﬂict with the Japanese during World War II. China 
had very little industry, high unemployment, and massive food short-
ages. In the United States in general and midwestern industrial cities in 
particular, widespread fear of communism stimulated industrial produc-
tion for the manufactured goods and services needed to support the Cold 
War. The inﬂuence of communism also had the largely salutary indirect 
effect that communist countries did not provide supply-side economic 
competition for the goods produced by midwestern manufacturers. 
The Impact of Globalization 
Communism notwithstanding, the period between the 1950s and 
the 1970s brought an enormous overall increase in international trade. 
Perhaps most importantly, it was at this time that Japan and the “East-
Asian Tigers”—Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea— 
began large-scale export-oriented industrialization. The rise of indus-
trial production, especially in the Far East, created new competition for 
midwestern industry in downstream markets for ﬁnished goods. Japa-
nese production, in particular, began to compete seriously in the United 
States, at ﬁrst with small, inexpensive trinkets, toys, and baubles of low 
quality, and later with high-quality motorcycles and vehicles such as 
automobiles, as well as ofﬁce machinery, scientiﬁc and optical equip-
ment, semiconductors, and other electronic components. U.S. ﬁ rms had 
no choice but to participate in increasingly globalized markets, either 
by inclusion or exclusion. 
Early signs of the decline of midwestern industrial cities—the rise 
of the Rust Belt—began to appear in the 1960s, as both the concept and 
processes of globalization began to take new root. The word “global-
ize” began to show up in the academic literature in the 1960s and in 
the mainstream press in the 1980s, roughly meaning to make global in 
scope (Liu, Hong, and Liu 2012; Oner et al. 2010; Oswick, Jones and 
Lockwood 2009). Greater numbers of people than ever before started 
to move around the world; more places were involved in the global 
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economy; and ﬂows of international goods and investments increased 
signiﬁcantly. A greater reliance on international markets occurred uni-
versally, except in the communist regimes, and competition increased 
acutely in markets that had been essentially dominated by midwestern 
industry. 
U.S. Socioeconomic Trends 
Economic decline beginning in the 1950s in midwestern cities was 
additionally caused by a mix of factors, foremost amongst which may 
have been the widespread preferences of individuals to move to places 
with mild winters, along with increased incomes that made it possible 
to act upon these preferences, and the mass production of affordable air-
conditioning technology (Rappoport 2003). Another major contributor 
was the rapidly changing industrial composition of U.S. employment. 
At the end of World War II, service industries accounted for 10 percent 
of nonfarm employment compared to 38 percent for manufacturing. By 
1996, service industries accounted for 29 percent of nonfarm employ-
ment compared to 15 percent for manufacturing (Meisenheimer 1998). 
The changing composition of industry meant a shift from heavy manu-
facturing of such goods as steel and automobiles, which were concen-
trated in midwestern cities, to service industries, which were freer to 
locate throughout the country. Moreover, the cost of labor in the heavily 
unionized northern and midwestern cities was higher than the cost of 
labor in the largely union-free South and West. These factors played a 
signiﬁcant role in the massive population migrations that occurred from 
the North and Midwest to the South and West (Greenwood 1997; Hobbs 
and Stoops 2002). To make matters worse for the inner cities, a shift 
occurred in the population of metropolitan areas, from cities to suburbs, 
brought on by widespread adoption of the automobile starting during 
the mid-twentieth century, along with massive investment in highway 
and road construction. As described in Box 1.1, the result of such trends 
can have dire consequences. 
Economic Change in China 
As the twentieth century came to a close, by far the most signiﬁ-
cant systemic alteration in world markets affecting midwestern indus-
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Box 1.1 Economic Decline in Formerly Preeminent Cities: 
Detroit’s Bankruptcy 
On July 18, 2013 the city of Detroit ﬁled for Chapter 9 bankruptcy 
protection. As the 11th largest city in the U.S., Detroit’s bankruptcy 
stands as a dubious marker in the urban history of a city once considered 
the icon of American industry. While Detroit had been suffering from 
severe ﬁscal stress since at least 2002 (Scorsone and Bateson 2012), 
the possibility of bankruptcy became all but imminent with the appoint-
ment of Kevyn Orr as Emergency Manager in March 2013.a The city’s 
debt has been estimated to be somewhere between $18 and $20 billion 
(Davey and Walsh 2013), with the city’s pension fund being its larg-
est creditor (Renaud-Komiya 2013). While some pin Detroit’s failures 
squarely on the backs of a corrupt local government that completely 
failed at managing the city’s ﬁnances (Marotta 2013; Auslin 2013), oth-
ers see the bankruptcy as an outcome of not only this ﬁ nancial misman-
agement, but also a set of multifaceted and complex issues plaguing the 
city for decades, including deindustrialization; globalization; suburban 
sprawl, which reduced the city’s tax base; ﬁscal stress in the form of
annual operating deﬁcits; burdensome health care and pension costs; 
city services stymied by outdated technology and poor service delivery; 
and clear race and class separation between the city and surrounding 
region (Florida 2013; Davey and Walsh 2013). 
As the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history, there is keen 
interest in how Detroit will navigate these somewhat uncharted waters— 
less than 500 municipalities have sought Chapter 9 protection since its 
inception in the 1930s (U.S. Courts, n.d.). Many municipalities are 
experiencing greater ﬁscal stress since the Great Recession, and legacy 
costs (i.e., pension and other retiree beneﬁts) are of particular concern 
to many midwestern industrial cities as many of these cities face simi-
larly steep contribution requirements (Scorsone and Bateson 2012). In 
a 2012 report that evaluated merits of Chapter 9 bankruptcy for the city 
of Detroit, Scorsone and Bateson (2012) note that the primary advantage 
of bankruptcy is cost containment, speciﬁcally in regard to reduction of 
legacy costs, as well as improvements in cash ﬂ ow. 
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Box 1.1 (continued) 
The impact on residents and the existing assets of the Detroit is also a 
key concern. Both residents and city workers have been assured that city 
services will continue uninterrupted (Davey and Walsh 2013), but cer-
tainly changes lie ahead. Furthermore, although the liquidation of local 
assets is not allowed under Chapter 9, creditors have still requested and 
received appraisals of artwork at the Detroit Institute of Art. Kevyn Orr 
has stated that the sale of artwork was not in the city’s plans (Haskell 
2013). 
Florida (2013) argues that bankruptcy may be the reset Detroit needs 
and that it may help bolster the city’s nascent revitalization efforts by 
stabilizing its ﬁscal management, spurring greater regional cooperation, 
and highlighting the need for more equitable and inclusive urban revital-
ization models. Thus, many questions remain about Detroit’s ﬁ scal and 
economic future, and both the Rust Belt and the nation will be keenly 
observing its progress through bankruptcy, whether it helps propel the 
city’s revitalization prospects, and the impact on residents, employees, 
and governance structure. 
a Fiscal stress “refers to [ﬁnancial] indicators that merit further attention [and] 
may be indicated by budget shortfalls, decreasing cash balances, or increasing 
debt loads” (Scorsone and Bateson 2012, p. 2). As Emergency Manager, Orr is 
the primary decision-maker and has the power to remove both the Mayor and 
Detroit City Council, through both Orr and local ofﬁcials have been working 
cooperatively to this point. 
trial cities was the end of communist economic ideology in China. The 
accession to power of Deng Xiaoping upon the death of Mao Zedong in 
1976 gave rise to the so-called Chinese economic miracle, and changed 
the future of supremacy within the economic world system (Rodriguez 
2011). Whereas previously it had been feasible for a relatively wide 
range of midwestern industries to achieve world-level preeminence, 
the ascendency of China on global markets placed constraints on the 
options for midwestern ﬁrms. Substantial Chinese penetration began in 
markets that had been virtually the exclusive domain of U.S. manufac-
turing. China’s export bundle increasingly overlapped with that of U.S. 
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production, and did so at progressively low relative prices. In 1972, 
Chinese products were present in only 9 percent of manufacturing prod-
uct categories, but by 2005 they were present in 85 percent (Schott 
2008). With China’s huge and inexpensive labor force, high savings 
rates, and investment in infrastructure, its industry began to pose new 
and daunting levels of competition for the United States and for other 
countries. 
The Chinese economic transformation can generally be explained 
by microeconomic and institutional reforms based on decentralization, 
privatization, and the development of markets (Lin, Cai, and Li 1996), 
and by newly adopted macroeconomic policies favoring openness 
through increased international trade, direct investment, and integration 
into global production networks (Chai 1998; Lardy 2003; Lie, Romilly, 
and Song 1997). In the big picture, the macroeconomic openness side 
probably has had a larger, more direct impact upon midwestern indus-
trial cities. However, the reform side is in some ways more instructive 
for those interested in the renewal of these cities, in that it illustrates 
the tremendous economic power that can be unleashed by the proper 
market incentives for self-initiative and responsibility. 
The reforms were born of the revival of private enterprise follow-
ing massive state spending on industrialization under Mao, along with 
the unimaginable catastrophes brought on by the Great Leap Forward 
in 1957 and the Cultural Revolution in 1966. In the aftermath of Mao’s 
death, confusion over leadership and the control of political power at 
the national level brought opportunities for brave regional governments, 
including the well-known Anhui province in eastern China, to establish 
some elementary private ownership arrangements. There, for the ﬁrst 
time since the rise of centralized communist economic control, farmers 
were allowed to meet their quotas and to keep excess production to sell 
in markets. This gave farmers the incentives to take risk and to use their 
intelligence to improve agricultural productivity. 
Optimism for a better future grew massively along with the increases 
in agricultural productivity. The gains in productivity in turn stimulated 
the development and diffusion of the township and village enterprises 
in Anhui province and elsewhere. These enterprises produced a wide 
variety of goods and services, such as clothing and other consumer 
items. Production decisions began to be made by local actors with 
information about area conditions and markets, rather than by commu-
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nist party chiefs in Beijing. Although these local actors did not at ﬁrst 
have formal property and ownership rights over their products, they 
continued to follow the established Anhui province model, allowing the 
participants in township and village enterprises to be residual claimants 
on the output of their labor. 
Soon, people all over the country were allowed to act as if they 
were the owners of any products they created in excess of the minimum 
amount set for them by the local leadership. Individuals throughout the 
vast Chinese population were thereby incentivized to produce and to 
begin saving and investing in their land and themselves. The economic 
miracle was thus born of a newfound freedom for the Chinese people to 
respond to market incentives, which created a sense of hope for chang-
ing some of the stagnant economic conditions created by the past mis-
takes of communism. 
Today’s economic world order provides new and daunting chal-
lenges and opportunities in midwestern industrial cities. Looming large 
among these challenges is economic competition by the Chinese, as 
well as by other newly emerging global economic competitors. House-
holds, ﬁrms, and policymakers within the region will need to recognize 
and to act upon the conditions of the twenty-ﬁrst century, not those of 
the past period of midwestern industrial dominance. 
MIDWESTERN INDUSTRIAL CITIES WITHIN TODAY’S 
CHANGING ECONOMIC WORLD ORDER 
The post–World War II economy was transformed not only by sys-
temic changes in global-level competition but also, especially of late, 
by a combination of population growth and advancements in informa-
tion and communication technologies. Attendant increases in inter-
dependence throughout social systems have brought new difﬁ culties in 
understanding the substantive aspects of problems such as the renewal 
of prosperity in midwestern industrial cities. Population growth brings 
greater demand for food, shelter, and other resources. Starting with the 
Industrial Revolution in the 1700s, advanced societies have met these 
demands by increasing the intensity and scale of production, leading to 
higher levels of output, driven primarily by fossil fuels. In turn, indus-
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trialization has had major geopolitical, strategic, economic, and social 
implications, some of which bear directly on the prospects for mid-
western industrial cities, and some of which could hamper the ability of 
the United States and its allies to maintain security (Jackson and Howe 
2008). 
To be clear, the United States and indeed the entire world is larger 
than ever before and still growing. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
when midwestern industrial cities were being formed, the population 
of the United States was 76 million and the world population was 1.7 
billion. Today, the U.S. population is 309 million and the world popula-
tion is just over 7 billion. According to midrange projections for 2050, 
the U.S. population will be 400 million (U.S. Census Bureau 2013) 
and the world population will be 9.5 billion (United Nations 2012). All 
the additional people will need food, water, clothing, shelter, and other 
subsistence items. They will want electricity and public infrastructure 
for sewerage and transportation. If and when they become wealthy, 
they will also demand luxury goods, sometimes lots of them. All of this 
requires resources from nature. Thus, these unprecedented population 
sizes pose new risks of resource depletion, problems of resource com-
petition, and increased pressures for interregional trade. Johnson and 
Earle (2000, p. 301) also argue that increased population size almost 
invariably brings greater opportunities and pressures for increasingly 
centralized political and economic control of the means of subsistence, 
largely because of risk management, technological complexity, and 
trade considerations. 
Population Growth, Technology, and the Exploitation of Resources 
Growth in population has historically been interdependent with 
technological innovation. As populations have continued to increase, 
greater levels of industrial production have been required to meet the 
sustenance needs of households. This has tended to add to the demand 
for agricultural products and for energy and other upstream resources or 
inputs to production. Moreover, the way industry and the market econ-
omy have met this enlarged demand is by ﬁrst exploiting the easiest-to-
acquire, most immediately available, and therefore least costly resources. 
As these readily accessible resources have become depleted, it has 
become increasingly advantageous for industry to turn to less desirable 
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and more costly alternatives. Technological innovation is one of the 
primary strategies with which industry has exploited these options. 
Take as an illustration recent efforts to drill for oil in deep water in 
places such as the Gulf of Mexico. Previously the oil and gas industry 
exploited the relatively accessible oil resources located in shallower 
water and closer to land. Prior to the 1990s, most of the oil came from 
shallow water wells, where drilling and production platforms could 
stand on stilts anchored to the sea ﬂoor. As one would expect given a 
growing population, the demand for oil continued to increase. During 
the 1990s, Global Positioning Systems (GPS) navigation technology 
became available; this made it possible for drilling rigs and ships to 
stay precisely positioned over an oil well using satellite navigation and 
microthrusters. Drilling rigs could thus be located and kept in exact 
position long enough to lay the many miles of pipes required to exploit 
a deepwater oil resource, and without drilling and production platforms 
anchored to the sea ﬂoor. Deepwater drilling has thus now taken off in 
the Gulf. The easiest-to-acquire, immediately available, and least-costly 
oil resources have been largely depleted, and new technologies have 
made it possible to exploit previously ignored or inaccessible ones. 
New technologies have enabled more people in more households 
to meet their sustenance needs and to enjoy their luxury goods. Fur-
ther advancements in technology have made it possible for industry to 
exploit additional resources, facilitating increased population growth, 
which has posed problems that require more technological innovation, 
allowing even less accessible resources to be utilized. According to 
More (2000), this sort of positive feedback loop between population 
growth and technological innovation has allowed industrialization to 
continue to meet the sustenance needs of growing populations since 
the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Johnson and Earle (2000, 
p. 29) argue that this has been a general tendency in human societies 
throughout history, leading to an “upward spiral” of political-economic 
integration and more powerful leaders. 
The combination of population growth and technological advance-
ment has changed the international calculus of production, consump-
tion, and competition in a way that is unlikely to reverse itself in the life-
time of anyone alive today, and it has brought new forms of risk. Take, 
for instance, products that come from rare earth elements, upstream 
resources used, among other things, in automobile production, petro-
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leum reﬁning, ﬂat panel displays in cell phones, portable digital ver-
satile discs (DVDs) and laptops, magnets, batteries, generators, medi-
cal devices, jet ﬁghter engines, missile guidance systems, antimissile 
defense, and space-based satellites and communication systems. The 
United States used to be self-reliant in domestically produced rare earth 
elements, but over the past 15 years it has become 100 percent reliant 
on imports, primarily from China, largely because of lower-cost opera-
tions there (Humphries 2012).3 
Dependence on upstream resources from foreign countries entails 
potentially enormous economic and political vulnerabilities. Factors 
such as distant natural hazards and accidents, as well as possibly hostile 
foreign political and economic decision makers who control upstream 
resources, threaten the stability of the production processes upon which 
the well-being of segments of local populations depend. Insofar as 
global markets function properly, and no hostilities arise, markets will 
continue to solve some of these risk problems efﬁciently. However, the 
integration of local production processes into global markets means a 
loss of local security for the affected ﬁrms and households. 
The Need for Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
As long as the U.S. and world populations continue to grow, demand 
will continue to increase for new technologies that enable improve-
ments in the efﬁciency and effectiveness with which previously inac-
cessible resources can be utilized. The newly accessible resources will 
in turn enable increasing population growth, with its attendant increases 
in industrial specialization and trade. This is one big reason why inno-
vation and entrepreneurship really matter. Regardless of whether the 
populations of midwestern industrial cities grow, remain stable, or 
shrink, rising national and world populations will put greater demand 
on resources and cause increased competition in markets. Households 
and ﬁrms in these cities can innovate, bring new goods and services to 
market, and either successfully compete in these markets or be excluded 
from them. Alternatively, households or ﬁrms can migrate in search of 
a better set of circumstances, as many have done over the past few 
decades. 
Innovation, which is arguably the most desirable prospect for ﬁrms 
and the households that depend on them, can be seen in the central 
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Ohio automotive cluster, which has been able to maintain a competi-
tive advantage over alternative locations that might offer better labor 
or input costs by focusing on high-value-added manufacturing. As Hill, 
Samuel, and Stewart (2008) explain: 
The traditional ways in which manufacturers have tried to add 
value to products have been to offer better quality, lower cost or 
more speed or dependability in meeting just-in-time demands. 
These factors have become business necessities: Delivery reliabil-
ity, quality and cost are now standard. The new value opportunities 
lie in customer experience, supply risk, and product and process 
innovation. The quality of the business relationship, the support 
for innovation, and the drive to minimize supply risk perhaps best 
explain why some OEMS [original equipment manufacturers] are 
succeeding and others are struggling. New domestics like Honda 
of America Manufacturing [located in central OH] tend to nurture 
a close relationship with their chosen suppliers, even providing 
access to the production lines in order to improve not only product 
but process. Tier 1 suppliers spoke favorably of customer com-
panies that exhibited willingness to work with them on product 
development and pricing. This kind of close relationship has real 
economic beneﬁt in that it helps reduce risk and spur innovation. 
(pp. 12–13) 
Technology has always been a driving force for economic change, 
and Freeman (1989) classiﬁes the latest shifts attributable to informa-
tion and communication as the fourth major technological revolution. 
This fourth phase adds to the textile innovations of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, railroads in the mid to late nineteenth 
century, and electricity as well as the internal combustion engine dur-
ing the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The most recent 
transition has accelerated the development of international markets and 
powerful multinational and global corporations, and has fostered a new 
economic climate that features the rise of the service sector, the loss of 
prominence for manufacturing, and widespread consumerism. 
Castells (1996) notes that this latest movement has been multidi-
mensional in nature, but that a new paradigm rooted in major advance-
ments within information and communication technologies lies at its 
heart. These technological improvements have vastly increased the 
integration of the existing world economy and created a new global-
ized economy. While the previous international economy experienced 
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capital accumulation that ﬂowed between countries, the new global-
ized economy differs in that its “core components have the institutional, 
organizational, and technological capacity to work as a unit in real time, 
or in chosen time, on a planetary scale” (p. 102). 
The process of industrial globalization is characterized by connec-
tions within national markets via consumers, production processes, and 
the expansion of market competition (Wiersema and Bowen 2008). In 
turn, consumers and the productive activities of ﬁrms are linked through 
globalized industries, which make products and services ever more stan-
dardized through increasingly homogenized consumer preferences and 
global economies of scale in both manufacturing and research and devel-
opment (Wiersema and Bowen 2008). During the latter half of the twen-
tieth century, globalization was also aided by government policies favor-
ing deregulation and free market principles (Castells 2000; Singh 1994); 
reduced trade barriers and costs of international transportation and com-
munications (Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 1999; Krueger 1995); increased 
integration of global capital markets (Sachs et al. 1995); greater capital 
mobility and reduced transaction costs; and a larger number of ﬁnancial 
instruments (Irwin 1996). All of these changes have unalterably affected 
the markets within which midwestern industries must compete.
The Outcomes of Globalization 
By the 1990s, many developing countries had been brought into the 
world economy, with increases in foreign direct investment, technol-
ogy transfer, and production efﬁciencies (McMillan and Rodrik 2011). 
This world market has, among other things, resulted in the breakdown 
of the traditional, vertically integrated “Fordist” production process, 
which formed the core of the U.S. manufacturing sector in the middle of 
the twentieth century (Feenstra 1998), and in the growth of specializa-
tion by individual countries on certain phases of production (Hummels, 
Ishii, and Yi 1999). The outcomes of globalization have also included 
increased levels of regional, national, and global competition (Wiersema 
and Bowen 2008), cross-border mergers and acquisitions (UNCTAD 
1987–1999), and the growth of multinational ﬁrms (Wiersema and 
Bowen 2008). Collectively, these outcomes have negatively impacted 
the economies of midwestern industrial cities, partially by increasing 
competition in product markets, and partially by concentrating the cen-
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ters of ﬁnancial control in fewer and fewer world cities, exacerbating 
the decline that began during the 1960s and 1970s. Integration of the 
developing countries into the world economy all but guarantees that the 
population and productive output of the United States in general, and 
of midwestern industrial cities in particular, will continue to steadily 
shrink as a share of the world’s total (Jackson and Howe 2008).4 
Newly structured global-scale corporations have seized upon 
before-unseen economies of scale in production, distribution, market-
ing, and management, giving way to a new level of world consumerism 
that was a death knell for many previously thriving midwestern ﬁrms 
that did not or could not operate on this scale (Levitt 1983). The global 
corporation is a more advanced entity than the multinational corpora-
tion, and one that “operates with resolute consistency—at a low relative 
cost—as if the entire world (or major regions of it) were a single entity; 
it sells the same things in the same way everywhere” (Levitt 1983, p. 
92). While global competition has forced U.S. ﬁrms to be more produc-
tive and efﬁcient (Hill, Samuel, and Stewart 2008), these beneﬁ ts have 
not come without high costs, including stagnating wage rates (Law-
rence and Slaughter 1993) and lost manufacturing jobs (Levitt 1983), 
which contributed to the decline of cities and regions that were once 
industrial powerhouses, such as those in the Midwest. 
The “new economy” that had more or less fully emerged by the 
1990s was integrated as never before in history at a global scale. It 
was rooted in global knowledge and ideas, with wealth and job creation 
tied to innovation and technology in all sectors of the economy (Acs, 
de Groot, and Nijkamp 2002; Atkinson and Gottlieb 2001). Electricity 
and the electrical engine helped bolster the industrial-based economy 
that allowed cities such as Cleveland and Detroit to prosper during 
the early and middle decades of the twentieth century. Similarly, the 
new knowledge-centric economy has been driven by microelectronics, 
computing, and digital communication advancements, including the 
Internet and extensive software developments, which have spurred the 
growth of places like Silicon Valley and the Research Triangle (Castells 
1996). The infrastructure and transportation linkages that created com-
parative advantages for many midwestern cities during the early part of 
the twentieth century were crucial to the success of their manufactur-
ing industries. But these linkages were less important to burgeoning 
knowledge-intensive industries that rely heavily on human capital to 
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create a competitive advantage, and that are are primarily service- rather 
than production-oriented while competing at a global scale. 
Another major component of this “new economy” was the momen-
tous shift from manufacturing to the service sector, leading to a new 
industrial structure for many regions within the United States. The 
demise of the global dominance of the U.S. manufacturing sector began 
in the late twentieth century, during a period when developing countries 
experienced signiﬁcant gains in technical skills and closed education 
gaps that previously existed with other nations, particularly in industrial 
and engineering ﬁelds; this was accomplished by developing infrastruc-
ture within universities, technical institutions, and vocational training 
schools (Singh 1994). These knowledge and infrastructure gains, cou-
pled with rapid capital mobility, allowed U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms to 
exploit the regulatory, trade, wage, and environmental policies present 
within many developing countries by either relocating there or subcon-
tracting through ﬁrms within those areas (Feenstra 1998). Furthermore, 
changes from recent technological innovations also directly affected 
the operations of the manufacturing sector through the expansion of 
new products, reduced costs, a reorganization of ﬁrms and industries, 
improved structure and efﬁciencies of large factories and ﬁ rms, changes 
in production systems, ﬂexible specialization, and the introduction of 
just-in-time production (Singh 1994). 
The multidimensional forces of globalization that propelled a shift 
in industrial structure for many regions within the United States also 
helped to trigger a new, heavily bifurcated occupational structure, com-
posed of higher-wage information technology jobs and lower-wage 
service sector occupations, and the decline of mid-wage, blue-collar 
manufacturing positions. A steady drop in both plant and ﬁrm sizes was 
seen in manufacturing throughout the United States and other western 
industrialized nations, which resulted from a combination of reduced 
noncore business activities and new computer-based technologies that 
improved productivity (Carlsson 1989). 
The transition we have described means a larger-scale, more 
integrated, technologically intensive, knowledge-based, and service-
oriented world economic order. As the inﬂuence of China, and to a 
lesser degree India and Brazil, continues to grow, the U.S. economic 
system in general, and the midwestern economic systems in particular, 
will surely play a less dominant role on the world stage. But we do not 
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see this as a cause for alarm. There is no convincing evidence that the 
inhabitants of cities with greater economic dominance in world markets 
fare better than residents in cities with lesser dominance.5 Goals, objec-
tives, and policies oriented toward improved quality of life for residents 
rather than attainment or reattainment of economic dominance appear 
to offer greater promise for the future of midwestern industrial cities. 
NEW STRATEGIES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR PROSPERITY
 In general terms, the global economic transition is driven by popu-
lation growth together with technological progress, but in its details it 
is complex beyond human understanding. The transition is inseparable 
from the myriad of day-to-day decisions by unimaginably large numbers 
of individuals throughout the economic world order. The disconcert-
ing and sometimes frustrating experience of uncertainty in the face of 
change felt within midwestern industrial cities is no doubt exacerbated 
by the belief that these cities will not in the twenty-ﬁrst century regain 
the world-level preeminence they enjoyed in the twentieth century. 
As a consequence, a sense of social and economic crisis and bewil-
derment is common today in many midwestern industrial cities and 
elsewhere. Within these places, there is a widespread perception of loss 
of past prosperity and a diminished feeling of well-being. A frequently 
shared view is that things used to be better, and public policies and pro-
grams must be devised and implemented to restore previous levels of 
afﬂuence. Yet there is little agreement on what speciﬁc actions should 
be taken to this end. Public policy proposals differ vastly, not only in 
terms of what actions should be taken, but also who should initiate and 
take responsibility for them, and who should pay for them. Moreover, 
efforts to sort through and interpret the multitudes of inconsistent and at 
times even contradictory facts, rules, norms, and interests served by any 
given proposal tend to leave people frustrated, sometimes even those of 
us who have dedicated our work lives to studying cities and public poli-
cies. We are presented with a predicament in which we encounter con-
ceptualizations and relationships among multiple interdependent vari-
ables, all of which are necessary to think coherently about the renewal 
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of prosperity in these cities, but which when taken together exceed our 
unaided mental powers to meaningfully evaluate. 
This book is predicated on the perspective that while midwestern 
industrial cities will not remain globally preeminent, they need not 
necessarily continue to experience diminished prosperity. Although the 
time and circumstances since the heyday of midwestern industrial dom-
ination have changed and sociotechnical systems have become larger 
scale and more complex, the foundations of renewed prosperity may 
stem today, much as they always have, from a vibrant market economy. 
Capitalistic markets are a central phenomenon of modern life. They, 
and the institutional frameworks that enable and sustain them, such as 
the U.S. Constitution, are arguably more than a little responsible for the 
initial rise of prosperity in industrial cities in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries. 
The Importance of the Market 
Capitalistic markets are in no small measure the cause of wealth and 
productivity increases and are the vehicle that has made a much broader 
array of goods and services accessible to many more people than ever 
before. Capitalistic markets and their institutional frameworks have 
been the source of technological advancements, a previously unimagi-
nable range of choice of occupation and lifestyle, and unprecedented 
levels of happiness and well-being enjoyed by a relatively large per-
centage of the population today (Stevenson and Wolfers 2008, Nelson 
1990, Ridley 2010). Perhaps most importantly, these markets, together 
with their enabling institutions, have arguably given rise to unprece-
dented access to more and better information. Consequently, examina-
tion of these markets, their institutional frameworks, and their effects 
on prosperity from various political and disciplinary perspectives (and 
from perspectives that transcend normal disciplinary boundaries) is too 
important to be left only to economists and public policymakers, largely 
because they involve a great deal more than what we typically think of 
as “economic” and “political” issues. 
Of course, not everyone has conﬁdence that unfettered markets and 
free institutions alone can or will renew prosperity in today’s midwest-
ern industrial cities, especially without exacerbating other problems, 
such as distributional inequities between class and race. Indeed, the 
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concept of a capitalist market is merely a model or abstraction from 
reality that helps us to represent and grasp some key elements of our 
societies and their relationships to one another. Moreover, this model 
may not be an altogether adequate one. It neglects to consider a range 
of political and social realities that depart from premises of consumer 
choice and decentralized decision making. For instance, it does not pro-
vide guidance on how and when societies should regulate monopolies 
or provide infrastructure. It tends to come up short as to how or when 
societies should respond to problems of extreme income inequality and 
inequity. It provides no reason to have compassion for ﬁrms that go 
under or for individual households that have been placed at risk for 
homelessness and unemployment as a result of market efﬁciencies. 
The ideal type of capitalistic market makes certain assumptions 
about private property, exchange between legally free individuals, and 
the production and distribution of goods and services through mutual 
understandings and agreements between transacting parties to market 
transactions. The assumptions about private property, in turn, presup-
pose the existence of governmental authority to design and establish 
laws and property rights, and police power for the enforcement of those 
laws and rights. The assumptions about exchange between legally free 
individuals presuppose that people possess certain rights that meaning-
fully distinguish them from serfs or slaves, and that labor is not forcibly 
extracted from them through the exercise of superior political author-
ity or power. The assumptions about the production and distribution of 
goods presuppose that decisions to exchange are not made by custom 
or through the coercive use of power by any sort of centralized author-
ity. In turn, all of these assumptions are open to question, if in no other 
way than in their applicability in any given situation or set of situations, 
including the renewal of prosperity in midwestern industrial cities. 
The Role of Public Policy 
Nevertheless, some suppositions must always be made prior to any 
systematic examination of a phenomenon. In this book, the assumption 
throughout all of the individual contributions is that while capitalistic 
markets provide the only tried and tested method of achieving pros-
perity, they have certain imperfections for which public policies are 
at times necessary. Furthermore, all of the contributions are consistent 
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with the following propositions: that augmented production (rather than 
consumption) and exchange of goods and services within the context of 
free institutions offer the best long-term solution to the social and eco-
nomic problems of Rust Belt regions;6 that the development of renewed 
productive capacity in these regions will in the ﬁrst instance require 
up-front investments of time, attention and energy, and in the second 
instance ﬁnancial capital; that many of the most important resources 
and factors in the production of capital goods are not and will never be 
completely mobile with respect to space and time; and that therefore net 
increases in regional prosperity necessitate urban institutions, public 
policies, practices, and cultures willing and able to divert into enhanced 
production input resources that would otherwise go to goods and ser-
vices that are immediately consumed. 
All of the contributions assume conﬁdence in public policies and 
institutions supportive of innovation, entrepreneurship, specialization, 
and trade as the best route to renewed regional prosperity. But just as 
markets have certain limitations, so do public policies. Not all public 
policies are conducive to renewed prosperity; indeed, as the following 
chapters discuss, even some of those public policies advocated in terms 
of their positive effects on midwestern regional economic development 
may do more harm than good. 
We hope that the chapters in this book can avoid getting narrowly 
associated with labels such as “conservative” or “liberal.” The focus is 
on how older industrial regional systems really work and what can and 
should be (and what cannot and should not be) done through both public 
institutions and private markets in efforts to improve their performance. 
How might urban policy be used to renew and update capitalist markets 
so as to put old industrial regions back on the road to prosperity? What 
mix of market versus nonmarket allocation mechanisms is optimal? 
How can and do free people in such regions, living in democratic capi-
talist systems, solve problems to meet the needs and wants of others, so 
as to turn their perceptions of scarcity and loss into ones of abundance? 
Reframing Prosperity 
When thinking of prosperous places, we may invoke images that 
translate to a high quality of life and living standards, such as vibrant 
artistic, musical, and literary communities; entertainment districts with 
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a relatively high number of restaurants, bars, and cultural institutions; 
an environment with great parks, green spaces, and recreational activi-
ties; accessible, convenient, and affordable transportation; good schools 
and universities; and low rates of poverty, with high levels of employ-
ment. This is not an exhaustive list, nor are these characteristics only 
found in places such as New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles.  
It seems to us that an important component of prosperity centers 
on reframing this concept. The economic dominance that was previ-
ously associated with many midwestern industrial cities is unlikely to 
reemerge, especially in light of the previously discussed transitions and 
the inﬂuence of growing economies such as China and India. How-
ever, it is important to note that prosperity need not be exclusively tied 
with economic dominance. Rather, the idea of a prosperous city is that 
most if not all of the people who live in it have good lives. In the spirit 
of Amartya Sen (1999), the people in a prosperous city have the free-
dom to live the kinds of lives they value. They see themselves as active 
participants in shaping their own futures and by taking initiative and 
accepting the responsibility for themselves and their actions, they have 
the opportunity to better themselves and the prospects faced by their 
children. There are numerous examples of urban and regional econo-
mies that have attained high levels of prosperity without economic pre-
eminence, and there is an abundance of knowledge available to help 
to turn the problems currently facing midwestern industrial cities into 
opportunities. This book is all about such knowledge. 
The concept of prosperity, which is traditionally linked to wealth 
and measured in terms of income, unemployment, and poverty rates, 
may be meaningfully and fruitfully reexamined with a more compre-
hensive approach, one that deemphasizes consumptive aspects and 
focuses on productive ones, as well as on the social, psychological, and 
health-related components (Bergmann 2010; Fodor 2001, 2012; Hamil-
ton 2003; Jackson 2009; Sen 1999). In particular, the emerging policies 
and practices of smart decline and right-sizing are working to address 
the unique realities facing formerly dominant industrial cities, which 
include planning for fewer people, buildings, and land uses, as well as 
better aligning physical landscapes to meet the needs of future popula-
tions (Hollander 2011; Popper and Popper 2002; Schilling and Logan 
2008). Furthermore, there is evidence that slower-growing metropoli-
tan statistical areas (MSAs), in terms of population, outperform higher-
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growth MSAs on many measures of prosperity, including income and 
poverty rates (Fodor 2012). 
Within the realm of midwestern industrial cities, achieving pros-
perity will require the leadership within cities and regions to broaden 
their focus from past models targeted at economic dominance and heav-
ily focused on short-term economic development strategies. While the 
consideration of short-term strategies inclusive of business attraction, 
retention, and expansion is warranted, these transactions need to be 
linked to strengthening and improving the assets within the region’s 
larger portfolio of products, businesses, and people.7 Past actions of the 
leadership within many cities and regions have tended to be based on the 
overriding importance and inevitability of increasing globalization and 
the argument that, to be competitive in world markets, cities must com-
pete for footloose industry not tied to any particular location or country, 
which can relocate in response to local economic conditions. Striving 
to succeed in globally competitive markets at all costs has proved less 
than successful for many places and has served to intensify levels of 
inequality among cities and among social strata within cities. Many 
of the economic development strategies adopted in efforts to compete 
for footloose investment tend to be short-term in nature and to focus 
on immediate needs as well as politically marketable achievements, 
such as job creation and growth of tax bases. While these approaches 
may produce some desired outcomes, they fail to address the longer-
term components of a comprehensive economic development strategy, 
which moves beyond selling the existing assets of a region and toward 
improving, strengthening, and changing assets for long-term prosperity. 
This book is predicated upon the assumption that renewed prosper-
ity is feasible in midwestern industrial cities if (and only if) good deci-
sions are made within them by individuals with inﬂuence in both the 
public and private sectors. Moreover, restructured public policy, espe-
cially microeconomic policy, is essential, as well as increased levels of 
international business exchange, especially with the Chinese. 
The Industrial Revolution changed the economic world order by 
giving prominence to cities, regions, and nations that could adapt their 
governance structures and the organizational processes through which 
they made collective choices toward the power of free markets and pri-
vate, personal industry, and innovation. By empowering the individu-
als within local economic systems, the Industrial Revolution empow-
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ered the cities, regions, and nations it affected. It led to a system in 
which nothing will improve the fortunes of ﬁrms and individuals more 
effectively and efﬁciently than public and private sector decisions that 
increase production of the goods and services people value and the 
exchange of such goods and services in free and competitive markets. 
This is as true for midwestern industrial cities today as it was during 
their inception, as it was for Chinese cities during their recent economic 
miracle, and as it is for cities throughout the global economic system. 
Notes 
1. Measured in constant 2005 dollars (http://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/ 
usgdp/result.php). 
2. GATT later became the World Trade Organization (WTO), which today sets the 
ground rules for international commerce. 
3. Such considerations have recently given rise to the President’s National Stra-
tegy for Global Supply Chain Security (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press 
-ofﬁce/2012/01/25/fact-sheet-national-strategy-global-supply-chain-security). 
4. The rate of growth of the U.S. population, along with the rates of growth of other 
advanced industrial nations such as Japan and Germany, is slowing down some-
what relative to the rate of growth of the world population overall. Partially this 
relative shrinkage is attributable to the high growth rates in Africa and India. Par-
tially it is also attributable to fertility declines that have historically been found to 
go hand in hand with the development of wealthy and advanced industrial econ-
omies (Guinnane 2011). Various theories of fertility decline have been brought 
forward to explain population growth rate declines, including ones that attribute 
them to factors such as the availability of contraceptives, women’s decisions to 
postpone childbirth, the relatively high cost of raising children in advanced indus-
trial economies, and more women choosing to remain in the workforce rather 
than have children (Becker, Murphy, and Tamura 1990; Bryant 2007; Galor 2012; 
Guinnane 2011). 
5. Indeed, the “global-city hypothesis” (Friedmann 1986) asserts that the most eco-
nomically dominant cities are especially prone to extremes of inequality. 
6. For a thoughtful, stimulating, and informative argument that far from being the 
path to prosperity, society’s orientation toward consumption is at the heart of our 
social ills, see Hamilton (2003). 
7. This conceptualization of a regional economic development framework stems 
from multiple lectures and discussions with Ned Hill. 
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Can Tax Expenditures Stimulate 
Growth in Rust Belt Cities? 
Benjamin Y. Clark 
Cleveland State University 
An oft-used arrow in the quiver of those overseeing local and 
regional economic development is the incentivization of tax expen-
ditures (public investment via tax abatements and credits, infra-
structure improvements, and workforce training). Most states and 
communities, including those in the Rust Belt, participate in the 
game to some extent, leading to competition for promised jobs and 
economic activity. Despite the willingness to offer such incentives, 
there is at best scant evidence that these incentives are an efﬁcient 
use of public funds. 
Why do some cities thrive economically and others sputter and 
decline? Are success and failure dependent on luck, or is there some-
thing more profound at play? While there are many ways to address 
these issues, and certainly many contributing factors, this chapter will 
examine one part of the question: Can tax expenditures play a role in 
stimulating the growth of these cities? Consideration of the role of tax 
rates, rather than tax expenditures, is also important but is outside the 
scope of this chapter. Instead, the discussion will focus on how and why 
state and local governments use tax expenditures to attempt to improve 
the conditions of their communities. 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate that tax expenditure policy is a 
highly inconsistent use of public funds. Local governments are at the 
mercy of a larger macroeconomic environment, over which they have 
little inﬂuence (Rubin and Rubin 1987). The lack of control leaves 
localities with few tools to create positive change in their communities. 
The device that these governments often turn to is tax expenditures. 
As will be indicated, unfortunately, tax expenditures have been dem-
37 
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onstrated for the most part to play little-to-no role in positive economic 
development. Further, despite this evidence, politicians continue to see 
tax expenditures as one of the most important options available to them. 
Using a case study of an intraregional corporate headquarters move, 
this chapter will investigate how competition among jurisdictions trans-
fers wealth, yet creates few, if any, beneﬁts. It then explores how cit-
ies, counties, and other countries are dealing with the competition for 
jobs that leads to tax expenditures and associated movements of wealth. 
Finally, there will be a brief examination of some alternative economic 
development tools that do not result in the large shifts of wealth associ-
ated with tax expenditures. 
WHAT ARE TAX EXPENDITURES? 
The bundle of tools that state and local government ofﬁcials use 
within the tax code to try to encourage development are called tax 
expenditures; they may also be viewed simply as spending that has been 
initiated through the tax code. Surrey (1970, p. 706) describes them as 
“special provisions . . . which represent government expenditures made 
through [the tax] system to achieve various social and economic objec-
tives.” The state of Ohio’s Executive Budget describes tax expenditures 
in the following way: 
Both tax expenditures and direct budgetary expenditures incur a 
cost to the state in order to accomplish public policy goals. Unlike 
direct budgetary expenditures, unless there is a pre-existing ter-
mination date, tax expenditures may remain in effect indeﬁnitely 
with little or no scrutiny by policy makers. In most states, tax 
expenditures are not analyzed and reviewed as part of the budget 
appropriation process; Ohio is one of the relatively few states that 
do produce a tax expenditure report in conjunction with the state 
budget. It is probably safe to assume that if it were not for this 
report, the ﬁscal impact of the various Ohio tax expenditure provi-
sions would not be systematically estimated (Testa 2011, p. 1). 
Tax expenditures include tax deductions, tax abatements, and tax 
credits. Two examples are the federal mortgage interest deduction and 
hybrid car tax credits. While there is a general belief that the original 
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goal of the mortgage deduction was to encourage homeownership, the 
subsidy came about largely by accident (Lowenstein 2006). Though the 
origin may have been accidental, the inability of opponents in Congress 
to rid the tax code of this tax expenditure could largely be tied to the 
myth that it is the backbone of increasing homeownership. The beneﬁts 
generated from the mortgage interest deduction accrue to those that 
own homes, have mortgages, and itemize their tax returns—which ends 
up being about 37 million people, or about half of the individuals who 
own homes (Lowenstein 2006). It does not directly beneﬁt renters or 
even the lower-income homeowners who do not make enough money 
to itemize their deductions. 
In a less accidental turn of events, the early adopters of the Toyota 
Prius received tax credits the year they purchased the car. The size of 
this hybrid car credit varied from year to year, but it provided a direct 
subsidy, through the tax system, that encouraged the ownership of fuel-
efﬁcient automobiles. And like spending on roads or other goods and 
services, all tax expenditures are transfers of resources from one group 
to a designated priority; however, in the case of tax expenditures, the 
wealth transfers are manifested in lower tax payments for select groups 
or ﬁrms. 
Tax expenditures are found at all levels of government. State and 
local governments have been using tax expenditures to lure and develop 
businesses since colonial times—in fact, Alexander Hamilton was the 
beneﬁciary of a tax expenditure by New Jersey in 1791 to locate a fac-
tory in the state (Buss 2001). Despite the long history of tax expendi-
tures in the United States, it was not until after the end of World War II 
that their use gained signiﬁcant traction. The changing political moods 
of the 1980s and 1990s further fueled the practice, leading many to see 
tax expenditures as “free money,” by simplifying them as foregone rev-
enues rather than a true expense. 
The ﬂawed view of tax expenditures is problematic for budgeting 
and makes ﬁscal policy evaluation exceedingly difﬁcult. Some states, 
such as Ohio (where the case study in this chapter takes place), do try 
and estimate the budget impact of tax expenditures. Further, the evi-
dence, even if it may not be precise, presents a story of a big bud-
get hole, $7.4 billion in ﬁscal year 2012 and $7.8 billion in ﬁ scal year 
2013 of “foregone revenues” or tax expenditures for Ohio (Testa 2011, 
p. 9). Taken together, at more than $15 billion, Ohio would not have 
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had a deﬁcit to work around for the biannual budget for ﬁ scal years 
2012–2013 and would have actually been in surplus for both years. The 
magnitudes for local governments will clearly be much smaller, but the 
comparative impacts can be just as large. 
States often “prefer not to evaluate tax incentive programs in any 
way,” thus avoiding the difﬁcult question of their effectiveness (Buss 
2001, p. 93). Rigorous evaluations are often requested when direct 
expenditure subsidies are provided to individuals or businesses (i.e., 
grants, food stamps, welfare checks), but they are frequently not 
required when tax expenditures are being considered (Buss 2001). This 
results in a huge void in our understanding of their impact on the ﬁs-
cal condition at all levels of government. The state of Ohio report on 
tax expenditures speciﬁ cally states that it “offers no conclusions about 
the validity of those expenditures. The responsibility of evaluating the 
expenditure’s merit with regard to public policy belongs jointly to the 
General Assembly and the Governor” (Testa 2011, p. 1). 
Neither of the preceding parties has offered a comprehensive in-
depth analysis of the effectiveness of these programs. This demon-
strates that, even in a state that has made efforts to actually account for 
and report on the size of the tax expenditure budget, there still remains 
a huge hole in our understanding of how effective these policies are at 
achieving their goals. More broadly, however, tax expenditures decrease 
the transparency of government budgets. Tax expenditures “allow poli-
ticians to appear to be reducing the size of government (reducing taxes) 
while actually increasing it (increasing spending)” (Steuerle 2000, p. 
1639). 
At the local level, tax abatements are one of the most common 
types of tax expenditures. Tax abatements are the product of a process 
that is both bureaucratic and political in nature and result in lowering 
the property tax burden on speciﬁc parcels of land. The political aspect 
of tax abatements demonstrates how they are meant for more than just 
tax relief, to encourage redevelopment of an area or economic growth 
more broadly (Dalehite, Mikesell, and Zorn 2005). Finding a compre-
hensive study of a state’s local tax expenditures is not possible. States 
that allow tax expenditures at the local level have “established the ﬁscal 
framework under which local governments operate, including determi-
nation of the tax options available to them and the extent to which those 
governments may adopt exceptions to the general structure” (Mikesell 
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2002, p. 41). While some states track major local taxes, “local tax 
expenditures are not detailed to particular local governments” (p. 41). 
What this all means for state and local governments is that they need to 
allocate more resources to investigate the effectiveness of tax expendi-
tures if they are going to use them—something that just is not happen-
ing right now. 
Why Are Tax Expenditures Being Used? Are They Effective? 
Poor and rich cities alike have been employing tax expenditures to 
attempt to spur economic development across the country, and not just 
in the Rust Belt. The strategy is used to encourage development and 
attract new jobs, under the assumption that if net taxes (taxes minus all 
tax expenditures) in one city are higher than in its neighbor’s, jobs will 
ﬂow to the jurisdiction with the lower net tax rate. 
Unfortunately, this generally accepted and overly simplistic notion 
is not consistent with the evidence. Aﬁrm’s decision to locate in a com-
munity (leading to an inﬂow of jobs to that community) is far more 
complex than making a comparison of taxes across jurisdictions (Chi 
and Hoffmann 2000; Wassmer 2007). The location decision-making 
process falls under a much broader concept of business climate— 
although there is signiﬁcant disagreement over how we can actually 
measure climate—but it typically includes the quality of life, govern-
ment policies, and the quality and cost of resources (Buss 2001). Some 
business climate measures amount to seeking out the state with the low-
est wages, taxes, and utility cost, paired with the weakest regulations, 
the absence of a unionized workforce, and high subsidies for capital 
(p. 98). However, it is clear that if that were the only possible determi-
nant for ﬁrm location, the states with the nation’s highest tax burdens, 
such as New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut, would be without 
employers, and that is clearly not the case. 
What does have a clearer connection to a ﬁrm’s location decision 
is the linkage between the levels of revenue collected and the services 
provided by a jurisdiction. Consequently, the bundle of features a ﬁrm 
seeks out, including tax rates and expenditures, involves not just the 
taxes, but the taxes and level of service provided (Buss 2001). As with 
any sort of investment, ﬁrms seek ones (in this case, in their location) 
that will bring the biggest “bang for their buck,”where most are willing 
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to pay a higher tax rate if the service they are receiving is also higher 
quality or more comprehensive. 
The Impact of Tax Expenditures 
Ideally, investments yield positive returns. Similarly, the appropri-
ate use of tax expenditures “should produce economic beneﬁ ts greater 
than [their] costs. An even better [tax expenditure] is one that is cost-
effective, meaning that it delivers more beneﬁts for a given cost than 
other similarly targeted initiatives” (Weiner 2009, p. 6). Tax expendi-
tures, particularly those targeted at large ﬁrms, have failed “to produce 
signiﬁcant net beneﬁts for their host communities, calling into question 
the high-stakes bidding war over jobs and investment” (Fox and Mur-
ray 2004, p. 78). Weiner (2009) shows that “for each dollar of credit 
granted, states usually collect less than one dollar in new tax revenue. 
Thus most credits do not appear to ‘pay for themselves.’ It is therefore 
important to understand the beneﬁts states are gaining for the revenues 
they are giving up” (p. 4). 
The discussion of beneﬁts foregone is often one that is not had by 
states and local governments. A great deal of effort goes into crafting 
tax expenditure policies, for little or no payoff, while much of what 
affects local/regional economic growth (labor costs, skilled workers, 
energy cost, natural resources, or climate) is beyond the control of these 
governments (Bradbury, Kodrzycki, and Tannenwald 1997). 
When a government entices a large ﬁrm to move to a particular 
jurisdiction with a host of incentives, including tax expenditures, “the 
location of a large company can crowd out other economic activity by 
shifting sales from existing ﬁrms, congesting local infrastructure, and 
raising prices in factor markets” (Fox and Murray 2004, p. 79). A large 
organization locating in an area can create a diminishing return (Fox and 
Murray 2004; Porter 1999). This may come about because a large ﬁrm 
may choose to locate in an area without other signiﬁcant competition in 
order to dominate that place and discourage other large companies from 
locating there (Fox and Murray 2004); these businesses may actually be 
hampering further economic development, rather than encouraging it. 
Examples of this can be seen in Mercedes-Benz locating in Tusca-
loosa County, Alabama (where the ﬁrm claims to be the “state’s larg-
est exporter, with more than $1 billion exported each year to countries 
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throughout the world” [MBUSI 2011]); and BMW in Spartanburg, 
South Carolina (where the company asserts that it is “one of several 
powerful engines driving the state’s growth” [BMW 2011]); and Volk-
swagen in Chattanooga, Tennessee (where the “plant is expected to gen-
erate $12 billion in income growth and an additional 9,500 jobs related 
to the project” [Volkswagen Group of America 2011]); and Kia Motors 
locating in West Point, Georgia (where the “project is the largest in his-
tory for the State of Georgia” [KIA Motors 2011]). 
The incentive packages that these ﬁrms received were substantial, 
but they were only a small part of the ﬁrms’ decision-making process. 
Ultimately, the data on ﬁrm site selection show that “the location of a 
large ﬁ rm has no measurable net economic effect on local economies” 
if it is examined holistically (Fox and Murray 2004, p. 79). This means 
that the aggressive effort to recruit ﬁrms “fails to create positive pri-
vate sector gains and likely does not generate signiﬁcant public revenue 
gains either” (p. 79). This can be interpreted to mean that the siting of 
a ﬁrm, often lauded as a major “win” by state and local development 
agents, may not actually have the great effect promised. Because “there 
is little evidence of positive or negative growth impacts associated with 
the location of large ﬁrms,” local governments should instead try to 
make more cost-effective economic strategic moves (p. 91). 
The big “win,” as seen in high-proﬁle “mega-events” like the Super 
Bowl and Olympics, which cities constantly ﬁght over, also provides 
very little help in spurring economic development. Activities like the 
Super Bowl or Olympics “have no real effects on spending in host com-
munities,” a result that can in part be blamed on the “crowding-out phe-
nomenon,” where long-term economic activity and investments lose 
out to short-term jobs (Fox and Murray 2004, p. 79). 
Distributional Issues
The intent of many property tax abatements is to draw employers to 
an area that might have otherwise been ignored; this can help to create 
conditions that improve economic equality. When the tax expenditures 
are constrained only to high-poverty and high-unemployment areas, 
research suggests that tax expenditures can provide a disproportionate 
beneﬁt to minorities and low-income individuals (Bartik 2007; Peters 
and Fisher 2004; Wassmer 2007; Wassmer and Anderson 2001). 
Bowen.indb 44  12/16/2013 2:13:44 PM   
 
 
 
 
 
  
44 Clark 
However, most applications of economic-development-oriented tax 
expenditures create an environment of inequality (Bradbury, Kodrzycki, 
and Tannenwald 1997; Chi and Hoffmann 2000; Goss and Phillips 
1999; Greenbaum, Russell, and Petras 2010; Kocieniewski 2011; Reese 
1991; Reese and Sands 2006; Wassmer 2007). Tax expenditure policies 
tend to exacerbate inequality across a region, rather than abate it. The 
wealthy jurisdictions can afford tax expenditures that the poor ones can-
not, which can lead to the rich getting richer (more jobs and economic 
development) and the poor jurisdictions getting poorer (Dewar 1998; 
Goss and Phillips 1999; Reese 1991; Reese and Sands 2006). This is 
not to say that poor cities are not using tax expenditures, but that these 
expenditures often put additional stress on communities in an already 
difﬁcult ﬁnancial position (Rubin and Rubin 1987). For rich and poor 
cities alike, these incentives rarely provide the beneﬁt they promise, 
and those beneﬁts they do provide rarely exceed the costs (Reese and 
Sands 2006; Wassmer and Anderson 2001). 
Moreover, the beneﬁts associated with tax expenditures tend not to 
accumulate where policymakers state they are supposed to accummu-
late (which is often in economically distressed areas). Goss and Phillips 
(2001), for example, ﬁnd that “business tax incentives have had a posi-
tive effect on economic growth in low-unemployment counties, but not 
in high-unemployment counties” (p. 237) and “tended to be undertaken 
in areas with historically higher investment activity, thus contributing to 
greater economic performance differences among counties in the state” 
(p. 217). Tax expenditures have often been “criticized because they are 
only effective at the margins in business location decisions” (Reese and 
Sands 2006, p. 72). Negative relationships have been found between 
some types of tax expenditures and the improvement of a jurisdiction’s 
economic health spanning a 20-year period. While this does not mean 
that in all instances tax expenditures will have a negative impact on a 
jurisdiction, the research indicates that by not using tax expenditures 
jurisdictions are not hindering their growth (Reese and Sands 2006). 
Tax expenditures may foster inequality by favoring one industry 
over another. A great number of tax expenditures concentrate exclu-
sively on manufacturing, but in the process end up ignoring other 
important sectors such as business services, health care, and ﬁnance 
(Buss 2001). 
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At the federal level, the corporate tax system can rightly be con-
sidered both uneven and highly complex (Kocieniewski 2011), in large 
part because of tax expenditures that beneﬁt individual ﬁrms or spe-
ciﬁc industries. The inequity can spread to an intra-industry inequal-
ity, where two companies in the same industry, producing very similar 
products, have different tax rates. This is often a result of the larger ﬁrm 
having more power and wealth, allowing it to have its effective rates 
reduced through new tax expenditures. At the federal level, tax expen-
ditures that “intentionally beneﬁ t speciﬁc companies or industries, cost 
an estimated $100 billion more a year” (Kocieniewski 2011). However, 
Greenbaum, Russell, and Petras (2010) show that when controlling for 
the location of tax expenditures, neither distressed areas nor speciﬁc 
industries were seen to beneﬁt, and that instead tax expenditures (or 
incentives) were distributed in a pattern that “largely reﬂects the local 
industrial mix” (p. 155). This same study did ﬁnd disparities between 
urban and rural areas, where the beneﬁts of tax expenditures accrued at 
higher rates to rural than to urban locales. 
Many who support interjurisdictional competition claim that it 
reduces taxes for all competing jurisdictions. This assertion, however, 
is only valid when jurisdictions “are similarly endowed with taxable 
resources and face similar ﬁscal challenges” (Bradbury, Kodrzycki, 
and Tannenwald 1997, p. 12). Reality tells us that jurisdictions within 
a region are rarely in the same resource/ﬁscal position, because some 
“jurisdictions are continual winners and others perpetual losers in the 
competitive process, especially in the absence of equalizing aid from a 
higher level of government” (p. 12). 
To make matters worse, most states do not have any written guide-
lines for determining how and when tax expenditures to business are 
offered (Chi and Hofmann 2000). This can result in inequality in the 
distribution of tax expenditures and make evaluation of the programs 
very difﬁcult. Iowa, seeing some of the problems in Minnesota, where 
“tax incentives tend to be focused on those areas already primed to do 
well,” limited its tax expenditure program to “business investment in 
areas of the state lagging in economic performance” (Goss and Phillips 
1999, p. 226). Focusing on a particular socioeconomic group does not 
necessarily mean that the tax expenditures will provide a greater beneﬁt 
than cost, but, in terms of creating policy aimed at alleviating inequal-
ity, Iowa at least targets communities in greatest need. 
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Information and Competition 
If tax expenditures are only effective at the margins, as Reese and 
Sands (2006) indicate, a signiﬁcant information asymmetry problem 
arises for local jurisdictions. They are faced with a task of determining 
which of those employers seeking the tax expenditures are the marginal 
cases and which are just seeking additional rents (or proﬁt seeking) for 
a decision they have already made. Unfortunately, these governments 
have no good way to determine which cases are marginal and which are 
not. Traditionally, the outcome of negotiations between a ﬁrm seeking a 
tax expenditure and a local government depends on the relative power 
of the respective sides (Byrnes, Marvel, and Sridhar 1999). If a jurisdic-
tion has little to lose if the ﬁrm leaves, it can certainly try and call the 
ﬁrm’s bluff, wait it out, and hope for the best. 
In Ohio, as the ability to offer tax abatements extends to more juris-
dictions, the competition among these areas leads to larger abatements 
(Cassell and Turner 2010). From 1993 to 2009, nearly half of the 2,059 
tax expenditures in Ohio that were approved by the state Tax Credit 
Authority “were terminated or canceled before completion” (Lieb 
2011). The failure rate to which the state of Ohio is admitting is simply 
pointing out that these projects were terminated or cancelled, not that 
they were actually successful in creating the jobs or economic gains that 
they set out to attain. The current year projection puts tax expenditures 
approved in one year for eight northeast Ohio (the area that includes 
Cleveland/Akron/Canton) projects at $49.5 million over a period of 15 
years (Schoenberger 2011). This results in large sums of money being 
promised for projects over the long term, which come with very high 
incompletion rates. 
While these risky moves may be good for ﬁrms, the evidence that tax 
expenditures provide a net beneﬁt is not very strong. Interjurisdictional 
competition is a zero-sum game, in which companies pit neighboring 
cities against one another for the best deal, and can hardly be described 
as good for development across jurisdictions. The consequences are the 
“job gains” for one city and “job losses” for its neighbor, a strategy 
that does not provide net beneﬁts to the region. And, in many cases, 
the businesses have no intention of moving but just want to get a bet-
ter tax expenditure deal in their current location (Lynch, Fishgold, and 
Blackwood 1996). Wohlgemuth and Kilkenny (1998) note that “acqui-
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escing to the rent-seeking behavior of ﬁrms leads to socially suboptimal 
outcomes” (p. 140). The best case tax expenditures scenario, say Peters 
and Fisher (2004), “is that incentives work about 10 percent of the time, 
and are simply a waste of money the other 90 percent” (p. 32). 
IF TAX EXPENDITURES ARE A LARGELY INEFFECTIVE 
TOOL, WHY ARE THEY USED SO FREQUENTLY? 
If tax expenditures aimed at economic development have at best a 
10 percent success rate, and are a waste of money the other 90 percent 
of the time, why do governments continue to use them? The reason 
appears to be political, rather than their economic value. Although noth-
ing is inherently wrong with a strategy based on politics, tax expendi-
tures programs are frequently sold to the public based on their effective-
ness. It is time that politicians acknowledge that these are frequently 
political actions, not economic ones. 
One reason tax expenditures are used so commonly is that poli-
ticians frequently do not view them as actual outlays of government 
revenues. The ﬁght over what constitutes a tax expenditure and what 
constitutes a tax can pit long-time ideological allies against each other. 
For instance, in 2011, there was a battle over eliminating ethanol tax 
expenditures, which, coincidentally, were commonly referred to as sub-
sidies in the media. Grover Norquist, iconic antitax champion and head 
of the group Americans for Tax Reform, was pitted against Senator Tom 
Coburn, an antitax conservative from Oklahoma, who was himself a 
signatory to Norquist’s famous antitax pledge. Norquist claimed that 
the elimination of ethanol tax expenditures was an increase in taxes for 
farmers and producers. In his view, a tax expenditure was not an expen-
diture at all but a part of the tax rate, so that any attempt to eliminate a 
tax expenditure was actually a tax increase. On the other hand, Senator 
Coburn rightly saw tax expenditures for what they are: spending. As 
a result, two natural allies publicly opposed one another because they 
could not agree on what constitutes an expenditure. This is problematic 
for the government’s ability to manage its ﬁnances and budget. 
While two self-deﬁned ﬁscal conservatives have fought over what 
is and is not a tax expenditure, the broader political marketplace is even 
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murkier. Beyond the debate over the deﬁnition of tax expenditures, our 
political climate in recent decades has made new expenditures very dif-
ﬁ cult to justify. This has led to expenditures masquerading as tax cuts, 
and policymakers pushing for tax expenditures because they are more 
politically palatable than additional spending. 
Job and industry mobility within the United States and internation-
ally, or at least the perception of that mobility, increases the pressure to 
do something (Wolman and Spitzley 1996). However, it appears that 
the fear of relocation is not necessarily based on veriﬁ able reality. Lee 
(2008) ﬁnds “a relatively small role for relocation in explaining the 
disparity of manufacturing employment growth rates across states” (p. 
436). Also, ﬁrms moving from one jurisdiction to another, while not 
uncommon, cannot be explained by the incentive programs trying to 
keep or pull them to or from a jurisdiction. In some situations, these 
incentive programs are even positively correlated with a loss of jobs 
or shuttering of factories. This may just indicate that state and local 
governments are acting too late to keep ﬁrms that are moving jobs, but 
it may also show that tax expenditures simply are not what drives the 
decision to locate or relocate. A number of tax expenditures, particu-
larly those for capital purchases, actually have a negative impact on 
employment because they are making the machinery and equipment 
that replace laborers cheaper, resulting in layoffs (Lee 2008). 
Cutbacks in state and federal intergovernmental aid are putting bur-
dens on local governments to do more with less (Wassmer 2007). At 
the heart of the $1.4 billion budget impasse that shut down the state 
of Minnesota in July 2011 was more than $400 million in cuts to local 
governments (Dunbar 2011). Ohio’s 2011–2013 biennial budget cut 
its support to local governments by nearly half a billion dollars (Mar-
shall 2011). The challenges that many local governments face are not 
just found in shrinking intergovernmental aid, but also in the ways and 
amounts of money that can be raised. Here again politics is a primary 
agent. State lawmakers are compelled to do something, which often 
results in the institution of property tax restrictions that further hin-
der the ability of local governments to raise money. These cutbacks 
and restrictions cause local governments to seek out alternative ways to 
redevelop their economic situation. The result has often been the use of 
tax expenditures policy, “not because it was effective but because it was 
a remarkably easy path to follow, one that allowed [politicians] to claim 
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they were mounting a serious attack on the economic problems of the 
city” (Swanstrom 1985, p. 149). The tax expenditures allow politicians 
“to take a bow for causing some massive private project” or “point to 
towering skyscrapers downtown and say, ‘without my help these never 
would have come about’” (pp. 149–150). 
Often it appears as though “the solutions not only precede the 
problems, they may supersede them and provide their own motiva-
tion” (Rubin and Rubin 1987, p. 57). As a consequence, short-sighted 
public ofﬁcials trying to maximize reelection probabilities “may offer 
more incentives than required. That is, the closer the negotiation with 
business is to an election, the less chance the government ofﬁ cial will 
take in ‘losing’ the business, and the more likely the incentive package 
will be larger” (Byrnes, Marvel, and Sridhar 1999, p. 809). To counter-
act these self-serving political aspirations, adding citizen involvement 
could be beneﬁcial in tax expenditure negotiations with ﬁrms. 
Another element of the political calculation is the number of jobs 
the projects supported by tax expenditures will create. Both politi-
cians and ﬁrms have a motivation to overestimate job numbers to jus-
tify spending. Gabe and Kraybill (2002) ﬁnd that tax expenditure pro-
grams result in ﬁrms on average overestimating the number of jobs the 
tax incentives will create by 28.5 jobs with each facility’s expansion. 
Their results “suggest that [tax expenditure] incentives do not result 
in the creation of more jobs than would have been created without the 
programs” (p. 724). Again, politicians are willing enablers of these 
approaches because they want to be seen doing “something” and want 
to be able to take credit for beneﬁts—if any materialize. Voters are left 
without sufﬁcient information to do post hoc evaluations of these pro-
grams, uncertain if the jobs were created as a result of the tax credits 
or not. The lack of an analysis of the promises made by the companies 
creates an incentive for these organizations to overestimate the beneﬁts 
and to garner larger tax credits. 
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THE CASE OF BROOKLYN, OHIO, AND 
AMERICAN GREETINGS 
The case of American Greetings (AG), the largest publicly traded 
greeting card company in the United States, provides a real-world 
example of the implementation of tax expenditures at the state and local 
levels in an attempt to keep or lure a ﬁrm. The predicament of Brooklyn, 
Ohio, a Cleveland suburb and site of AG’s corporate headquarters, is all 
too familiar. In May of 2009, Brooklyn faced the challenge of choosing 
between drastic cutbacks to services and a tax increase in order to bal-
ance its budget. The citizens of Brooklyn voted, albeit narrowly, to raise 
the local income tax rate from 2.0 to 2.5 percent (Noga 2009). Between 
the time that this tax levy was put onto the ballot and the time that vot-
ers approved the measure, employers Key Bank, Hugo Boss, and AG 
all announced layoffs from their local facilities. In response, the city’s 
leaders pledged that they would reduce the property tax millage from 
6.9 to 5.9 if the income tax rate were increased, as it eventually was 
(Noga 2009). The total property tax rate for a Brooklyn property owner 
would be 75.9 mills for those without exemptions, and considerably 
lower for those who qualiﬁed for exemptions. 
What transpired after the voters of Brooklyn approved the tax 
increase is a story that many cities face every year: AG threatened to 
move its headquarters out of the city because of the tax increase. The 
company stated that although it understood Brooklyn’s predicament, it 
was “disappointed” in the action taken by the city (Cho 2010). AG then 
began a search for a new headquarters to locations not just in northeast 
Ohio, but throughout the nation. In return, Brooklyn promised to lower 
its income tax rate back to the 2 percent level at which it had been prior 
to the voter-approved increase, with some in the government pushing 
for it to be reduced to 1.5 percent. The challenge for Brooklyn Mayor 
Richard Balbier was that “you just can’t take the taxpayers’ money and 
give it to a company” (Cho 2011b). 
By November 2010, AG had narrowed its new headquarters search 
to 15 Ohio sites, most of which were still in the Cleveland area, and 
to one in Chicago. Brooklyn prepared a tax expenditure package that 
would be worth $6.5–$10 million over 15 years (Cho 2011b). The state 
of Ohio got involved by passing a special tax credit for AG to remain 
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in Ohio, signed ceremonially at the AG headquarters by Governor John 
Kasich. In total, the state package prepared to encourage AG to stay in 
Ohio equaled $93.5 million over 15 years (Cho 2011a). Days after this 
tax expenditure package was signed into law, AG announced that it was 
staying in Ohio. 
A few weeks later, on May 20, 2011, AG announced that it was 
moving its headquarters to Westlake, another Cleveland suburb. Coin-
cidentally or not, the new headquarters location is part of a larger devel-
opment that is owned in part by members of the Weiss family, which 
leads AG (McFee 2011). 
The move of AG’s headquarters from Brooklyn to Westlake will 
be a devastating blow to its former home, as 13 percent of that city’s 
revenues, or about $3 million, are generated from AG. Westlake may 
have won out over Brooklyn in part because of a lower tax rate (1.5 
percent rather than Brooklyn’s 2.5 percent), but company ofﬁ cials did 
make it clear that the decision was much larger than taxes. AG wanted 
“an environment that more accurately reﬂects and effectively supports 
our creative and innovative culture” (Cho 2011a). The ﬁrm also had an 
aging headquarters that needed to be replaced. If one considers total 
tax burdens, and not just the income tax, as is often the case, Westlake 
actually has a substantially higher property tax millage of 9.6. The total 
property tax burden for city residents is 100.9 mills, which includes 
city, library, schools, and county taxes (City of Westlake 2011a). 
IF TAXES WERE NOT THE IMPETUS FOR AG LEAVING 
BROOKLYN, THEN WHAT COULD IT BE? 
During the search for a new headquarters, executives of AG consis-
tently stated that “they sought a location that would allow it to recruit 
and retain talent in an atmosphere fostering creativity” (Bullard 2011). 
The ﬁrm’s chief executive ofﬁcer stated that the new location, Crocker 
Park in Westlake, would provide AG with a “lifestyle center that will 
be attractive to our current and future associates. You will be able to 
shop, dine, and ﬁnd a variety of leisure activities nearby. It is easily 
accessible from several local freeways. The amenities and environment 
at Crocker Park will give our associates in every department a place to 
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ﬂourish, and maximize their performance, innovation and creativity” 
(Bullard 2011). 
The beneﬁts of having more perks and services nearby have been 
mastered by Silicon Valley ﬁrms like Google, which have barbers, day 
care, dining, laundry, and recreation facilities. These perks for employ-
ees “have the added bonus of keeping the employee workforce in the 
ofﬁce more often. Give employees enough reasons to stick around and 
you’ll likely see productivity go up. Why head home when everything 
you need is at work?” (Strickland 2008). By moving to Crocker Park 
in Westlake, AG will have access to far more services that could poten-
tially entice its workers to stay around the ofﬁce longer and that perhaps 
could lead to higher productivity. This is clearly a beneﬁt for AG that 
has nothing to do with tax expenditure policy. 
By further comparing Brooklyn’s and Westlake’s infrastructures 
and ﬁnances, a clearer picture of AG regarding the move will start to 
surface. This is not to say that any one of these factors provides the 
answer as to why AG moved, but together they do create a picture of the 
differences between these two locations. 
First and foremost, Westlake is a wealthier community than Brook-
lyn. This can be measured with two simple metrics: median household 
income and median value of homes. In 2010, the median home value in 
Westlake was about 89 percent higher than in Brooklyn, $234,000 and 
$124,100, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). Westlake’s median 
household income in 2010 was 67 percent higher than Brooklyn’s 
($68,091 and $40,661, respectively). Westlake has fared substantially 
better during the housing bust that started across the country in 2008. 
Brooklyn saw the average sales price of homes drop by 24.33 percent 
between 2005 and 2010, while Westlake saw only a 12.12 percent 
decline. The 10-year change in prices for the two cities also shows a 
disparity: Brooklyn’s average change from 2001 to 2010 was a decline 
of 8.02 percent, while Westlake saw a modest 0.56 percent increase 
(Cleveland Magazine 2011). 
The disparities between Brooklyn and Westlake can be further 
examined by looking at the cumulative assessed value of both cities. 
Since the population sizes of the cities differ substantially, Figure 3.1 
controls for assessed value based on population. What is demonstrated 
in this chart is that Westlake’s assessed value per capita consistently 
hovers around a value that is about three times as large as Brooklyn’s. 
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Next, Brooklyn also has 1.6 times as many people living below the 
poverty line as Westlake (6.6 percent below poverty for Brooklyn and 
2.5 percent for Westlake). Why might a wealthier city attract AG? It 
may be that AG wants to project an image of prosperity to its employ-
ees, and clearly Westlake has a substantial advantage according to those 
two measures of community wealth. 
Third, there are substantial and measurable differences in the per-
formance of the two cities’ education systems. Each year Ohio rates all 
of its school districts. In 2011 it rated Brooklyn’s schools as “effective,” 
while Westlake’s were rated as “excellent.” Each school district was 
additionally given performance ratings (ranging from 0 to 120); West-
lake received a score of 107.2 and met adequate yearly progress (Ohio 
Department of Education 2011). While Brooklyn’s performance rating 
score was 96.8, the district did not meet adequate yearly progress. Addi-
tional information comes from Cleveland Magazine’s annual “Rating 
the Suburbs” issue. While rating systems in a magazine are bound to 
come with some controversy, they are still read by people in the com-
munity and by those planning to move to the area. Here again we see 
Westlake with substantially higher scores in education, receiving a rank 
Figure 3.1  Assessed Value per Capita, Brooklyn and Westlake, Ohio 
(2011$) 
140,000 
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SOURCE: Assessed valuation data come from the cities’ Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Reports. Population estimates are from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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of 10 out of more than 200 communities in the Cleveland metro area, as 
compared to Brooklyn, with a rank of 46 (Cleveland Magazine 2011). 
Fourth, Westlake outperforms Brooklyn on a broad range of other 
“lifestyle” ratings. Westlake is perceived to be a safer community than 
Brooklyn. Again drawing from the Cleveland Magazine (2011) pro-
ﬁles, Westlake received a rank of 20 (lower being better) and Brooklyn 
received a rank of 73. These scores are based upon a variety of crime 
statistics for all metro Cleveland jurisdictions. Westlake’s “total com-
munity services” rating is 13, while Brooklyn’s is 15. 
Finally, the ﬁnancial stability of the two cities is quite different. 
One very broad indicator of ﬁnancial condition is bond ratings. Brook-
lyn’s bond rating, in September 2011, by Moody’s (2011), was Aa2. 
Westlake’s rating by Moody’s, from December of 2011, was Aaa. While 
both cities’ credit ratings are excellent, Westlake’s rating is as high as a 
rating can be, considered a prime rating, while Brooklyn’s rating is two 
notches lower. Westlake is unique in the entire state for being “the ﬁrst 
suburb in Ohio to have been awarded all of the Aaa/AAA ratings” (City 
of Westlake 2011b). 
We can also look at ﬁnancial stability in terms of budget balances. 
The fund balances of both cities are exceptional. Both carry fund bal-
ances well in excess of the best practice recommendations of the Gov-
ernment Finance Ofﬁ cers Association (2009). This is particularly rele-
vant in recent years of stagnating revenues (the Great Recession), where 
both cities have been very capable of providing a cushion from which to 
draw down excess funds without raising taxes or cutting services. 
What can we tell from looking at the perceptions of infrastructure, 
safety, and ﬁnancial stability? The case demonstrates clearly that taxes 
were not the main issue in AG’s deliberations. Table 3.1 summarizes 
the potential deciding factors in AG’s move from Brooklyn to Westlake. 
On all nontax elements, Westlake has a clear advantage over Brooklyn. 
If taxes were the main driver, then AG would have stayed in Brooklyn 
because the city offered to lower its income tax rate to one comparable 
to Westlake’s, in addition to a tax expenditure package worth up to $10 
million and lower property tax rates. The case further demonstrates a 
reality for many cities; they are at a great disadvantage relative to ﬁrms, 
particularly large companies. If a major employer wants a new facility, 
perhaps even one that it has been planning for years, it can leverage the 
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Table 3.1  Comparison of City Advantages, Brooklyn and Westlake, Ohio 
Advantage 
Brooklyn Westlake 
State tax 
expenditures 
Local tax 
expenditures 
Tax rates 
Community wealth 
Home sale price 
Median household 
income 
Assessed value 
Poverty rate 
Education systems 
“Lifestyle” ratings 
Financial stability 
Neutral 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Ohio offered the largest package, 
although there were no require-
ments to stay in Brooklyn. 
Brooklyn offered a larger package 
of tax expenditures. 
Total tax burden in Brooklyn is 
lower. Brooklyn income tax rate 
was readjusted after AG threatened 
to move; Brooklyn previously 
had a lower property tax rate than 
Westlake. 
system to reap, at times, huge sums of money to do something it was 
already going to do, with or without the funds. 
In the case of AG, a triggering event (a one-half percentage point 
income tax increase in Brooklyn) gave the company a strong negotiat-
ing position. Without access to AG’s internal communications, there is 
no way of knowing if the ﬁrm truly wanted to leave the area prior to this 
circumstance. What can be seen is a company seizing the opportunity 
to extract rents from different jurisdictions by threatening to leave the 
city, county, and state. 
One can question the actions of the state in the Brooklyn-AG 
case. Was the rush to keep AG in Ohio actually what killed Brooklyn’s 
chance at keeping AG? The deal (nearly $100 million) provided by the 
state of Ohio may have kept AG in Ohio, but for the state it did not mat-
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ter where AG was located, as long as it was within the state. This creates 
an environment for the rich to get richer: the company got nearly $100 
million and the city of Westlake got a new large employer at apparently 
little direct cost themselves. This also provides an environment for the 
poor to get poorer: the state of Ohio’s revenues dropped by nearly $100 
million at a time when Governor Kasich was trying to ﬁll an $8 billion 
budget deﬁcit, and Brooklyn, a poorer Cleveland suburb, lost its largest 
employer, creating a big hole for it to dig out of. As stated by Cuyahoga 
County Executive Edward FitzGerald, with AG leaving Brooklyn, 
“You will have a community that will be the big loser [Brooklyn], and 
the state will have paid for that” (Niquette 2011). 
The case of AG echoes the ﬁnding in the literature that the decision 
to move is not simple and pits neighboring cities and states against one 
another, to the direct advantage of the ﬁrm. AG’s actions are rational, 
based on its operating environment, and the company cannot be faulted 
for how it handled the situation. This case is not meant to be a critique 
of AG, but rather a critique of the political ecosystem within which it 
operates. 
A WAY FORWARD 
AG’s move within Cuyahoga County from Brooklyn to Westlake is 
having a signiﬁcant local political impact. This case is an example of 
a kind of interjurisdictional competition that is seen across the United 
States. Clearly the move will be devastating to Brooklyn, and while 
it may not be a net loss for the county, it again feeds more inequality 
into the jurisdiction in this zero-sum game. This is leading Cuyahoga 
County and other places nationwide to start thinking less about compe-
tition and more about cooperation. 
Cooperation among Jurisdictions 
One step Cuyahoga County took in the Brooklyn-AG situation was 
to not provide any incentives to AG. Cuyahoga County did not “want 
to give them any incentive to move from one city in Cuyahoga County 
to another,” especially in this case with, as Cuyahoga County Executive 
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FitzGerald notes, “wealthier suburb[s] that can afford more grants and 
tax incentives” (Cho 2011a). In an effort to stem the tide of cities within 
Cuyahoga County ﬁghting with each other to land the next big head-
quarters, FitzGerald is trying to leverage his economic development 
budget by offering incentives to cities signing on to an antipoaching 
pact. Communities that commit to this will get revenue sharing and a 
piece of the county’s $100 million economic development fund (John-
ston 2011). 
The ﬁght for jobs through tax expenditures among U.S. jurisdic-
tions is also going on elsewhere in the world. In 2003 all but one of 
Australia’s states and territories “signed an historic pact to end inter-
state bidding wars for business investment and major events” (State of 
Victoria 2003). The pact, which was renewed in 2006 (State of Victoria 
2006) and set for another renewal vote in 2011, came about as a result 
of a bidding war for a A$430 million News Corporation/Fox movie 
studio. Similar to the approach being taken by FitzGerald in Cuyahoga 
County, the Australian pact “includes protocols to avoid offering ﬁnan-
cial and other investment incentives to companies relocating from else-
where in Australia—a situation where there is no national economic 
beneﬁt.” Australian subnational ofﬁcials have found the pact to be very 
valuable in reducing the ﬁrms’ rent extractions, because the businesses 
try to overstate “the incentives offered by the potential ‘rival’ location” 
(State of Victoria 2003). 
One of the keys to the Australian and Cuyahoga County programs is 
the explicit goal of sharing information among governments. By doing 
so, these programs reduce the information asymmetry that exists when 
ﬁrms attempt to play one jurisdiction against another. At heart, the chal-
lenge for these potentially rival jurisdictions is a prisoner’s dilemma, 
in which cooperation will yield a better outcome for both government 
parties, but with informational barriers present, one or both of the juris-
dictions will tend to defect, resulting in a race to the bottom (Oates 
1972, 1999). 
The race to the bottom creates a fear in community ofﬁcials of 
“losing local business and jobs [which] thus leads to suboptimal levels 
of state and local public goods” (Oates 1999, p. 1135). Alice Rivlin 
(1992), the ﬁrst to head the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce and a recent 
member of the Obama Administration’s Debt Commission, sees the 
competition between neighboring jurisdictions as a ﬁght that produces 
Bowen.indb 58  12/16/2013 2:13:49 PM   
 
 
  
58 Clark 
inadequate levels of public service delivery because the competition 
drives revenues too low. She has proposed a revenue-sharing scheme 
that would alleviate some of jurisdictions’ worries about losing busi-
ness (Rivlin 1992). 
While Cuyahoga County strives to create a system in which its 
cities share information, the state of Ohio appears to be going in the 
opposite direction. It has privatized its development activities, which 
constrains access to information and citizen involvement. The limits 
that Ohio Governor Kasich seeks are thought by some people to be an 
economic advantage for the state, as it competes with its neighbors for 
companies. Site brokers, the agents working for ﬁrms trying to relocate, 
counsel governments to keep all bids secret. These consultants essen-
tially threaten to blackball states and site brokers if they do not comply 
with the secrecy pacts (Markusen and Nesse 2007, p. 22). The ﬁrms 
beneﬁt from having information asymmetry on their side, which keeps 
the fear of losing a deal alive by leaving cities and states in the dark. But 
it is obvious that cities and states may not be going in the same direction 
on this issue. 
Jurisdictions are left in a quandary: they want to improve their ﬁs-
cal and economic situations without being taken advantage of by ﬁrms 
or decimating neighboring jurisdictions. Rivlin (1992) suggests that 
States might provide higher-quality services if they shared some 
taxes and did not have to worry so much about losing businesses 
to neighboring states with lower tax rates. They would then have 
more incentives to compete on the basis of excellence of their ser-
vices. They would have to attract businesses and residents with 
good schools, parks and transportation, rather than with tax breaks. 
The common taxes would also simplify the tax structure and lower 
the compliance costs facing companies that operate in many states, 
as well as reducing the enforcement costs of the tax collectors. 
(p. 142) 
The Importance of Evaluating Results 
We know that tax expenditures will continue to be used. It is also 
clear that under certain circumstances tax expenditures can be margin-
ally effective policy tools, but only if the jurisdictions employing them 
take the time to analyze their use. Unfortunately, research suggests 
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that “few municipalities place conditions on [tax expenditures], most 
never evaluate the performance of ﬁrms . . . and abatement requests 
are seldom or never rejected” (Sands, Reese, and Khan 2006, p. 44). 
When data are collected, the information is often not appropriate to help 
in evaluation of programs, nor is it timely (Buss 2001). One-third of 
governments place few, if any, conditions on who gets tax expenditure 
beneﬁts, and 88 percent of governments reject virtually no one (Sands, 
Reese, and Khan 2006). Because most jurisdictions do not bother to 
evaluate the outcomes of tax expenditures, it is little wonder that this 
tool is so ineffective. The shotgun approach clearly is not working; tar-
geting tax expenditures to distressed areas and evaluating the programs 
could turn tax expenditures from a 10 percent to a 90 percent success 
rate (Peters and Fisher 2004). 
Further thought needs to be put into what types of ﬁrms are getting 
the beneﬁts as well. Does the tax expenditure create negative externali-
ties for a community (sweatshop work environments or major environ-
mental burdens)? If so, does this really help to develop the community? 
Clear goals for development are necessary, rather than a mechanism “to 
provide political cover for the decision to grant an abatement” (Sands, 
Reese, and Khan 2006, p. 53); not rejecting any ﬁ rm’s applications 
for tax expenditures provides just such a situation. However, in most 
programs the evidence of targeting simply does not exist (Greenbaum, 
Russell, and Petras 2010). 
In addition to a lack of actual evaluation of the tax expenditure poli-
cies, there is also some difﬁculty in deﬁning the problem that is being 
addressed. How is growth deﬁned? Is it growth of GDP, or employ-
ment, or some other factor? Why a company decides to move its head-
quarters to the Rust Belt, or out of it, is not a simple question. Trying to 
model this decision-making process is even more difﬁcult. For exam-
ple, Phillips and Goss (1995) note that “studies that use investment or 
income growth as the dependent variable ﬁnd that taxes have a larger 
inﬂuence on growth than do studies using aggregate employment or 
individual ﬁrm data” (p. 325). Both income growth and employment 
would presumably measure the economic health of a region, but if they 
are leading to contrary conclusions, then modeling this question will be 
problematic, at best. 
Decisions made in the past can haunt a city for years, even when 
the conditions are not the same today (see Box 2.1). If a large part of 
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Box 2.1 Minicase of Atlanta, Georgia 
Atlanta’s rapid growth has resulted in “trafﬁc congestion so bad it 
threatens the region’s vitality” (Hart 2011, p. A:1). No deﬁnitive plan has 
been developed, but Georgia’s and Atlanta’s leaders want to ensure that 
the area can continue to grow. A proposed new sales tax could be one 
way to fund a “balanced” approach (roads and public transit), but “ﬁerce 
debate is under way over what that balance should be” (p. A:1). 
Some leaders in the region are starting to recognize that, while “tax 
cuts may favorably tilt the cost-beneﬁt analysis of investors pondering 
whether to build a manufacturing plant in Georgia,” those beneﬁ ts “may 
be quickly reduced if the end product is trucked through Atlanta, as plant 
owners incur the indirect, yet real cost of tractor-trailers slogging inefﬁ-
ciently across” the city (Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2010). The Atlanta 
metro area has been described as being a “region at odds with itself,” as 
it contains cities poaching ﬁrms from one another in the same zero-sum 
game that the Rust Belt faces. Leaders in the region do recognize the 
inconsistencies, as Atlanta residents hate the trafﬁc problems but also 
hate the idea of raising taxes to the level necessary to ﬁx those problems. 
The prospect of resolving these issues is complicated by a lack of coop-
eration among governments in the metro area, “which makes it more dif-
ﬁcult to create a thriving region and compete with our peer cities around 
the country and world” (Chapman 2011). 
Atlanta’s future hinges on its ability to solve not just its trafﬁc chal-
lenges, but also its water problem. The state of Georgia has been in 
protracted disputes with Tennessee, Florida, and Alabama for access to 
river waters, and the Atlanta area constantly ﬁghts with south Georgia 
for waters within the state. Droughts in recent years have made access to 
water perhaps even more important than transit to Atlanta’s future, and 
this debate is more complicated because of rainfall, something no one 
can control. 
why a company stays or leaves a particular location is based on “softer” 
issues like quality of life, which are even harder to measure than eco-
nomic growth, the subjectivity of the potential answers will bias study 
results. Some good ﬁrst steps will be to collect data, make sure the data 
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being collected can actually measure the outcome, and have that data 
collected and analyzed in a timely manner. 
One of the basic themes of this book is that free trade in unfet-
tered markets and the production of things people value, rather than 
tax expenditures and other forms of government intervention into local 
economies, offer the greatest promise for economic prosperity. The 
tools that surface time and again in the tax expenditure literature are 
investments in physical and human capital. These topics could neces-
sitate entire chapters or books to cover their depth, but will be touched 
upon brieﬂy here to illustrate alternative approaches. 
Other Ways to Promote Industrial Development 
Shifting the tax burden from businesses to residents often cre-
ates an environment that reduces the quality of services that are pro-
vided (Markusen and Nesse 2007). As has been mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, taxes and tax expenditures are only a small part of the 
decision-making process for ﬁrm location. The results of a higher tax 
rate or lower tax expenditures may actually be welcomed by companies 
because many of them place a high value on government services that 
beneﬁ t the ﬁrms directly or indirectly (Bradbury, Kodrzycki, and Tan-
nenwald 1997; Wassmer 2007). For example, good school or university 
systems will provide quality workers to ﬁrms, and good transportation 
systems will allow for easier and cheaper shipping of goods to mar-
ket. In the case of Brooklyn-AG, Brooklyn’s infrastructure and schools 
were seen as insufﬁcient (or even deteriorating), while Westlake’s were 
viewed as some of the best in the region (and improving). This disparity 
provided yet another reason why AG would want to move its headquar-
ters out of an area with inferior services to one with superior services. 
Mathur (1999) provides evidence that investment in the develop-
ment and accumulation of human capital is a more productive and pru-
dent strategy to help support growth than are programs that focus on 
other aspects of developing an economy. An overreliance on simply 
luring companies based on tax rates or expenditures puts a region at risk 
in the long term; if a company locates somewhere simply because of the 
low rates, it is likely to jump ship as soon as another jurisdiction can 
offer a better rate. However, if a company has made a choice because of 
a region’s broader set of advantages, then small changes in a tax rate or 
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tax expenditures will be little noticed, given all of the other factors that 
brought the ﬁrm to its present location. As Mathur (1999) points out, 
“public policy that encourages human capital stock and R&D is in the 
long-term interest of a region, and the threat of interregional spillovers 
should not distract regional policy makers from initiatives that promote 
human capital stock of the region” (p. 214). 
Investing effectively in physical or human capital infrastructure 
requires actual outlays of funds, which is why the tax expenditure route 
is taken so frequently—it offers much less resistance and conﬂ ict. Each 
city, county, or region has its own special needs, and there is no one-
size-ﬁts-all approach available for economic development. But it is 
clear that investing in physical and human capital can be an alternative 
to tax expenditures that has a more predictable and lasting effect on the 
local economy. The mayor of Westlake, for one, does not want to be 
faulted for the investments his city has made in infrastructure. He states 
that “Westlake put a lot of money into its infrastructure and quality of 
life. . . . Why shouldn’t we reap the dividends on that investment?” 
(Miller 2011). In the case of AG, clearly Westlake is reaping the divi-
dends of its investment. Broadly speaking, one of the best things a city 
can do to ensure its future is to “take care of the basics, like infrastruc-
ture and education” (Talbot 2012, p. 74). This is particularly important 
when resources are idle during a recession, when building materials, 
capital, and labor are much cheaper, and will enable a city to prepare for 
its next industry or employer. 
CONCLUSION 
The challenges that Rust Belt communities face are substantial. Let 
us reconsider the question raised at the start of this chapter: Why do 
some of these cities thrive, as others decline? Clearly, special attention 
should be paid to the lessons that can be learned from the use of tax 
expenditures in economic development programs. The ﬁscal stresses 
that the region faces are substantial and reinforce the problems. Much 
of the political rhetoric surrounding the demise of the area and the rise 
of the South and Southwest tends to focus only on taxes, essentially 
ignoring all other relocation factors. 
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At the same time one needs to consider that these southern states 
were also very far behind economically when compared to northern 
states, so some of the geographical southern shift can be attributed to 
the equalization of regions rather than an outright ﬂight. This is, of 
course, no comfort to the residents of Flint, Michigan, who have lived 
through decades of economic struggle, or to those of Cleveland, which 
once had among the greatest concentrations of corporate headquarters 
in the country, and is now frequently seen as an also-ran. 
The problems facing Rust Belt communities are not isolated. Boom-
ing cities in the South, such as Atlanta, which were once the beneﬁcia-
ries of the southern shift, are now facing the same challenges: compa-
nies leaving for greener pastures. 
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The Evolution of Clusters 
and Implications for the Revival 
of Old Industrial Cities 
Haifeng Qian 
Cleveland State University 
It has long been thought that ﬁrms cluster to gain shared economic 
beneﬁts related to scale, access to skilled labor forces, and trans-
portation costs. Over time the concept of clusters has evolved, no 
more so than in the Rust Belt cities of the Midwest. 
The study of industrial or regional clusters has a long history. 
Alfred Marshall (1920) discussed the localization of ﬁrms within the 
same area to pursue a shared labor pool, local provision of industrial 
inputs, and spillovers of knowledge and information. The neoclassical 
tradition emphasizes the impact of transportation costs and economies 
of scale on shaping the location of ﬁrms (Hoover 1937; Isard 1951; 
Krugman 1991). Following the economic transformation from Fordist 
capitalism to post-Fordist capitalism in the developed world, there has 
been renewed attention on agglomeration and clusters for the past three 
decades. Scholars with a variety of backgrounds, including econom-
ics, regional science, geography, planning, and business management, 
have sought the reasons for clustering or agglomeration economies. 
These researchers have pursued new perspectives, including increasing 
returns, ﬂexible production, innovation, entrepreneurship, knowledge 
spillovers, and networks (Acs and Varga 2005; Gordon and McCann 
2000; Jacobs 1969; Markusen 1996; Porter 1998; Scott 1988). 
Witnessing the success of U.S. high-technology clusters, such as 
Silicon Valley in California; Austin, Texas; and Research Triangle Park 
in North Carolina, policymakers have increasingly considered clusters 
as an effective tool for economic development. President Obama, for 
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instance, supported a federal initiative to bolster regional innovation 
clusters, with $100 million requested in his proposed ﬁscal year 2010 
budget. This has been especially inspired by the work of Harvard Busi-
ness School Professor Michael Porter (1998, 2003), who has sought 
to operationalize the identiﬁcation of clusters. Professor Porter was 
invited to speak on clusters at the 2011 annual meeting of the National 
Governors Association. Meanwhile, as of July 2011, 7 of the 10 most 
read articles in Economic Development Quarterly, a journal focusing 
on economic development policy and practice, included “cluster” in 
their titles.1 
The purpose of this chapter is to survey the literature on the evolu-
tion of clusters and explore its implications for the revival of old indus-
trial or Rust Belt cities. Many old industrial cities feature declining or 
declined clusters and are struggling to revitalize their economies. The 
chapter starts with a review of deﬁnitions and typologies of clusters. It 
then summarizes four streams of literature discussing the evolution of 
clusters and endeavors to identify some major forces behind the dynam-
ics of clusters, based on the limited research available. It does not solely 
address clusters manifested in old industrial cities (e.g., the industrial 
complexes identiﬁed by Iammarino and McCann [2006]), since one 
type of cluster may evolve into another type. The chapter further exam-
ines cluster development in the U.S. Rust Belt, using Cleveland as an 
example, and explores the implications of clusters’ evolution paths for 
the revival of old industrial cities. 
CLUSTERS: DEFINITIONS AND TYPOLOGIES 
There are several terms associated with clusters, which have been 
increasingly used in an interchangeable fashion, including “agglomera-
tion,” “new industrial districts/places,” and “regional/industrial/busi-
ness clusters,” among others. The ﬁrst wave of cluster research was pri-
marily propelled by the seminal work of Marshall (1920), who popular-
ized an agglomeration approach to understanding the phenomenon. This 
perspective was carried forward in the work of Hoover (1937, 1948), 
Mills (1972), and Krugman (1991). Together with Isard’s industrial 
complex approach (e.g., Isard and Vietorisz 1955), the agglomeration 
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view explored the beneﬁts of spatial or geographical clusters in terms 
of transportation costs, economies of scale, shared labor and industry-
speciﬁc inputs, and to a lesser extent, knowledge spillovers. Hoover 
(1937, 1948) classiﬁed agglomeration as consisting of ﬁ rms’ internal 
expansion, localization economies, and urbanization economies. Inter-
nal expansion represents a ﬁrm’s economies of scale; localization econ-
omies address cost reductions as a result of the spatial concentration of 
businesses from the same sector; and urbanization economies consider 
the beneﬁts of agglomeration irrespective of sectors. 
Clusters regained scholarly attention in the early 1980s among not 
only economists but geographers, planners, regional scientists, and 
management scholars. This second wave commenced from several case 
studies of the artisanal and design industries in the “Third Italy” (e.g., 
Brusco 1982) and was later extended to the ﬁlm industry in Los Angeles 
(Storper and Christopherson 1987) and to high technology, particularly 
in Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1994; Scott and Angel 1987).2 Scott (1988) 
terms these places “new industrial spaces,” which are characterized 
by ﬂexible production, social division of labor, formation of external 
economies, dissolution of labor market rigidities, and reagglomeration 
of production. These industrial districts feature “a congeries of inter-
connected producers and associated local labour markets” (Scott 1988, 
p. 182). 
Markusen (1996) provides an inﬂuential typology of the industrial 
district, which she deﬁnes as “a sizable and spatially delimited area of 
trade-oriented economic activity which has a distinctive economic spe-
cialization” (p. 296). She argues that there are other types of “sticky” 
industrial districts beyond Scott’s new industrial places that have dem-
onstrated resilience, and proposes four types of industrial districts. 
The ﬁrst type, called “Marshallian industrial districts,” features a 
business structure dominated by small and locally owned ﬁrms. In these 
districts, there is a substantial amount of trade among locally embed-
ded suppliers and buyers, which is generally secured by long-term con-
tracts, and a ﬂexible labor pool internal to the district instead of to any 
speciﬁc ﬁrms. Compared with the classic Marshallian industrial district, 
its Italianate extension is more innovative, cooperative, embedded, and 
government led. 
The second type of industrial district, the “hub-and-spoke,” is one 
in which one or several large ﬁrm headquarters play a pivotal role in 
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local business. These ﬁrms are vertically integrated, surrounded by 
local suppliers, and embedded nonlocally. They are also globally ori-
ented in terms of their input, products or services, and investment deci-
sion making. 
The third type is coined “satellite industrial platforms” and has a 
business structure dominated by large branch facilities that are exter-
nally owned and headquartered. These branches can range in the nature 
of production from routinized assembly plants to research facilities, as 
long as they are able to “stand alone.” Because the facility is controlled 
by its remote headquarters, its cooperation with other local facilities is 
generally low. 
The last type, named “state-anchored industrial districts,” involves 
a business scenario dominated by the local presence of state or national 
capitals, large government institutions, or big public universities. 
Porter (1998) proposes the most inﬂuential framework of clusters. 
He deﬁnes clusters as “geographic concentrations of interconnected 
companies and institutions in a particular ﬁeld” (p. 78). He considers 
clusters to be a strategy for regions to build competitive advantage. 
Consistent with his diamond model (Porter 1990), clusters involve 
other industries connected with the core industry via both backward 
linkages (i.e., suppliers) and forward linkages (i.e., channels and cus-
tomers), and supporting institutions such as governments, universities, 
and trade associations. 
Porter argues that clusters encourage both competition and co-
operation and promote innovation, entrepreneurship, and productivity. 
He further operationalized his concept of clusters, using a combination 
of location quotient analysis, locational correlation analysis, and input-
output models to identify the clusters of traded industries in a speciﬁc 
region (Porter 2003). The Porter school of cluster theory soon gained 
popularity among not only scholars but also planners, practitioners, and 
policymakers. This occurred despite the seemingly traditional policy 
instruments Porter has proposed, such as improving human capital, 
infrastructure, and intellectual property protection (Porter 1998). How-
ever, Martin and Sunley (2003) suggest cautious use of clusters as a 
development strategy. 
Porter’s concept of clusters is extended by Hill and Brennan (2000), 
who deﬁne a “competitive industry cluster” as “a geographic concen-
tration of competitive ﬁrms or establishments in the same industry that 
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either have close buy-sell relationships with other industries in the 
region, use common technologies, or share a specialized labor pool that 
provides ﬁrms with a competitive advantage over the same industry in 
other places” (pp. 67–68). This idea advances the research by provid-
ing a methodology based primarily on cluster analysis and discriminant 
analysis to identify the clusters with competitive advantages in a region. 
Gordon and McCann (2000) and Iammarino and McCann (2006) 
develop a typology of industrial clusters in terms of transaction costs. 
Under their deductive approach, categories of industrial clusters include 
“pure agglomeration” following the tradition of Marshall (1920); “the 
industrial complex” following the perspective of Isard (Isard 1951; 
Isard and Kuenne 1953; Isard and Vietorisz 1955); and the “social net-
work” following the work of Granovetter (1973). The ﬁrst type, echoing 
Marshallian industrial districts in Markusen’s typology, is structured by 
atomistic ﬁrms with unstable trading relations. Industrial complexes, 
with one or several large ﬁrms surrounded by local suppliers, represent 
identiﬁable and stable trading relations, and are structurally consistent 
with the hub-and-spoke model. And the social-network model is char-
acterized by the role of trust and social capital in forming business rela-
tions and is “essentially aspatial” (Iammarino and McCann 2006). 
The aspatial nature of the social-network model discussed by Iam-
marino and McCann (2006) suggests that the geographic unit for clus-
ters is indeed ﬂexible. Although every cluster has a geographic scope, 
what matters for a cluster is interconnectedness of economic agents 
(Porter 1998). The geographic unit of a cluster can be very small or 
very large, depending on the spatial extent to which economic activi-
ties interact. By the same token, the geographic boundary of a cluster 
is rarely consistent with any administrative boundaries and may even 
be transnational (e.g., the Seattle-Vancouver technology corridor). The 
unclear geographical scope of clusters has incurred criticism, such as 
from Martin and Sunley (2003). 
It should also be noted that, within the same region, different types 
of clusters might coexist. An example is Silicon Valley, which, as 
Markusen (1996) points out, hosts all of the four types of clusters she 
identiﬁes. According to Scott and Angel (1987) and Saxenian (1994), 
Silicon Valley is a typical Marshallian district. However, it also fea-
tures the hub-and-spoke model with the presence of major hubs such 
as Stanford University and Hewlett-Packard, the satellite industrial 
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platform with the presence of branches of IBM, Oki, NTK Ceramics, 
Hyundai, and Samsung, and the state-anchored model with the presence 
of a strong defense electronics and communications sector (Markusen 
1996). 
THE EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS 
To date, the literature on clusters’ evolution has been relatively 
insufﬁcient for at least two reasons. First, clusters did not regain schol-
arly attention until the 1980s, and the most inﬂuential studies to date 
are concerned with deﬁnitional and typological issues in the context of 
post-Fordism and generally consider clusters to be static (e.g., Marku-
sen 1996). Second, different types of clusters (and even those within the 
same type) may exhibit diverse paths of evolution, which make it dif-
ﬁ cult to ﬁnd commonalities. Efforts to explain the evolution of indus-
trial clusters have been made for some speciﬁc cases (e.g., Feldman, 
Francis, and Bercovitz 2005; Huggins 2008). Despite the difﬁ culties of 
generalization, a few scholars have discussed cluster evolution, and the 
resulting literature may be categorized into four streams: 1) an indus-
trial cluster evolves following the product cycle of its core industry, 2) 
technical changes lead to new industrial composition of a cluster, 3) an 
industrial cluster transforms itself from one type to another, and 4) an 
existing cluster or even an incumbent ﬁrm may incubate a new cluster. 
Each stream is discussed in detail in this section. 
The Product Life Cycle Approach 
The product life cycle theory, introduced by Vernon (1966) in the 
context of international trade, describes the evolution of products, 
which can be applied to the evolution of the associated industries. A
typical product life cycle can be decomposed into four stages: intro-
duction, growth, maturity, and decline. In the ﬁrst stage, a new product 
is introduced to the market and produced locally. As it is increasingly 
accepted by consumers both locally and from outside the region, the 
industry experiences a rapid expansion in the second stage, and pro-
duction starts to move to other areas seeking lower costs, especially 
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in terms of land and labor. At the third stage, the market demand for 
this product is stable or even starts to fall, the production process is 
mature, and production facilities are primarily located in areas with low 
costs. Last, new products emerge as better substitutes, and the industry 
declines. Jacobs (1969) ﬁnds that large diversiﬁed cities are cradles of 
innovation and are thus the natural environment for the ﬁrst stage of 
the product life cycle. Duranton and Puga (2001) further reveal that 
innovations generally occur in diversiﬁed cities, but production may 
relocate to specialized cities with lower costs once the production pro-
cess becomes standardized. 
In his seminal paper, Porter (1998) also addresses the evolution of 
clusters in a way similar to the product life cycle approach. He lists 
some forces behind the birth, growth, and decline of a cluster, arguing 
that a cluster may emerge simply by a chance event, or as a result of 
historical circumstances or new demand. An incumbent cluster or large 
ﬁrms may also serve as the incubator of a new cluster. Once a cluster 
starts emerging, according to Porter, its growth and expansion are char-
acterized by a self-reinforcing process, in which opportunities in the 
new cluster will bring dynamic, collective actions of talent, specialized 
suppliers and forward channels, service providers, and related govern-
ment agencies. A vigorous local business climate and supportive insti-
tutions provide jurisdictional advantages for the region, facilitate the 
growth of clusters, and enable long-term prosperity for the region and 
the cluster. The decline of a cluster, as Porter argues, generally comes 
with technological discontinuities, failure to meet consumers’ changing 
demand, and internal rigidities. 
Change of Industrial Composition 
In addition to the product/industry/cluster life cycle approach, some 
quantitative scholars trace cluster changes over time in terms of their 
industrial composition. A cluster in the Porter school involves not only 
one or more traded industries but also linked industries as suppliers and 
channels or consumers. These interindustry linkages can be identiﬁed 
through the input-output model. Industries may also be interconnected 
through shared labor pools and knowledge spillovers, as suggested by 
Marshall (1920) and Hill and Brennan (2000), but these ﬂows are much 
less measurable than interindustry trade. 
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The industrial makeup of a cluster may be altered over time, reﬂect-
ing technical developments occurring during that period. Montana and 
Nenide (2008) adopt this approach and examine evolving clusters in 
California’s central San Joaquin Valley and northeast Indiana from 
1997 to 2002. The business and innovation services cluster in northeast 
Indiana, for instance, was composed of ﬁve four-digit North American 
Industrial Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) industries in 1997: 1) print-
ing and related support activities (3231); 2) other ﬁ nancial investment 
activities (5239); 3) agencies, brokerages, and other insurance-related 
activities (5242); 4) insurance and employee beneﬁt funds (5251); and 
5) employment services (5612). By 2002, this cluster had evolved by 
adding ﬁve newly related industries: 1) Internet publishing and broad-
casting (5161); 2) securities and commodity contracts, intermediation 
and brokerage (5231); 3) management, scientiﬁc, and technical con-
sulting services (5416); 4) ofﬁce administrative services (5611); and 5) 
facilities support services (5613). 
Cluster Transformation between Different Types 
As the third evolutionary approach, a cluster can be transformed 
from one type to another under a given typology. Historically, regions 
hosting the automobile cluster, e.g., Detroit, were transformed from 
Marshallian industrial districts in the early decades of the twentieth 
century to hub-and-spoke districts (Markusen 1996), or from the pure 
agglomeration model to the industrial complex model (Iammarino and 
McCann 2006). Today, there are only a few oligopolistic producers 
dominating the local business structure in these regions. The ﬁnan-
cial market in London, the fashion cluster in New York, and the semi-
conductor and electronics sector in Silicon Valley evolved from the 
social network type to pure agglomeration (Iammarino and McCann 
2006). As Iammarino and McCann (2006) point out, even for the high-
tech industrial sector, its cluster type and evolution path may vary from 
case to case: Unlike its counterpart in Silicon Valley, the electronics 
industry in Scotland has remained an industrial complex cluster for the 
past 40 years. 
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New Cluster Born out of Incumbent Clusters and Firms 
The fourth type of evolution focuses on the role of one or several 
incumbent clusters in incubating new clusters. Southern California’s 
aerospace cluster, which has attracted talent and suppliers specialized 
in castings and advanced materials, was associated with the birth of the 
golf equipment cluster in San Diego (Porter 1998). Gray, Golob, and 
Markusen (1996) and Markusen (1996) report that the aircraft/space-
craft cluster in Seattle anchored by the giant company Boeing contrib-
uted to the formation of other clusters such as port-related activities, 
software, and biotechnology. Sometimes, several clusters may jointly 
foster the formation of a new cluster. Porter (1998) ﬁnds that a clus-
ter producing built-in kitchens and appliances was developed at the 
intersection of the home appliances and household furniture clusters in 
Germany. 
Alternatively, the “incubator” may not be existing clusters but sim-
ply large and innovative ﬁrms or institutions. A new cluster may emerge 
as a result of massive spin-offs from an incumbent ﬁrm in a region. For 
instance, Fairchild Semiconductor played a critical role in shaping the 
semiconductor cluster in Silicon Valley, spinning off a large number of 
new entries, including major players such as AMD, Intel, and National. 
According to Klepper (2011), a majority of the top performers in the 
semiconductor industry were located in Silicon Valley and descended 
from Fairchild Semiconductor, directly or indirectly. Klepper also 
reports that the inﬂuence of B.F. Goodrich is associated with the cre-
ation of Diamond Rubber, Kelly-Springﬁeld, Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 
and Firestone Tire & Rubber, which collectively underpinned the tire 
cluster in Akron, Ohio. Similarly, America Online and MCI were the 
hubs that facilitated the formation of the telecommunications cluster in 
the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area (Porter 1998). 
CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF CLEVELAND 
This chapter seeks implications of the evolution of clusters for the 
revival of old industrial cities. This is a challenging task, because there 
have been various evolutionary paths and because the diversity among 
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old industrial cities implies different cluster-based economic revitaliza-
tion strategies. The old U.S. industrial cities in the Rust Belt, such as 
Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, and Pittsburgh, differ from each other in 
terms of their industrial base and industrial organization, as well as the 
extent of their progress toward renewal. As a result, it is inappropriate 
to discuss cluster development in the general context of old industrial 
cities. 
This chapter’s focus is on the Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor metropoli-
tan area. Cleveland has been declining for the past several decades, 
suffering both population loss and stagnant economic performance. The 
2010 census data show that Cleveland was still among the top 30 largest 
metropolitan areas, with a population slightly above 2 million, down 
3.3 percent from 2000. Economically speaking, employment had a 14 
percent drop for the period of 1998–2009, as indicated by the census 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) business pattern data. This section 
presents the pattern of cluster development in the Cleveland metropoli-
tan area, and the next section will discuss the implications of the cluster 
evolution literature for the revitalization of this region. 
Given the emphasis on cluster evolution, examining the longitudi-
nal data is critical. Longitudinal cluster development in Cleveland will 
be described using two sets of data. One is from the Cluster Mapping 
Project led by Porter, which identiﬁes clusters for each metropolitan 
area using a combination of location quotient, locational correlation, 
and input-output analysis (Porter 2003). At the core of each cluster is 
one four-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) code industry 
that exports products, with a group of local industries supplying inputs. 
The size of each cluster is measured by total employment in both the 
traded and supplier industries. 
There are two interrelated problems in using this data set for 
this research. First, it covers only the time period of 1998–2008 (as 
of March 2011). When looking at the evolution of clusters, long-term 
historical data are needed, since it generally takes decades for clusters 
to evolve (Sallet, Paisley, and Masterman 2009). Data for one decade 
shed little light on the long-term evolution of clusters. Second, because 
Cleveland started to lose its competitive advantage in the 1960s, data 
for only the latest decade may not provide insights into the sources of 
the decline. Technically, as long as employment data by industry are 
available, it is possible to extend Porter’s methodology into earlier peri-
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ods. However, input-output relationships among industries, which are 
needed to identify clusters, are not stable in the long term. The indus-
trial composition of the same cluster hence could be very different over 
a long time period due to technical changes in production. As a conse-
quence, it is almost impossible to examine the growth and decline of a 
cluster deﬁned in terms of a static industrial composition. However, if 
changes in input-output relationships are accounted for, as in Montana 
and Nenide (2008), a cluster could change signiﬁcantly in its structure 
over a long time period, making the temporal data less comparable at 
different times. This approach might be feasible for investigating one or 
a few clusters based on the case study methodology, which allows for 
reporting details of cluster structural changes along time, but might not 
be appropriate for studying all clusters in a region. 
As complementary information, long-term employment changes of 
Cleveland’s leading traded industries, without considering intraindustry 
linkages, will also be studied. Traded or export industries are identiﬁed 
using the methodology introduced by Porter (2003)and the 2002 employ-
ment data by industry (four-digit NAICS code).3 The industry data used 
in this chapter are from Moody’s Analytics Web site, (2013) economy 
.com. The advantages of this site are that its data reach back to 1970 
and address the suppressed data problem that appears in the federal data 
source—the County Business Patterns (CBP). In the latter case, indus-
try employment data are occasionally suppressed to avoid disclosing 
information of individual businesses. These leading traded industries 
are likely to be the core of major clusters and thus can be used to track 
their evolution in Cleveland to some extent. 
Table 4.1 presents the national ranking of major clusters in the 
Cleveland metropolitan area based on Porter’s Cluster Mapping Proj-
ect. A cluster is considered “major” and included in the table if its 
employment size in Cleveland was among the nation’s top 20 either 
in 1998, the earliest year with available data in the Cluster Mapping 
Project, or in 2008, the latest year with available data (as of March 2011 
[Porter 2011]). The table also shows the percentage change in employ-
ment during this decade. It can be seen that major clusters in Cleveland 
are all in manufacturing, reﬂecting the historical economic base of the 
city. In terms of employment size, the three largest among these clusters 
are metal manufacturing (the largest both in 1998 and in 2008), pro-
duction technology (the third largest in 1998 and the second largest in 
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Table 4.1  National Rankings (by Employment) of Major Clusters in 
Cleveland, Ohio, 1998 and 2008 
Ranking % change in 
employment 
Cluster name 1998 2008 (1998–2008) 
Automotive 4 7 −44 
Lighting and electrical equipment 4 10 −51 
Metal manufacturing 4 3 −29 
Production technology 5 3 −21 
Motor driven products 8 >40 n/a 
Building ﬁxtures, equipment, and services 10 5 62 
Plastics 10 11 −23 
Chemical products 12 14 −25 
Medical devices 13 26 −33 
Power generation and transmission 14 21 −31 
Biopharmaceuticals 16 20 −28 
Aerospace engines 17 13 −3 
Construction materials 19 12 −2 
Heavy machinery 29 11 81 
NOTE: Bold type indicates a rise in ranking. 
SOURCE: Cluster Mapping Project, Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, Har-
vard Business School. © 2010 President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights 
reserved. 
2008), and automotive (the second largest in 1998 and the third largest 
in 2008), as the Cluster Mapping Project data show. In terms of national 
rankings, which provide insights into regional competitive advantage, 
Cleveland placed in the top ﬁve nationally in employment in the auto-
motive, lighting and electrical equipment, metal manufacturing, and 
production technology clusters in 1998. In 2008, the leading clusters 
were metal manufacturing and production technology. Cleveland was 
among the nation’s top three in these two clusters. In addition, Cleve-
land had the nation’s ﬁ fth-largest building ﬁxtures, equipment and ser-
vices cluster in 2008. 
As for changes between 1998 and 2008, Cleveland gained competi-
tive advantage, as evidenced by rising national rankings, in 6 out of the 
14 listed clusters: 10 metal manufacturing; 2) production technology; 3) 
building ﬁxtures, equipment and services; 4) aerospace engines; 5) con-
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struction materials; and 6) heavy machinery. Among them, the heavy 
machinery cluster marked the most signiﬁcant improvement, jumping 
from number 29 to number 11. Following that, Cleveland moved up by 
at least four spots in the construction materials, aerospace engines, and 
building ﬁxtures, equipment, and services clusters. It is worth noting 
that, although Cleveland had a higher rank in 6 out of 14 clusters in 
2008, only two clusters—heavy machinery and building ﬁ xtures, equip-
ment, and services—experienced employment growth in this decade. 
In comparison, Cleveland’s rank in 8 of the 14 clusters worsened 
during the period. Among them, Cleveland’s motor driven products 
cluster was number 8 in the nation in 1998, but dropped below number 
40 in 2008. Other signiﬁcant declines occurred for the medical devices, 
power generation and transmission, and lighting and electrical equip-
ment clusters, each moving down in the ranking by at least six spots. 
Now we turn to industry data for the time period of 1970–2009, 
which provide better information for studying evolution trajectories. 
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the longitudinal change of Cleveland’s top-10 
traded industries as ranked by their 1970 employment. Only 2 out of 
these 10 industries—wired telecommunications carriers and insurance 
carriers—are not manufacturing based. In 1970, the dominant traded 
industry was motor vehicle parts manufacturing (with total employment 
of roughly 30,000), which shrank tremendously in the ensuing 39 years 
through 2009. Likewise, other top-traded industries in Cleveland also 
declined during this period, although not as signiﬁcantly. One exception 
was the insurance carriers industry, which grew by 60 percent, thanks to 
the expansion of a few large insurance companies based in Cleveland, 
such as Medical Mutual of Ohio and Progressive. 
Figure 4.2 exhibits the industrial evolution of the 10 most special-
ized traded industries in Cleveland as ranked by their 1970 location 
quotient;these are all in manufacturing, except interurban and rural 
bus transportation.4 Using the location quotient instead of employ-
ment size can control for the national growth trend of industries (i.e., 
product/industry life cycles) and thus can better represent the dynamics 
of Cleveland’s economy relative to the nation or other regions. Four 
manufacturing industries also appear in Figure 4.1 among the largest 
traded industries: 1) foundries; 2) machine shops, turned product, and 
screw, nut, and bolt manufacturing; 3) metalworking machinery manu-
facturing; and 4) motor vehicle parts manufacturing. Changes in the 
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Figure 4.1  Employment of Top 10 Traded Industries, 1970–2009, as 
Ranked by 1970 Employment, Cleveland MSA, Ohio 
Motor vehicle parts mfg. Iron and steel mills and ferroalloy mfg. 
Foundries Wired telecommunications carriers 
Machine shops; turned product; and screw, nut, and bolt mfg. Insurance carriers 
Other general purpose machinery mfg. Aerospace product and parts mfg. 
Metalworking machinery mfg. Other fabricated metal product mfg. 
35,000 
30,000 
25,000 
20,000 
15,000 
10,000 
5,000 
0 
SOURCE:  Moody’s Analytics (2013). 
location quotient of these most specialized traded industries exhibit 
more diversiﬁ ed patterns than does the employment change in the 
major traded industries listed in Figure 4.1. The location quotient of the 
electric lighting equipment manufacturing industry, in which Cleveland 
was most specialized in 1970, dropped from 6.5 to 1.8 from 1970 to 
2009. Signiﬁ cant drops also occurred in the other transportation equip-
ment manufacturing industry, the motor vehicle parts manufacturing 
industry, and the interurban and rural bus transportation industry. By 
contrast, specialization in the forging and stamping industry intensiﬁed 
during the same period. The longitudinal location quotient for the elec-
trical equipment manufacturing industry shows an interesting U-shaped 
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Figure 4.2  Location Quotients of Top 10 Traded Industries, 1970–2009, 
as Ranked by 1970 Location Quotient, Cleveland MSA, Ohio 
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2009 
Electric lighting equipment mfg. Metalworking machinery mfg. 
Foundries Electrical equipment mfg. 
Forging and stamping Motor vehicle parts mfg. 
Machine shops; turned product; and screw, nut, and bolt mfg. Other transportation equipment mfg. 
Interurban and rural bus transportation Hardware mfg. 
SOURCE: Moody’s Analytics (2013). 
curve, ﬁrst becoming less specialized and after the 1990s regaining its 
proportion relative to the national level. Changes in other traded indus-
tries were moderate. 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 replicate Figures 4.1 and 4.2, respectively, 
except that the industries are identiﬁed based on the 2009 data. A com-
parison between industries included in Figure 4.3 with those included 
in Figure 3.1 suggests major shifts of leading traded industries between 
1970 and 2009. In 2009, the top ﬁve largest traded industries were all 
service based. Only 3 out of the top 10 were manufacturing industries: 1) 
the motor vehicle parts manufacturing industry; 2) the machine shops, 
turned product, and screw, nut, and bolt manufacturing industry; and 
3) the other fabricated metal product manufacturing industry. As shown 
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Figure 4.3  Employment of Top 10 Traded Industries, 1970–2009, as 
Ranked by 2009 Employment, Cleveland MSA, Ohio 
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Insurance carriers Machine shops; turned product; and screw, nut, and bolt mfg. 
Colleges, universities, and professional schools General freight trucking 
Legal services Management, scientific, and technical consulting services 
Computer systems design and related services Motor vehicle parts mfg. 
Individual and family services Other fabricated metal product mfg. 
SOURCE: Moody’s Analytics (2013). 
in Figure 4.1, these were also among the largest traded industries in 
1970 but declined since then. The “big four” traded industries—insur-
ance carriers; colleges, universities, and professional schools; legal 
services; and computer systems design and related services—have 
expanded signiﬁcantly since 1970 and each hired over 10,000 employ-
ees in 2009. Behind the high rank of the individual and family services 
industry was Cleveland’s largest employer, the Cleveland Clinic. 
In contrast to Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4 reveals that the 10 traded indus-
tries with the highest location quotients in 2009 were exclusively manu-
facturing industries, and 5 of them were also among the top 10 most 
specialized traded industries in 1970. The most remarkable change 
between 1970 and 2009 was in the paint, coating, and adhesive manu-
Bowen.indb 85  12/16/2013 2:13:56 PM   
 
 
  
  
The Evolution of Clusters and the Revival of Old Industrial Cities 85 
Figure 4.4  Location Quotients of Top 10 Traded Industries, 1970–2009, 
as Ranked by 2009 Location Quotient, Cleveland, Ohio 
Paint, coating, and adhesive mfg. Steel product manufacturing from purchased steel 
Forging and stamping Machine shops; turned product; and screw, nut, and bolt mfg. 
Iron and steel mills and ferroalloy mfg. Metalworking machinery mfg. 
Foundries Electrical equipment mfg. 
Coating, engraving, heat treating, and allied activities Other general purpose machinery mfg. 
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4 
3 
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SOURCE: Moody’s Analytics (2013). 
facturing industry, with an increase in its location quotient from 2.9 to 
6.2. Location quotient changes for other traded industries were moder-
ate, providing evidence that Cleveland has been consistently special-
ized in these manufacturing industries. 
What can be learned about cluster development and the evolution 
of traded industries in Cleveland based on these data? Three observa-
tions merit attention. To begin with, manufacturing clusters and indus-
tries are foundational to Cleveland’s economy. Table 4.1 demonstrates 
that all clusters with a high national rank (by employment) are manu-
facturing based, as of 1998 or 2008. Similarly, Figures 4.2 and 4.4 show 
that Cleveland was consistently specialized in manufacturing industries 
between 1970 and 2009. 
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In addition, Cleveland’s manufacturing clusters and industries have 
declined, but to a large extent due to product life cycles—the nation-
wide downsizing of manufacturing employment. In the case of clusters, 
the decade following 1998 witnessed employment growth in 2 of the 14 
leading clusters in Cleveland; however, Cleveland moved upward in the 
national rankings of 6 of these 14 clusters. In the case of traded indus-
tries, while nearly all of Cleveland’s top-10 largest traded industries in 
1970 shrank in the following decades, changes in location quotients for 
Cleveland’s 10 most-specialized traded industries in 1970 (9 of which 
were manufacturing industries) were rather diversiﬁed. For example, 
Cleveland in 2009 lost 80 percent of its1970 employment in the found-
ries industry; its location quotient by contrast went down only slightly, 
from 5.3 to 3.9. 
Last but not least, some service-based traded industries have exhib-
ited their vibrancy and have been driving job creation in Cleveland for 
the past four decades; however, they have yet to build standout compet-
itive advantage nationally. For example, the insurance carriers indus-
try had over 16,000 employees in 2009 and was Cleveland’s largest 
traded industry, but had only a modestly high location quotient of 1.7. 
The location quotient for Cleveland’s second-largest traded industry in 
2009—colleges, universities, and professional schools—was only 1.2. 
THE EVOLUTION OF CLUSTERS: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR CLEVELAND 
How may the literature on the evolution of clusters shed light on 
the revitalization of a declining manufacturing city like Cleveland? The 
four streams of literature on cluster evolution introduced previously 
may have the following implications for cluster-based economic devel-
opment and revival strategies. 
To begin with, economic development strategies should reﬂect the 
primacy of the market in cluster development. As Porter (1998) has 
argued, the growth of a cluster is a self-reinforcing process in which 
entrepreneurs seize market opportunities embedded in the dynamics 
of cluster emergence. Entrepreneurship and competition are funda-
mentally important for cluster development, irrespective of the clus-
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ter type. Even for the industrial complex model identiﬁed by Gordon 
and McCann (2000), or similarly the hub-and-spoke districts deﬁned 
by Markusen (1996), the barriers to or opportunities for entrepreneur-
ship created by one or a few large ﬁrms are critical to the performance 
of a cluster. While Seattle is generally considered a success (Markusen 
1996), Detroit is notorious for the rigidity and inﬂexibility brought by 
the “Detroit Three” automakers. 
Industrial policy, represented by tax incentives and government 
subsidies speciﬁc to certain industries or ﬁrms, has been a popular prac-
tice. One of the latest cases of this kind of policy in Cleveland was 
a 15-year, $93.5 million incentive package put together by the state 
government in 2011 to retain the headquarters of American Greetings, 
a Fortune 1000 company, in northeast Ohio.5 This case is discussed in 
Chapter 3 of this book. Industrial policy, which reﬂects the preference 
of the government and not necessarily competitiveness in the market, 
may distort competition, discourage new entries, and create opportuni-
ties for rent seeking and destructive entrepreneurship—not to mention 
the generally higher-than-minimum costs taxpayers have to bear due to 
information asymmetry between the government and incentive receiv-
ers. This type of policy challenges market primacy, is a threat to healthy 
cluster development, and thus should be abandoned. 
The acceptance of market primacy and the repeal of industrial pol-
icy do not, however, mean that there is no role for government in clus-
ter development. As Porter (1998) suggests, intellectual property pro-
tection and antitrust law enforcement at the national level and human 
capital development and physical infrastructure improvement at the 
subnational level are important aspects of cluster policy. The decline 
of population in Cleveland has made physical infrastructure sufﬁcient 
for cluster development. The focus should be on investing and retaining 
human capital. Based on 2000 census data, only 23 percent of Cleve-
land’s adult population has a bachelor’s degree, a proportion that ranks 
as 157 among the 331 U.S. metropolitan areas. Human capital is critical 
to both knowledge creation and entrepreneurship (Qian and Acs 2013) 
and accordingly plays an important role in maintaining the vibrancy of 
clusters. 
The second implication from the literature is that economic devel-
opment strategies should take into account the path-dependent nature of 
cluster evolution. Cleveland, as it has been for most of its history, is still 
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specialized in manufacturing production both for clusters and for traded 
industries. Nationally, most of these are declined or declining industries, 
constituting the major source of the stagnancy of Cleveland’s economy. 
Despite that, any proposed cluster development strategy for Cleveland 
cannot simply overlook its manufacturing base. The history of the city 
renders its infrastructure, supply chains, business climate, and institu-
tional setting all favorable to the manufacturing sector. The competitive 
advantage of Cleveland lies in its support systems for manufacturing. 
For the last several decades, growth has been remarkable in service 
areas such as insurance carriers and legal industries, yet these services 
are very competitive given the values of their location quotient. Policies 
or strategies in favor of service industries over manufacturing industries 
would be fundamentally wrong. 
In fact, it is not “shameful” to be manufacturing based. It is good 
to have a specialization in “sexy” industries where that reﬂ ects genuine 
competitive advantage, such as within high-tech industries in Silicon 
Valley or Research Triangle Park, ﬁnancial and fashion industries in 
New York City, or entertainment industries in Los Angeles, but manu-
facturing industries can also be drivers of economic growth. Accord-
ing to Markusen (1996), when the national manufacturing employment 
growth rate between 1970 and 1990 was almost zero, the manufactur-
ing employment of industrial cities that grew most rapidly during this 
period increased by at least 50 percent. Porter (1998) states that “all 
industries can employ advanced technology; all industries can be 
knowledge intensive” (p. 80). 
Consequently, cities like Cleveland should not think of abandon-
ing manufacturing, but rather should focus on building regional capac-
ity and jurisdictional advantages that reinforce the competitiveness of 
manufacturing clusters. As long as Cleveland maintains its competitive 
advantage, a manufacturing industry in the city may still grow by taking 
a higher share of this nationally shrinking industry. At the core of the 
competitiveness of manufacturing clusters is continuous innovation. 
Such changes are not speciﬁc to high-tech industries; they are funda-
mentally important for sustaining the growth of all industries or clus-
ters. This imperative also calls for public policy to strengthen regional 
or local human capital. 
The third implication from the literature is that there is a support-
ing role that public policy may play in facilitating the emergence of the 
Bowen.indb 89  12/16/2013 2:13:57 PM   
 
 
  
The Evolution of Clusters and the Revival of Old Industrial Cities 89 
next competitive cluster in Cleveland. As Klepper (2011), Markusen 
(1996), and Porter (1998) have contended, the emergence of a clus-
ter may result from the incubation activity of existing clusters, large 
incumbent ﬁrms, or institutions like universities. Irrespective of indus-
try, knowledge spillovers and entrepreneurship are critical in the forma-
tion of clusters this way. In fact, these two factors are interrelated; as 
Acs et al. (2009) and Qian and Acs (2013) argue, entrepreneurial activ-
ity may serve as a mechanism of transmitting knowledge spillovers. 
Cleveland’s productivity in knowledge creation, as measured by pat-
ents per capita in year 2000, ranked 144 out of 331 metropolitan areas; 
by contrast, its entrepreneurial activity, as measured by new ﬁrms per 
capita in year 2000, ranked 224 out of 361 metropolitan areas.6 These 
measures suggest that not only knowledge creation and spillovers but 
also entrepreneurship in Cleveland need to be strengthened to foster the 
development of new clusters. 
Beyond human capital investment and retention, as discussed 
under the ﬁrst implication, public efforts may be put into small busi-
ness support programs, like business incubators and Small Business 
Development Centers. Business incubators, for example, may facili-
tate both knowledge spillovers (through the networking opportunities 
they provide) and entrepreneurship (through the various primary and 
professional services they offer). The publicly funded business support 
programs, in accord with cluster policy, should service local businesses 
from all industries. 
Last but not least, it does not matter when a regional cluster was 
transformed from one type to another under a typology like Markusen’s 
(1996) or from one industrial composition to another one as suggested 
by Montana and Nenide (2008), as long as the cluster maintains its com-
petitiveness. The fall of Detroit was not because its automobile cluster 
evolved from a Marshallian industrial district to a hub-and-spoke dis-
trict (Markusen 1996), but because, along with this transformation, the 
oligopolistic Detroit Three lapsed into rigidities that deferred entrepre-
neurial new entries (Chinitz 1961). Cleveland used to be one of the 
most entrepreneurial cities in the United States a century ago, and its 
decline was largely attributed to the loss of that spirit. Cleveland’s clus-
ters, as elsewhere, have been evolving, and today its leading clusters 
more or less cover all of the four types of industrial districts identiﬁed 
by Markusen. All these types of clusters could be competitive, or not. 
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Regardless of cluster type and industrial composition, the true sources 
of clusters’ competitiveness in a region are high stocks of human capi-
tal, well-developed infrastructure, and social, business, and institutional 
climates that encourage learning and innovative and entrepreneurial 
activities. Cluster development policy in Cleveland and other old indus-
trial cities should be made in these directions. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter focuses on the evolution of clusters and the associ-
ated implications for the revival of old industrial cities, using Cleveland 
as an example. It reviews the literature on the deﬁ nitions, typologies, 
and evolution paths of clusters and also introduces some facts about 
Cleveland’s cluster development based on the Cluster Mapping Project 
and Moody’s economy.com data. At the core of the discussion is how 
cluster evolution theories may shed light on the revitalization of Cleve-
land. Four implications are drawn from the literature: 1) highlighting 
the roles of primacy of market, 2) path dependency, 3) public policy in 
the emergence of clusters, and 4) the irrelevance of cluster types in the 
context of economic development. In conclusion, human capital, inno-
vation, and entrepreneurship should be the targets of Cleveland’s focus 
in building competitive clusters and regaining economic vibrancy. The 
capacity building approach to cluster development, as Sallet, Paisley, 
and Masterman (2009) have noted, may mean that it will be decades 
before Cleveland regains its former stature in the national economy,
and it may require collective leadership from both public and private 
sectors. 
Notes 
The author would like to thank Minkyu Yeom for his research assistance with the data 
and Srikanth Sivashankaran for his editing work. 
1. See http://edq.sagepub.com/reports/most-read (accessed August 18, 2011). 
2. The Third Italy refers to the central and northeast regions of Italy. 
3. Porter (2003) gives three primary criteria for traded industries: 1) all states with a 
location quotient greater or equal to 1 account for at least half of the total employ-
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ment, 2) the top ﬁve states represent an average location quotient of at least 2, and 
3) the Gini index is at least 0.3. Following Porter’s suggestion, we also excluded 
resource-based industries, in this case all four-digit NAICS industries under Agri-
culture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting (NAICS code 11) and Mining, Quarrying, 
and Oil and Gas Extraction (NAICS code 21). 
4. Location quotient is the share of employment in an industry in a region divided by 
the share of employment in the same industry in the nation. It reﬂects the extent 
to which the region is specialized in the industry compared with the nation as a 
benchmark. 
5. For details, see http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2011/03/american_ 
greetings_to_stay_in.html (accessed October 1, 2011). 
6. Patent data and new ﬁrm formation data used the 1999 metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSAs) deﬁnition and the 2003 MSAs deﬁnition, respectively, leading to 
different total numbers of MSAs. Patent data were provided by Kevin Stolarick 
(University of Toronto); population data were from the 2000 census; and new 
ﬁrm formation data were from Business Information Tracking System of the U.S. 
Census Bureau. 
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Stop Shovelling 
A New Workforce Development Strategy to 
Promote Regional Prosperity 
Joel A. Elvery 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
Workers laid off in the declining industries of Rust Belt cities are 
often targets of the nation’s workforce development system. Addi-
tional training, it is thought, will help these workers ﬁnd new jobs 
requiring their newly acquired skills. However, this is a “needs-
based” approach; those workers perceived to have the greatest 
need are offered training. Perhaps, instead, the system should tar-
get displaced workers who are most likely to advance in occupa-
tions (those possessing interest and aptitude), thereby eventually 
creating openings for lower-skilled workers, i.e., job chains. 
Workforce development policy in the United States has been driven 
by goals, rather than by what is achievable. The main focus has been to 
help people with few skills enter or reenter the labor market. The pro-
grams implemented to achieve those goals, however, have had limited 
success. The simple truth is that many low-skilled workers have a dif-
ﬁ cult time ﬁnding work because they cannot keep up with advances in 
the economy. This has been especially problematic in the manufacturing 
centers of the Rust Belt, where many jobs have been lost to automation 
and competition from other regions. Even if low-skilled workers could 
be trained for in-demand occupations, the number of openings at any 
time is much smaller than the number of people who are unemployed 
or working for low wages (Lafer 2002). This means that job training for 
the least skilled has limited ability to reduce poverty. 
As an analogy, the labor market for each skill group is like a bucket. 
The bucket for the lowest skills is large, but it is completely full and 
95 
Bowen.indb 96  12/16/2013 2:13:59 PM   
 
 
 
 
 
  
96 Elvery 
shrinking relative to the other buckets. Workforce development organi-
zations have historically focused on helping individuals enter this por-
tion of the labor market. This emphasis continues today with the tiered 
service system of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), where people 
are only eligible for intensive training if they have proven to be unable 
to ﬁnd work at pay near that of their prior position. Consequently, train-
ing resources are targeted to people who have difﬁculty ﬁ nding work 
and, except during recessions and their aftermath, these individuals are 
typically low skilled. The training available is generally too little to 
move these participants beyond entry-level positions. While a lucky 
few ﬁnd a way to stay in the labor market, most spill over the side of the 
bucket. This effect discourages the many unlucky training participants 
who remain unemployed and wastes public resources. 
It is time to stop shoveling more individuals into low-skilled mar-
kets. We must recognize that poverty reduction is only one potential 
goal for workforce policy; increasing the efﬁciency of labor markets 
and the level of individuals’ earnings are also good objectives. The most 
effective way to achieve these aims is to orient our workforce system 
toward facilitating advancement into occupations in which the vacan-
cies outnumber the applicants. Job training dollars should be targeted 
to individuals based on interest and aptitude, not need. While this strat-
egy would not directly assist the poorest individuals, it would have the 
potential to create job openings for them. As people advance in their 
careers, their prior positions will open up, which could create a job chain 
that results in openings for low-skilled workers. In addition, the produc-
tivity and income increases connected to job advancement would create 
economic growth. This means that an advancement-centered workforce 
system could better achieve the goal of the current system: to increase 
the number of low-skilled individuals who are working. 
Reorienting the workforce system to promote advancement into 
open positions is especially important for metropolitan areas (metros) 
in the Rust Belt. In the last 50 years, the growth of regions has been 
closely tied to the education level of their population (Shapiro 2006) 
and there is every reason to believe that this will remain true (Moretti 
2012). The Rust Belt has suffered large, long-lived manufacturing job 
losses both from 1970 to 1985 and again from 1998 to 2003. These 
losses have generated a negative cycle that is difﬁcult to interrupt. First, 
population declines; one estimate ﬁnds a metro’s population declines by 
Bowen.indb 97  12/16/2013 2:13:59 PM   
 
  
  
Stop Shovelling 97 
1.8 people per job lost from the auto or steel industries (Feyrer, Sacer-
dote, and Stern 2007). The population decline reduces unemployment 
rates to typical levels, but it also alters the composition of the work-
force. Declines in population lead to declines in housing prices and the 
poor, who are low-skilled on average, are disproportionately attracted 
to inexpensive housing (Glaeser and Gyourko 2005). As a result, Rust 
Belt metros, whose residents were less educated than other metros with 
similar income levels and house prices before the decline in manufac-
turing jobs, saw slower increases in education levels than regions that 
did not suffer catastrophic job loss. 
Numerous programs have been put in place to increase state edu-
cation levels, but evidence of their effectiveness is lacking (see Groen 
[2011] for a review of the literature). The challenge is that skilled peo-
ple choose to live in regions where they can ﬁnd work. As a result, for 
every 10 additional bachelor’s degree holders a state graduates, it only 
gains three more degree holders than it would have otherwise (Bound et 
al. 2004). By focusing on the jobs that are available, programs that help 
people advance into open positions are likely to be an effective way for 
the Rust Belt to increase its skill level. 
This chapter argues that we need to reorient our workforce develop-
ment system to focus on advancement and describes policies and pro-
grams that ﬁt that orientation. The ﬁrst section presents an informal 
model for thinking about how labor markets function. Then, the dis-
cussion documents the limited success of the workforce development 
system created in WIA, describes the kinds of programs that would 
facilitate career advancement, and presents recent successful initia-
tives that demonstrate the value of advancement-centered workforce 
development. 
A LABOR MARKET FRAMEWORK 
A great deal of evidence shows that labor markets in industrial-
ized countries are imperfectly competitive (well summarized in Man-
ning [2003]). It is best to think of U.S. labor markets as made up of 
many submarkets, where each one covers a particular skill level and 
a metropolitan area or nonmetropolitan region. Due to chance, people 
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with the same skills can earn different wages, depending on which job 
they ﬁnd. A worker with the good fortune to ﬁnd a high-paying job is 
less likely to leave. People can only take jobs that are available, and 
most submarkets have about as many open positions as job seekers. The 
least-skilled submarkets are the largest; the more skilled the submarket, 
the smaller it is. Movement between different submarkets can be done 
in several ways. If individuals lose a job and cannot ﬁnd one at the same 
skill level, they eventually fall to a lower-skill submarket. People can 
also advance from one level to the next, but only with an investment of 
time and usually money. 
There are two types of unemployed workers in our labor markets. 
Some jobless individuals have worked before or have recently com-
pleted college or other substantial training. The other group consists of 
people who are hoping to enter the labor market either for the ﬁ rst time 
or after a long spell of unemployment. 
The degree of balance between the number of jobs and the number 
of people at each skill level has important ramiﬁcations. In submar-
kets with more people than jobs, unemployment persists and employers 
face little pressure to increase wages. In submarkets with more jobs 
than people, employers increase wages to attract the available workers. 
There are large differences in the numbers of jobs and people in low-
skilled submarkets (where people outnumber jobs) and submarkets that 
require speciﬁc technical skills but not a college degree (where jobs 
sometimes outnumber people). This can be seen in Figure 5.1, which 
shows the average from May 2005 to November 2007 of the number 
of unemployed individuals by most recent occupation and the num-
ber of openings advertised online in the occupation.1 The occupations 
where there were more than ﬁve unemployed workers for every adver-
tised position are less skilled: farming, ﬁshing, and forestry; construc-
tion and extraction; buildings and grounds cleaning and maintenance; 
food preparation and serving related; personal care and service; and 
production. The occupations with less than one unemployed worker per 
each opening are all highly skilled: computer and mathematical sci-
ence; health care practitioners and technical; architecture and engineer-
ing; business and ﬁnancial operations; life, physical, and social science; 
management; community and social services; and legal. 
The least skilled submarkets have many more seekers than jobs. 
Most individuals enter the labor market at this stratum. Some people 
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Figure 5.1  Average of the Help Wanted Online Supply/Demand Rate, by 
Occupation, from May 2005 to November 2007 
Farming, fishing, and forestry
Construction and extraction 
Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance
Food preparation and serving related 
Personal care and service 
Production 
Transportation and material moving
Protective service 
Education, training, and library
Sales and related
Health care support
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media
Office and administrative support
Installation, maintenance, and repair
Legal
Community and social services
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Life, physical, and social science
Business and financial operations
Architecture and engineering
Health care practitioners and technical
Computer and mathematical science 
All occupations=1.94 
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Average supply/demand rate 
NOTE: Average supply/demand rate is the average from May 2005 through November 
2007 of the number of unemployed persons divided by the number of online help-
wanted ads. “All occupations” is the total number of unemployed divided by the total 
number of ads. The occupation-speciﬁc rates are based on unemployed persons’ oc-
cupations in their prior occupations and the number of ads speciﬁc to that occupation. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Help Wanted OnLine (Conference Board 2013), 
accessed through Haver Analytics on March 6, 2013. 
quickly move on to more skilled work, but others stay in these sub-
markets for their whole career. There are two major reasons that these 
low-skilled markets have more participants than positions. First, work-
ers of any skill level can compete in this market if they need to do so. 
Second, the demand for labor in the least skilled submarkets has been 
declining as a share of overall demand; as a proportion of employment, 
the number of workers who specialize in manual tasks or routine cogni-
tive functions has steadily declined since 1970 (Autor, Levy, and Mur-
nane 2003). 
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Many submarkets for skilled technical workers with less than a col-
lege degree have more positions than eligible job seekers. These mid-
skilled occupations account for a large share of our labor markets (Hol-
zer and Lerman 2009). However, the number of people pursuing skilled 
technical degrees and certiﬁcates is predicted to grow more slowly than 
the number of positions requiring those skills (Aspen Institute 2003). 
This is already leading to fast-rising wages for some midskilled jobs. 
For example, while overall real wages grew by 5 percent from 1997 
to 2005, the real wages of radiological technicians rose by 23 percent, 
and those of electricians rose by 18 percent (Holzer and Lerman 2009). 
Because many such jobs require both specialized training and related 
experience, it takes time for people to enter these submarkets. People 
qualiﬁed for skilled technical jobs are less likely to migrate for a job 
than are people in occupations that require a college degree or higher 
(Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo 1992). Therefore, employers usually ﬁnd 
themselves searching for someone with a narrowly deﬁned set of skills 
within the local region, which can be difﬁcult. This has been true even 
during the slow recovery from the 2007–2009 recession. 
How does the workforce development system ﬁt into this frame-
work? In an ideal world, workforce programs would help people move 
from submarkets with more seekers than openings to those with more 
openings than seekers. This means facilitating the transition of people 
into skilled technical submarkets and out of the least skilled submarkets. 
However, the workforce development system created by WIA allocates 
occupational training services to people who cannot ﬁnd work. Except 
during recessions, much of the money goes to the least skilled job seek-
ers, who are unlikely to have the basic skills required for midskilled 
jobs. This means that public money is focused on training people to 
enter low-skilled labor submarkets. Without job growth in the least 
skilled submarkets, this is like adding sand to a bucket that is already 
full. Some of the new entrants may ﬁnd jobs, but only at the cost of 
displacing other people who are already working or looking for work. 
This is why we need to refocus workforce development toward 
advancement in the labor force, which would start with increasing the 
ﬂow of people into skilled technical occupations. Typically, individuals 
with some skills and work history can move into technical work more 
easily than people who have been out of the labor force or in the least 
skilled jobs. This implies that the people most eligible for advancing 
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into skilled technical work are those who have been or are currently 
employed in the next tier down. While helping such individuals would 
not directly assist those who are disengaged from the labor market, it 
could produce substantial beneﬁts for people in less-skilled submarkets 
by beginning a string of advancing workers, called a job chain. Per-
sky, Felsenstein, and Carlson (2004) estimate that 10 new jobs with 
hourly wages of $16.75 to $26.15 create 8.6 vacancies in lower-wage 
positions.2 Job chains provide real opportunity to low-skilled individu-
als, in contrast to the false promise of training that does not lead to 
employment. 
THE TRACK RECORD OF THE CURRENT
WORKFORCE SYSTEM 
Many readers may be disturbed by the proposition that the work-
force system should abandon its almost exclusive focus on reducing 
poverty by assisting the least skilled. I am not arguing that we should 
give up the goal of assisting the poor—indeed, I believe our nation 
should be doing more to that end—but I do believe that the current 
public job training system is not a good way to achieve this mission. 
It is not at all clear that the present approach to workforce develop-
ment helps the poor in a meaningful way. Harry Holzer, a supporter of 
job training programs, acknowledges the limited success of the public 
job training system (2009). Unfortunately, there has not been a rigorous 
evaluation of the beneﬁts of the WIA system, but the system that was 
in place from 1986 to 1998, created by the Job Training Partnership 
Act (JTPA), was evaluated using a classical randomized experiment. 
Holzer (2009) reports that the average annual earnings gain for dis-
advantaged adults found by the National JTPA Study was about $100 
per month in real dollars, with these effects appearing to dissipate over 
time. While these programs have net beneﬁts, the fact remains that $100 
per month in gross beneﬁt per participant is a minor gain. The results 
for youths are even weaker. These ﬁgures cover the program under the 
JTPA, when classroom-based occupational skills training was the main 
service individuals received from workforce agencies. Because evalu-
ations have shown that occupational skills training have the largest and 
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longest sustained effects, it is likely that the typical effect of WIA ser-
vices on individuals’ earnings is well below that of the JTPA. In 2007, 
only 13.6 percent of people assisted through the federal WIA received 
training services (Social Policy Research Associates 2010). 
In his book, The Job Training Charade, Gordon Lafer (2002) makes 
a compelling case that the limited labor market success of low-skilled 
individuals is due as much to the lack of openings as to the lack of 
skills. The majority of entry-level jobs in the United States essentially 
require that a worker be on time, learn to do three-to-ﬁve simple tasks, 
and have a good attitude and basic motor skills. The challenge for low-
skilled individuals is not that they are unable to do the work, but that 
there are too many people eligible for the same jobs. 
This explains why most job training efforts have had limited suc-
cess: they do not address the root problem. Even more than skills, work-
ers on the margin need job openings. The most obvious way to create 
these is through government programs that provide work opportunities 
and income. There are four major difﬁculties with this approach. First, 
it is unsustainable because the individuals only have jobs as long as 
the government pays for them. Second, it is unlikely that these indi-
viduals would be efﬁciently employed. Third, such a program would 
most likely need to continually grow as there has been a 40-year trend 
of low-skilled work declining as a share of employment (Autor, Levy, 
and Murnane 2003). Furthermore, even if this were an efﬁcient use of 
resources, it has proven to be politically infeasible. 
Sadly, federal workforce development programs have not achieved 
their goal of decreasing poverty, nor have they made labor markets 
more efﬁcient. In 1982, the occupations that employers described as 
important and difﬁcult to ﬁll with qualiﬁed candidates included “com-
puter programmers, systems analysts, word processors, data processors, 
medical and laboratory technicians, machinists, and electricians” (Lafer 
2002, p. 53). Today, only word and data processors can be removed 
from that list. This inability to address the needs of employers hurts 
regional and national economies. For example, Microsoft has opened 
ofﬁces in Canada in order to take advantage of that nation’s skill-
favoring immigration policies (Gohring 2007). When ﬁrms select work 
sites, the availability of a suitable workforce is usually a top consid-
eration. Regions that are adept at training individuals for more skilled 
work are attractive to employers. This is illustrated by the subsidized, 
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custom training programs provided by North Carolina’s community 
college system, which have been credited for playing an important role 
in the strong growth of the state’s Research Triangle region (Schmidt 
1997). 
WIA’s tiered service system limits the ability of its programs to 
beneﬁt employers because training is directed to the clients with the 
least skills. Data on the skills of those who receive training are not avail-
able. However, intensive training is reserved for people who are unable 
ﬁnd work for an extended period of time, and it is reasonable to assume 
that training participants are less skilled than the people who ﬁ nd work 
through Workforce Investment Board (WIB) postings. A Government 
Accountability Ofﬁce survey (2006) of ﬁrms that posted positions with 
one-stop centers operated through WIA found that two-thirds of the 
people hired from these postings were low skilled. Given the weak fun-
damental skills of people who are unable to secure even the most basic 
entry-level work, the hard-to-employ people that the workforce system 
focuses on are unlikely to succeed in midskilled careers. In order to 
address employers’ needs, the workforce system would have to target 
training resources away from the least skilled and toward people with 
strong basic skills. 
The U.S. workforce development system spends an overwhelming 
majority share of its resources on people who are not employed. How-
ever, it lacks mechanisms for helping people with jobs, or those who 
are able to ﬁnd their own jobs, to advance in their ﬁelds or to change 
careers. This would not be a problem if our economy were made up of 
nothing but large employers; such entities can hire people for entry-
level positions, learn about their aptitudes, and provide training for them 
to progress within the organization. However, 34.9 percent of employ-
ees at for-proﬁt ﬁrms in the United States work at companies with fewer 
than 100 employees; another 14.1 percent work at ﬁrms with 100–499 
employees (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2010). For these people, advanc-
ing often requires changing employers. 
The system of one-stop centers operated through WIA does pro-
vide a variety of training, but most clients either are not given access 
to these resources or they choose not to use them. Of the 3.1 million 
people served under WIA throughout the United States from October 
2007 to September 2010, only 382,626 (12.4 percent) received training 
services, and 15.9 percent of these were provided on-the-job or cus-
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tomized training.3 This means that less than 2 percent of the adults and 
dislocated workers served by the WIA system during this time span 
received on-the-job or customized training, the forms that are most con-
nected to the vision of refocusing the workforce development system 
on advancement. 
The primary public mechanisms in place to help people advance 
are community colleges and career centers.4 These are vital institu-
tions, which deserve continued support and growth, but are insufﬁcient 
in terms of capacity, affordability for students, and services offered. 
Unlike that provided by the WIA, individuals must pay for community 
college and career center training. As will be discussed in more detail, it 
is difﬁcult for people who have the goal of becoming more skilled to get 
the information they need about employment opportunities and options 
for training. This uncertainty about how to move up and the clear 
upfront costs of training are part of the reason that there is an imbalance 
between job seekers and openings for midskilled occupations. 
When someone advances to a higher-paying career, society as a 
whole beneﬁts. The individual has more disposable income and con-
sumes a portion of the incremental funds, causing economic growth. 
Such workers also pay more taxes. Importantly, one person advancing 
can start a chain of other people progressing, too. Suppose Jane has 
been working on the Geek Squad at Best Buy and becomes a computer 
programmer. Best Buy may promote a customer service worker into 
the Geek Squad and then hire a new customer service worker. Presum-
ably, Jane’s advancement has led to wage increases for one or two other 
workers and created an entry-level opening, which people who want 
to enter the labor market most need. These beneﬁts are not just hypo-
thetical; Persky, Felsenstein, and Carlson (2004) show that adding 100 
midskilled jobs to a local economy creates 80 openings in lower-skilled 
positions. 
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO PROMOTE ADVANCEMENT 
Workforce development focused on advancement would play sev-
eral roles lacking in our current system: 
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• identify occupations with the highest ratio of vacancies to eli-
gible candidates; 
• assess individuals interested in career change or advancement to 
determine their occupational aptitude; 
• encourage people with high aptitude for an in-demand occupa-
tion and who earn less than they would in that ﬁeld to pursue 
training to become qualiﬁed for the area; 
• work with employers and educators to identify bottlenecks so 
that a larger portion of those pursuing in-demand occupations 
eventually become qualiﬁed. 
There are a number of programs that could be introduced or ex-
panded to facilitate advancement. To identify where public intervention 
would be effective, it is helpful to think about the stages of progression 
for an employed individual. Imagine Dave, a 20-year-old working at a 
“big box” retailer who wants to gain skills and increase his earnings. 
There are limited opportunities for him within the store because there 
are few supervisory positions, and much of the ordering and logistics 
is automated. Dave will ﬁnd it easier to secure a promotion elsewhere. 
This means that his employer, even though it is large, has little incentive 
to invest in his advancement. 
Dave’s ﬁrst step would be to identify a new career. Ideally, he would 
base this decision on the number of openings, wage and employment 
trends, and knowledge of his own aptitudes. But where would he get 
such information about different ﬁelds? For people who are working, 
one-stop employment centers provide self-service assistance—essen-
tially showing them how to use computer resources to look up informa-
tion on jobs and training opportunities. He might go to the admissions 
ofﬁce of a community college or a proprietary school (a for-proﬁ t tech-
nical or trade school), though many people only take that step after they 
have identiﬁed a career. Most likely, he will talk to friends and family 
and accumulate anecdotal evidence about what careers are secure, pay 
well, and suit him. Depending on whom he talks to, he may or may 
not make a good choice. This is the ﬁrst opportunity for improvement: 
provide easy access to more and better information on advancement 
opportunities. 
Bowen.indb 106  12/16/2013 2:14:02 PM   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
106 Elvery 
After Dave selects a career, he has to choose a route for training. 
Some avenues are self-evident, such as community colleges and pro-
prietary schools. Other paths do not have such clear entry points and, 
particularly in the case of on-the-job training (OJT), can require ﬁnding 
a supportive ﬁrm. Suppose Dave decides to become a chef. The general 
consensus is that proprietary culinary schools are not worth their cost 
and it is better to learn through on-the-job experience (Hallock 2011). 
But how would Dave know this? How would he judge which restaurant 
jobs will provide valuable OJT? How would he know whether a com-
munity college or a proprietary school has a program that is respected 
and valued by employers? Again, there is a critical lack of information 
available to guide people on their paths to better jobs. 
Another factor in advancing is ﬁnding a program that accommo-
dates Dave’s work schedule and has slots available. Community col-
leges and proprietary schools have made great strides in accommodat-
ing working students’ schedules, but community college programs that 
lead to careers in high-demand ﬁelds, such as nursing and radiography, 
often have long waiting lists. These programs could be expanded. While 
it is generally easy to borrow money for college, Dave may require 
assistance with child care or transportation. Help may also be needed 
to avoid predatory school loans, especially for students at proprietary 
schools. 
If all goes smoothly and Dave does manage to get the training he 
needs to advance, he then has to search for work. If he chose a career 
well, this should be the easy part because he would be moving into a 
ﬁeld where there are more openings than people. If not, he may need 
further assistance in identifying job opportunities. This is an area where 
help is usually readily available, either through local one-stop centers 
or the placement ofﬁces of individuals’ alma maters. 
This hypothetical case demonstrates four clear areas in which gov-
ernment policies and programs could facilitate advancement for Dave 
and others like him: ﬁrst, improving information and available counsel-
ing to help people choose careers that are in demand and for which they 
have an aptitude; second, producing necessary information about com-
munity colleges, career centers, and proprietary schools; third, making 
it easier to get training through cost savings, convenient scheduling, 
and support services; and ﬁnally, matching individuals to the best avail-
able job through placement assistance. 
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Career Counseling 
The ﬁrst program that could facilitate advancement is one that 
devotes resources to making career counseling more broadly avail-
able. Workers need to know where they can turn to get guidance about 
how and where to advance. This could be achieved by refocusing WIA
spending in order to make substantive career counseling available to 
everyone who is interested. Any such expansion of services needs to 
be paired with a comprehensive marketing campaign so that people 
are regularly reminded of the opportunity. The WIA route is attractive 
because it could be paid for by redirecting funds from existing WIA
programs, rather than by ﬁnding new money to allocate to workforce 
development. Of course, more could be accomplished with additional 
resources, particularly since public spending on job training has been 
declining as a share of gross domestic product since the 1980s (Holzer 
2009). The challenge would be overcoming public perception of the 
WIA-funded one-stop centers as places that help the unemployed. 
Teenagers might feel more comfortable using the career services 
available at their local high schools. Even if they only serve their cur-
rent students, counselors in high schools can make a large impact on 
students’ career decisions. However, counselors are spread thin and 
have limited time available to give career advice. In 2006 there was 
one counselor for every 285 high school students in the United States 
(Barton 2006), and the number of students per counselors has most 
likely risen because of budget cuts during the recession (Flaherty 2013). 
Where counselors do remain, they primarily advise students how to ﬁnd 
the right college, not the right career. This leaves students who would 
be well suited for skilled technical jobs without advice on that option. 
The lucky ones ﬁnd their way to community colleges, where they may 
get better career direction. Many others will enter the workforce with 
no guidance about preparing for a career. 
Information about Training Programs 
One of the reasons that career counselors are so crucial is that there 
is little public information that can guide individuals toward job open-
ings and training programs. Unlike four-year institutions, community 
colleges are not featured and compared in guides to ﬁnding the “best” 
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program. Good career counselors become experts on local employers 
and training options. Therefore, the second option would be to give the 
public access to information about different career training options. 
At a minimum, there are ﬁve pieces of information that need to be 
available to help individuals choose a career path and training program: 
1) the proportion of people completing the program who are employed 
in a related ﬁeld a year later, 2) the median monthly earnings of people 
a year after their completion of the program, 3) the average weekly 
hours the completers worked a year after ﬁnishing, 4) the percentage 
of people who start the program who also ﬁnish, and 5) the number of 
completers. This information should be gathered on a two- or three-
year rolling basis so that it is up to date and also robust to idiosyncratic 
ﬂuctuations. Such material would tell individuals how likely it is that 
the program would lead to a job, what they can expect to earn, and 
the probability of ﬁnishing the curriculum.5 The data would come from 
annual surveys of students who have completed programs, which are 
currently used at some community colleges. These statistics would have 
to be collected for all the major types of training providers: proprietary 
schools, career centers, community colleges, and Internet-only schools. 
Supporting the Training Process 
The third way to facilitate advancement would be to provide sup-
port services while individuals are in training. Many such services 
have been put into place in the last couple of decades, but it would be 
worthwhile to expand them further. Policies that make training more 
affordable for individuals, such as repealing the automatic reduction 
of Pell Grants for students attending low-tuition schools and expand-
ing the number of seats in community colleges, could also help people 
advance (Kazis et al. 2007). Working adults would especially beneﬁ t if 
subsidized student loans were extended to part-time students. Offering 
a complete set of courses when working people ﬁnd it convenient has 
become more important with the increased need for lifelong learning 
and growth in single-parent and dual-earner families. People who go 
to school at night have difﬁculty ﬁnding child care, so expanding these 
programs is also important. 
Community college is one of the best mechanisms we have in 
place for facilitating advancement. These institutions are usually lower 
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in cost, and their students have higher earnings and employment rates 
ﬁve years after entering school than observationally similar proprietary 
school students (Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2012). Many are highly 
responsive to the requirements of local employers, which helps them 
prepare students for occupations with available openings. Community 
colleges welcome students who take one or two classes of their choos-
ing, enabling people to get just the training they need, so continuing to 
improve and expand these institutions is essential. Three areas stand out 
as opportunities for development: 1) enlarging programs with waiting 
lists and strong placement records, 2) assessing students to ensure that 
those enrolling in high-demand programs are likely to succeed, and 3) 
steering students to programs that have high placement rates. 
Even with limited information available, many people are able to 
ﬁnd training that leads to jobs. As a result, many of the community 
college programs with the best placement records have waiting lists. 
This is especially true in health careers. For example, nursing and 
radiological technology programs often have one-to-two-year waiting 
lists.6 If these programs could expand capacity, it would help individu-
als advance and assist hospitals in coping with the shortage of nurses 
and radiology techs. Of course, this is a difﬁcult task, and two major 
factors that limit the growth of programs have proven hard to address: 
the lack of instructors (Yordy 2006) and the scarcity of opportunities for 
clinical training. Both stem in part from the choices of local employers: 
people qualiﬁed to be instructors can earn more practicing than teach-
ing, and most clinical training happens at local hospitals. Partnerships 
between educational institutions and employers, such as Cincinnati’s 
Healthcare Career Collaborative, are the most likely way to address 
these problems. 
Until programs with waiting lists and strong placement records 
grow, we can facilitate advancement by doing a better job of allocat-
ing the limited spots available. Particularly in health career programs, 
a substantial minority of students drop out of training programs. Some 
community colleges now allocate seats in health sciences programs 
with wait lists based on students’ academic aptitude (Moltz 2010). This 
should become standard practice for community colleges across the 
country. 
Providing information and counseling to help people choose occu-
pations and training programs is crucial to reorienting our workforce 
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development system toward advancement. Improving student advising 
at community colleges is a relatively easy way to do this. In the last 
10 years, tremendous gains have been made in creating longitudinally 
linked wage record ﬁles from the unemployment insurance system. 
Some states and community colleges are using these data to produce 
rich information about the employment and wages of students who have 
earned credentials. Many community colleges survey recent graduates 
as another way to learn about the career outcomes of their students. 
However, this knowledge is often not conveyed to students. Advising 
tends to focus on student desires, which may or may not include an 
awareness of the job prospects associated with different training paths. 
If advisers consciously direct students to programs that lead to employ-
ment, both students and the local economy will beneﬁt. 
Of course, advisers can only steer the students with whom they 
meet. According to the 2013 Community College Survey of Student 
Engagement, 50.8 percent of community college students never or 
rarely use career counseling; 20.2 percent responded “Don’t know/ 
not applicable” (Center for Community College Student Engagement 
2013). Career counseling is needed by more than the scant 29 percent of 
community college students that sometimes or frequently use it. 
Placement Assistance 
The last strategy that can help promote advancement is placement 
assistance. Not everyone knows the importance of ﬁnding a job that also 
offers a career. Placement support needs to help people ﬁ nd employers 
and also determine whether the employer will assist them in advancing 
further. Continuing to provide job readiness training, which has proven 
to be a cost effective way to help people retain their jobs (Holzer 2009), 
is also worthwhile. 
PROGRAMS THAT HAVE SHOWN PROMISE 
The Cleveland/Cuyahoga County Workforce Investment Board 
Some exciting new workforce development programs have been 
implemented that also demonstrate how to facilitate advancement. The 
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Cleveland/Cuyahoga County Workforce Investment Board (CCCWIB) 
completely reinvented itself in 2010 because of a combination of bud-
get cuts and disappointment with the share of participants who were 
unable to ﬁnd work after completing training. Under the direction of 
Larry Benders, the agency shifted roles from that of a traditional WIB, 
which views itself as an organization that provides training for hard-to-
employ individuals, to one more like an employment placement agency. 
Essentially, because of the 2007–2009 recession, the number of people 
with job skills coming into the CCCWIB’s employment centers dra-
matically increased. This meant that the challenge was ﬁ nding openings 
for them, not making them employable. 
To ﬁnd positions, the CCCWIB combines cold-calling employers 
with a sales force similar to that of a for-proﬁt employment agency. 
The CCCWIB matches the openings to a database of people looking for 
employment. Qualiﬁed individuals receive calls informing them of an 
opportunity and its application procedure. Positions for which the num-
ber of qualiﬁed prospective workers is insufﬁcient are targeted for job 
training. Individuals with an interest and aptitude for the opening are 
hired by the employer, who receives a grant to defray the cost of train-
ing the clients. This hews to the idea of advancement in that it focuses 
job training resources on cases in which qualiﬁed workers are hard to 
ﬁnd and on those individuals who show strong potential for success. 
The CCCWIB’s new demand-facing approach has only been in 
place since July 2010 and has not been rigorously evaluated. However, 
the available evidence suggests that the strategy is producing better out-
comes. Compared to the rest of Ohio in the program years since the new 
approach was implemented (2010 and 2011), the CCCWIB saw more 
improvement in the outcomes of exiters than did the rest of the state. 
The results are reported in Table 5.1. In 2011, the entered employment 
rates (the percent of exiters who were unemployed at the beginning 
of their program who were employed one quarter after exiting from 
the program) for both adult and displaced worker exiters were above 
the comparable rates in 2007, while for the rest of the state these two 
indicators were well below their 2007 levels. Similar patterns hold for 
the average earnings of adult exiters, but for displaced worker exiters 
the CCCWIB and the rest of the state had similar changes in earnings. 
The CCCWIB also had larger increases in the number of adults and 
displaced workers served during 2010 and 2011 than did the rest of the 
state. 
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Table 5.1  Exiter Outcomes for Cleveland/Cuyahoga County Workforce Investment Board (CCCWIB) and the Rest 
of Ohio, 2007–2011 
Exiter’s entered employment rate (%) Average earnings (2012$) 
112  
Program Adults Displaced workers Adults Displaced workers 
year CCCWIB Rest of Ohio CCCWIB Rest of Ohio CCCWIB Rest of Ohio CCCWIB Rest of Ohio 
2007 80.1 78.2 84.7 87.5 14,702 16,264 18,479 18,629 
2008 75.5 75.3 82.6 85.1 19,118 16,085 20,005 18,833 
2009 53.1 65.6 62.3 68.6 14,755 15,472 17,405 18,038 
2010 79.8 66.4 79.5 73.1 14,889 14,965 18,885 19,519 
2011 91.2 72.9 91.1 79.1 18,244 15,585 19,564 19,487 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from data included in State of Ohio Workforce Investment Act Annual Reports for program years 
2007–2011(Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services 2013); Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2013a). 
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At the same time that the outcomes of CCCWIB’s exiters improved 
more than those for the remainder of the state, the Cleveland area was 
experiencing slower employment growth than the rest of Ohio. Table 
5.2 gives the percentage change in employment during each program 
year for the Cleveland Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA)—which has 
the county served by the CCCWIB as its core—and for the rest of Ohio.7 
In each program year from 2007 to 2009, the Cleveland CBSA lost a 
larger share of its employment than did the rest of Ohio. In 2010 and 
2011, the Cleveland CBSA had less growth than did the rest of the state. 
This is especially true in program year 2011, when employment grew 
by 0.51 percent in the CBSA and 2.31 percent in the rest of the state. 
The fact that the Cleveland area was growing less than the rest of the 
state during the implementation of the demand-facing approach makes 
the larger improvement in the outcomes of the CCCWIB’s exiters all 
the more impressive. 
The experience of the CCCWIB also gives hope that the public 
job training system can be radically transformed without additional 
funding. Due to the formulas for allocating WIA dollars, the CCCWIB 
saw its budget cut in half from 2007 to 2011. This means that the WIB 
served more clients and improved their outcomes at the same time it 
was cutting staff and services. Other WIBs may also ﬁnd it possible to 
achieve better results without increasing budgets by focusing on ﬁnd-
ing open positions, matching workers to those jobs, and training people 
when there are not enough qualiﬁ ed applicants. 
While the CCCWIB’s new approach has only been in effect since 
July 2010, this innovative program has performed exceptionally well in 
a difﬁcult time. More people are being placed into jobs (Perkins 2011), 
and those individuals are earning more than in the past. Anecdotally, 
employers are ﬁnding it valuable to partner with the WIB. People are 
receiving training that actually leads to jobs, and ﬁrms are getting help 
preparing people for hard-to-ﬁll positions. This is a leading example of 
how the workforce system could promote advancement and make labor 
markets more efﬁcient. 
Other Workforce Development Initiatives 
A pilot program that has shown promise is the Frontline Decision 
Support System (FDSS), which was a partnership between the W.E. 
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Table 5.2  Percentage Change in Employment in Cleveland Core Based 
Statistical Area (CBSA) and the Rest of Ohio, 2007–2011 
Program year Cleveland CBSA Rest of Ohio 
2007 −1.31 −1.12 
2008 −6.43 −6.13 
2009 −0.64 −0.22 
2010 0.57 0.97 
2011 0.51 2.31 
NOTE: WIA program years run from July of the indicated calendar year through June 
of the following year. The employment percentage changes are calculated from June 
of the indicated calendar year to June of the following calendar year. 
SOURCE: Seasonally adjusted Current Employment Statistics June 2007 to June 2012 
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013b). 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and the Georgia Depart-
ment of Labor.8 The Upjohn Institute has developed a methodology 
that takes advantage of aggregate labor market and administrative data 
from the unemployment insurance system and the Georgia Career Cen-
ters. For individuals served, the FDSS determines job prospects using 
advancement-oriented criteria: the chance of ﬁnding work in the cli-
ent’s most recent industry, the likely pay in the client’s next position, 
and the occupations related to, growth prospects of, and available job 
openings in the client’s most recent occupation. 
The job counselors at Georgia Career Centers have been able to use 
this information to help clients target their job searches or pursue train-
ing that will help them secure a job. The FDSS also assisted with this 
task by giving counselors data on which class of service was most effec-
tive for prior clients who were similar to the current client. This helped 
counselors guide individuals to the type of training that has the best 
prospects for success. The two pilot implementations of this program 
have received positive feedback from both staff and clients (Eberts and 
O’Leary 2009), but the state of Georgia has cancelled the program. 
The FDSS has promoted advancement in three ways. First, it has 
helped individuals to develop realistic expectations about their job pros-
pects, which prevents them from declining positions that pay less than 
what they want but more than they should expect. Second, it has given 
individuals a sense of the prospects for their occupation, which helps 
people in fading ﬁelds choose to train for another career. Finally, it has 
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provided guidance on which services are most likely to lead to employ-
ment. Giving counselors more relevant information should increase the 
number of job seekers who pursue training that helps them advance. 
In the arena of workforce development, programs that focus on spe-
ciﬁc sectors and on developing career pathways are seen as the most 
promising route forward (Holzer 2009). Sectoral initiatives with a suc-
cessful track record, such as the Wisconsin Regional Training Partner-
ship and Jewish Vocational Service of Greater Boston, combine close 
relationships with employers and, relative to most WIA-funded activi-
ties, long and intensive training that addresses basic skills (8th grade– 
level math, reading, and critical thinking), ﬁeld-speciﬁc skills, and job 
readiness (Maguire et al. 2010). Participants also have substantially 
larger earnings increases than do those in the typical WIA program. The 
average earnings gain was $4,000 per year for participants in the most 
successful sectoral program (Maguire et al. 2010), versus only $1,200 
per year for WIA participants (Holzer 2009). 
Sectoral workforce programs share many of the features that an 
advancement-focused workforce system would need. First, they screen 
applicants and work only with those who are anticipated to succeed in 
training, which typically requires 6th-grade reading skills. This means 
that they are better targeting their services to people who are likely 
to advance than the WIA system does. Public/Private Ventures evalu-
ated three of these programs and found that 7.0 percent of their partici-
pants did not have a high school degree or general equivalency diploma 
(GED), compared to almost 16.7 percent of people who received inten-
sive services through WIA in program year 2005 (Maguire et al. 2010; 
Social Policy Research Associates 2010). This difference is statistically 
signiﬁcant at the 0.1 percent level. Second, sectoral programs foster 
close relationships with employers, helping to focus training on occu-
pations with available openings. Finally, these programs stress develop-
ing technical competencies related to speciﬁc occupations, rather than 
basic skills or job readiness. This emphasis on hard skills training is 
essential to advancement. 
In fact, the success of these sectoral programs may make the best 
case for shifting to an advancement-focused workforce system. They all 
have a mission to serve disadvantaged workers, a pool of individuals that 
typically ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to succeed in training. It is likely that simi-
lar efforts would produce even more impressive results if they placed 
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less emphasis on socioeconomic status and more emphasis on aptitude. 
This is not to say that programs that serve disadvantaged workers and 
job seekers are unimportant. We should maintain and grow efforts like 
these while simultaneously introducing similar programs to promote 
advancement that serve a broader cross section of the workforce. 
These notable workforce development programs all have a greater 
focus on advancement than is typical. Each of them has shown prom-
ise, although only sectoral training has been experimentally evaluated. 
Collectively, they suggest that reorienting our workforce development 
system toward advancement can be successful, both in theory and in 
practice. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Workforce development policy has two fundamental goals: to assist 
individuals who are struggling in the labor market, and to help employ-
ers ﬁ nd workers with the skills they need. The track record on helping 
individuals is mixed; the one on helping employers is even weaker. We
could do better at both goals if we reoriented our workforce develop-
ment system toward helping people advance into open positions. This 
would require redirecting resources away from individuals who are not 
working toward those who are and who have good potential for pro-
motion. Given the small beneﬁts disadvantaged workers typically get 
from government-sponsored training, it is important to not overstate the 
value of the existing programs for this group of individuals. 
Promoting advancement is especially important in the Rust Belt for 
several reasons. Targeting resources to help people upskill into open 
positions would speed the process of adapting to further losses of man-
ufacturing employment. Increasing the supply of workers eligible for 
midskilled jobs that manufacturers report having difﬁculty hiring, such 
as machinists and industrial equipment mechanics, may reduce employ-
ment losses by encouraging manufacturers to stay in the region. Finally, 
the incremental improvements in skills associated with advancements 
can add up and reduce the gap in skills between the Rust Belt and the 
nation as a whole. 
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It may be possible to reorient our workforce development system 
toward advancement without additional funding. This new approach 
would probably provide more intensive services, but it would also serve 
fewer people. This is because people would be trained for open posi-
tions; the best estimates are that there are usually 10 times as many 
people (employed and unemployed) looking for new jobs as there are 
available jobs (Lafer 2002). Both individuals and employers would be 
better assisted by a program that moves fewer people into open posi-
tions than by one that provides many people training that does not lead 
to jobs. In fact, the CCCWIB was able to greatly improve its placement 
results by becoming “demand facing” despite simultaneously suffering 
large budget cuts. 
It is reasonable to hope that this strategy would also assist the dis-
advantaged people who are currently the focus of the U.S. workforce 
development system. Research and common sense suggest that the 
primary obstacle faced by these individuals is the chasm between the 
large number of people searching for low-skilled work and the smaller 
quantity of available positions. Helping people advance can lessen the 
gap by moving people from this market to more-skilled labor markets. 
Furthermore, it is likely that having more people progress to skilled 
employment will stimulate the economy because of increases in both 
productivity and earnings. As the experience of the 1990s showed us, 
sustained economic growth is the most reliable way to assist disadvan-
taged workers on a large scale. 
Notes 
1. These are averages of the occupation group-level Help Wanted OnLine data (Con-
ference Board 2013) from the ﬁrst month data are available to the beginning of the 
most recent recession. 
2. Based on Table 5.2 in Persky, Felsenstein, and Carlson (2004) and adjusting wages 
for inﬂation from 1992 to 2012.
 3. These ﬁgures are the author’s calculations from the Annual WIASRD Data Books 
for program 2007–2009 (Social Policy Research Associates 2010). 
4. A career center is a Perkins Act vocational educational venue that serves high 
school students and adults. The centers provide classroom and cooperative train-
ing, usually for a smaller set of occupations than would a community college. 
5. Completion can be hard to deﬁne because sometimes students get enough training 
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to be hired for a skilled technical job prior to ﬁnishing a program. Whether or not 
these people should be counted as completers is a difﬁcult question. The premise 
here remains relevant: students need to know if the program leads to employment 
and the pay and hours associated with that work. 
6. While there are not good aggregate data on the length of community college wait-
lists, there are reports from the popular media, such as Korry (2010). Data are 
available on the number of eligible students turned away from entry-level bac-
calaureate nursing programs. In the 2010–2011 academic year, 101,060 students 
were accepted to these programs while 58,327 eligible students were turned away 
(American Association of Colleges of Nursing 2012). This implies that admis-
sions would increase by more than half if there were sufﬁ cient capacity. 
7. WIA program years run from July of the indicated calendar year through June of 
the following year. The employment percentage changes are calculated from June 
of the indicated calendar year to June of the following calendar year. 
8. This description of FDSS summarizes Eberts and O’Leary (2002). 
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Distinctly Cleveland 
How the Arts are Helping 
to Revitalize Rust Belt Cities 
Gregory M. Sadlek 
Joan Chase 
Cleveland State University 
Faced with the decline of the traditional manufacturing-based 
economic engine, a handful of fading Rust Belt cities turned to 
the arts as a means for revitalizing their local economies. Among 
them is Cleveland, a city known for its rich cultural heritage. 
While the arts may not replace the number of high-wage factory 
jobs lost in manufacturing, it does offer different types of beneﬁts 
related to quality-of-life that help redeﬁne a community’s concept 
of prosperity. 
Downtown Grand Rapids, Michigan, was once in decline. Hurt by 
international competition, its manufacturing plants were closing, and, 
at the same time, residents began moving out of the city to the sub-
urbs. In the mid-1990s the situation started to change, and the turning 
point seemed to be the opening of the Van Andel Arena in the mid-
dle of downtown (Thompson 2006). Civic leaders, however, realized 
that revitalization was not simply a matter of constructing large public 
buildings; they needed a grand strategy to draw people back into the 
core of the city. 
In 2005, under the leadership of Urban Marketing Collaborative, 
a new “Arts and Entertainment Strategy: Downtown Grand Rapids” 
report was created (Urban Marketing Collaborative 2005). The vision 
captured in this document called for Grand Rapids to capitalize on “its 
growing reputation as a destination arts and entertainment area” (p. 1). 
It would have three distinct arts “attitude districts,” interconnected but 
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distinct, that would draw audiences and enable them to be immersed in 
a vibrant city core containing a broad cross section of arts. The values 
reﬂected in this large arts district were to be “diversity, eclecticism, 
urbanity, sophistication, high culture,” and it would become “a living 
laboratory to experiment, explore, learn and share” (p. 2). 
Although the document called for better marketing and promotion 
efforts, no mention was made of what would become one of the most 
important revitalization tools of Grand Rapids: the annual fall ArtPrize 
contest. Created in 2009 by Rick DeVos, grandson of Amway founder 
Rich DeVos, this contest annually transforms downtown Grand Rapids 
into a living museum of art. But the distinguishing feature is that the 
substantial prizes, until recently, were awarded not by professional art 
critics, but by the visiting public.1 In 2011, the festival drew approxi-
mately 322,000 visitors, who experienced the works of 1,580 artists in 
162 separate venues (Linn 2012). 
The payoff to the city is the ﬁnancial boost given by the visitors to 
the community. A study by Anderson Economic Group (2011) of East 
Lansing, Michigan, estimates that the 2011 ArtPrize competition added 
$15.4 million to the local economy. In addition, the Detroit Free Press
reports that the competition has been so successful that it is now being 
copied in such cities as Akron, New York, and Los Angeles (Stryker 
2012). Clearly, the arts strategy envisioned in the 2005 strategic plan 
has succeeded in a signiﬁcant way, and it presents a model of urban 
revitalization for other midwestern Rust Belt cities. 
Milwaukee is also steeped in a manufacturing heritage but is now 
counting on the arts to develop a new economic future. The Cultural 
Alliance of Greater Milwaukee spearheaded the creation of a regional 
arts economic development strategy, entitled Creativity Works! The 
approach focuses on design, performing arts, visual arts, media and 
ﬁlm, and culture and heritage organizations (Creative Alliance Mil-
waukee, n.d.). The Milwaukee region possesses a strong concentration 
of creative workers and hopes to leverage this advantage through four 
arts-based initiatives. The steps include growing the creative industries, 
expanding the local creative talent base, developing sustainable infra-
structure for creative industries, and fostering leadership systems to 
integrate these industries (Creative Alliance Milwaukee 2011a). 
A recent redevelopment effort that followed the strategy developed 
in Creativity Works! occurred when Milwaukee launched an innova-
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tive program to animate a faltering retail space. The Shops at Grand 
Avenue in downtown Milwaukee were “dedicated to presenting quality 
creatives and small business owners a place in which to teach, work, 
perform, and exhibit their work” (Creative Alliance Milwaukee 2011b). 
This program ﬁlled the underutilized retail spaces with local artists, 
artisans, and performers. 
While the ﬁnal outcome of the Shops at Grand Avenue is not yet 
known, Milwaukee advocates are committed to the Creativity Works! 
strategy. Indeed, a recent study indicates that in 2010, nonproﬁt arts 
organizations had a $300 million impact on the Milwaukee economy, 
representing a 20 percent increase over the 2005 ﬁ gure (Creative Alli-
ance Milwaukee 2012). 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ARTS 
AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 
The turn to the arts for urban economic redevelopment follows 
upon the publication of several inﬂuential studies. The contribution of 
arts and creative industries has been recognized at least since the release 
of Richard Florida’s Rise of the Creative Class (2002), and it has been 
developed further by Ann Markusen, Greg Schrock, and Martina Cam-
eron (2004) in their work on “the artistic dividend.” Florida links twenty-
ﬁrst-century economic vitality to concentrations of people who earn 
their living through creativity and innovation, including artists, arti-
sans, performers and writers, of both popular and high art, as well as 
to a regional cultural ecosystem that innovative people ﬁ nd attractive. 
Markusen and her colleagues show that the work of artists is connected 
in interesting and important ways to the growth of urban economies, 
although there is “no clear relationship between artistic strength and 
either overall regional employment size or recent growth rates” (p. 19). 
Cleveland is yet another manufacturing-oriented city in the Mid-
west that has suffered from changes in the global economy. As if to 
prove Markusen’s point, although the area has traditionally had strong 
arts institutions, it has suffered signiﬁcant losses of jobs and popu-
lation. Like Grand Rapids and Milwaukee, however, the city is now 
looking hard at building upon the arts to help its economic recovery. 
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Indeed, there are already intriguing signs of improvement, including the 
refurbished Euclid corridor, a transformed Gordon Square, the Global 
Center for Health Innovation (a part of the new Cleveland Convention 
Center), the Horseshoe Casino, the continued growth and development 
of Playhouse Square, and the renewal of Cleveland State University’s 
campus (Farkas 2013). 
In addition, despite population losses citywide, the two districts 
that actually gained population in the 2010 census were downtown and 
University Circle, suggesting that hip young members of the creative 
class are ﬁnding urban life in Cleveland appealing (Smith and Exner 
2011). Since 2000, for example, the downtown neighborhood has expe-
rienced a 73 percent surge in population (U.S. Census Bureau 2011). 
These residents are well educated: 49 percent have at least a bachelor’s
degree, compared to only 25 percent of the population in the Cleveland 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Downtown inhabitants are also 
youthful: 71 percent of the population is 44 years of age or younger 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2011). 
Finally, while the economic recovery has stalled in much of the 
nation, Northeast Ohio has been buoyed by manufacturing growth 
(Helper, Krueger, and Wial 2012). As conﬁrmation of this forward 
movement, it is interesting to note that Portland, Oregon, a city widely 
regarded as one of the top magnets for the creative class, has recently 
sent a delegation to study Cleveland’s economic progress. “Cleveland 
is an innovative city,” wrote the delegation’s organizers, and it excels 
“in the areas most critical to urban success: talent, connections, innova-
tion, and distinctiveness” (Miller 2012). 
In discussing Cleveland’s distinctive arts scene, we will also use the 
term “cultural ecosystem” because we want to suggest a broad deﬁni-
tion of “arts” that includes both high and low forms, a wide range of 
related nonproﬁt organizations, commercial art, and both formal and 
informal activities. Bulik et al. (2003) argue that to be a vibrant and 
distinctive community, a city must have a large range of arts activity, 
“from large arts organizations to street festivals, world-class artists to 
amateurs” (p. 8). We believe that Cleveland has such a strong mix. 
How can Cleveland leverage its traditional strengths in the arts to 
further this economic recovery? There are many theories of how cities 
prosper, 18 of which are ably summarized and categorized in Joseph 
Cortright’s City Success: Theories of Urban Prosperity (2008). Cortright 
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argues that while cities share many common problems, “each city will 
need to fashion its own distinct solution” (p. 4). Among the most rel-
evant approaches to Cleveland’s revitalization, we believe, are those 
he entitles the “attraction city,” the “amenity city,” and the “distinctive 
city,” respectively. The “attraction city” theory suggests that cities suc-
ceed by developing “iconic attractions” that appeal to visitors and estab-
lish a city’s unique brand (p. 50). The “amenity city” theory suggests 
that cities grow and thrive by providing social amenities, not only good 
schools, safety, and parks, but also various kinds of appealing entertain-
ment (p. 53). The “distinctive city” theory holds that cities ﬂ ourish by 
creating a special identity and related attitudes that clearly differentiate 
the city from others (p. 59). We believe that building upon Cleveland’s 
traditionally strong arts scene will help the community achieve all three 
goals, becoming a distinctive city with nationally known attractions and 
plentiful amenities. 
The signiﬁcance of a city’s distinctiveness is underscored by 
Cortright in a 2002 article in which he analyzes the unique nature of the 
Portland, Oregon, region; he concludes that, like Portland, each city has 
its “own unique set of opportunities, shaped by its residents’ tastes and 
previous development” (p. 13). Moreover, the cities that will best thrive 
are those that do not try to copy the successes of others but build upon 
the facets of their own histories and the special tastes and skills of their 
current populations. Although many midwestern industrial cities, like 
Grand Rapids and Milwaukee, are now turning to the arts for revitaliza-
tion, we believe that Cleveland has a distinctive arts proﬁle that will 
serve it well as it rebuilds in the new global economy. 
CLEVELAND’S STRATEGIC PLAN 
The examples of Grand Rapids and Milwaukee underscore the 
importance of having a strategic plan, and, indeed, Cleveland has one. 
In 1997 the Community Partnership for Arts and Culture (CPAC) was 
created by the Cleveland and George Gund Foundations (CPAC 2011). 
The partnership was immediately commissioned to write a strategic 
plan for the arts in Cleveland. That plan was completed in 2000, and 
since then, CPAC has sought to facilitate its implementation.   
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Under the leadership of its president, Thomas Schorgl, CPAC pro-
motes a closer connection between a lively arts scene and a vigorous 
community (T. Schorgl and M. Van Voorhis, personal communication, 
August 26, 2011). CPAC advocates for public policy that will sustain 
the local arts and culture community, provides assistance to individual 
artists and arts organizations, and conducts research related to the arts 
sector. 
As examples of the proactive nature of CPAC’s activities, we can 
cite its two conferences entitled “From Rust Belt to Artist Belt.” The 
ﬁrst was held in 2008 and focused on the opportunities created by the 
arts for the traditional manufacturing centers of the upper Midwest. 
The second was held in 2010, and its focus was artist-based community 
development. The report of the ﬁrst conference emphasizes the mutu-
ally beneﬁcial relationship between artists and the communities in 
which they reside. Rust Belt cities can offer artists affordable housing 
and workplaces as well as a context rich with already existing high-
quality arts institutions. Artists can provide renewed population for 
inner cities; sweat equity (as they restore dilapidated houses and studios 
with their own hands and thus increase property values); and, ﬁ nally, a 
positive impact on the economies of the cities they adopt (CPAC 2008). 
The second conference resulted in a program to encourage artists to 
settle in the Collinwood arts district on Cleveland’s East Side. The ini-
tiative is a partnership between CPAC and New York–based Leveraging 
Investments in Creativity (Ott 2011).  
For 14 years, then, CPAC has been promoting community growth 
by helping to build and unify the local arts culture. Are its efforts paying 
off by luring more of the creative class to Cleveland? Thomas Schorgl 
believes they are. He points to two recent articles that suggest that young 
artists in the culturally rich city of New York are moving to Cleveland. 
In Crain’s New York Business, Souccar (2010) describes the severe dif-
ﬁculties experienced by artists who try to live in New York; she then 
notes the increasing interest of New Yorkers in a housing development 
for artists in Cleveland’s Collinwood area. Collinwood is working to 
continue this trend with the funding provided by CPAC and Leveraging 
Investments in Creativity. 
This phenomenon is explored in more detail by Alter (2009) in a 
Wall Street Journal article. Alter discovers artists working to revamp 
houses in Cleveland’s Detroit-Shoreway neighborhood and in Collin-
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wood. What’s more, Cleveland has adopted artist-driven renovation as 
a strategy to counteract recent depopulation, investing $500,000 in 50 
citizen-led pilot projects to reclaim vacant property. Alter focuses on 
the journey of two New York artists, Michael Di Liberto and Sunia 
Boneham, to a Collinwood project planned by Northeast Shores Devel-
opment Corporation. Di Liberto, Boneham, and others are being lured 
to Cleveland by its rich arts offerings coupled with a low cost of living. 
Collinwood’s commercial district, the centerpiece of a once run-
down neighborhood, is being renovated by a collective of 12 artists, 
named Arts Collinwood. The group bought a 5,000-square foot building 
in 2004 and has transformed it into an art gallery, a café, and nine art 
studios. This initial investment opened the door to “a ﬂood of musi-
cians, painters, and sculptors” (Alter 2009). The new residents, in turn, 
opened three new art galleries, a recording studio, and a stained glass 
studio. All of these serve as tangible evidence of urban revitalization.
This trend needs to be better documented through further research, but 
the two articles in New York publications suggest that Cleveland is 
becoming a magnet for young artists. 
THE CITY’S ARTS PROFILE 
Major Cultural Institutions
If Cleveland must develop its distinctive cultural ecosystem in 
order to prosper, what is its characteristic arts proﬁle? Here one must 
begin with the older, established arts institutions. Eric Wobser, execu-
tive director of Ohio City Incorporated, identiﬁes “the big ﬁ ve” cultural 
institutions of the community as the Cleveland Orchestra, the Cleveland 
Museum of Art, Playhouse Square, the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, 
and the West Side Market (E. Wobser, personal communication, July 
25, 2011). No one who has listened to the Cleveland Orchestra play in 
the majesty of Severance Hall or who has spent hours either exploring 
the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame or navigating the various booths in the 
West Side Market could disagree. The Cleveland Museum of Art, which 
opened in 1916, houses 43,000 works of art and is especially noted for 
its Asian and Egyptian collections. It closed in 2005 to begin a major 
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renovation and expansion to 592,500 square feet, a project designed by 
New York architect Rafael Viñoly. The work is expected to cost $350 
million, an amount that dwarfs anything else comparable in Ohio (Litt 
2008). In 2008, the museum began reopening in stages. When com-
pleted, 30 percent more gallery space, including new east and west 
wings and a large central court, will have been added. 
While a dwindling population base has turned Cleveland into one 
of the smaller major-league cities, it is remarkable that the commu-
nity has such high-quality and long-established cultural landmarks 
(T. Schorgl and M. Van Voorhis, personal communication, August 26, 
2011). The “big ﬁve” institutions play a key role in making Cleveland 
an “attraction city,” and they certainly draw tourists. For instance, more 
than 90 percent of visitors to the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame come 
from outside the Cleveland region (Rock and Roll Hall of Fame 2011). 
The strengths of these institutions are sources of civic pride for a town 
that has endured many difﬁcult setbacks. Karen Gahl-Mills, the direc-
tor of the region’s recently founded public arts-granting organization, 
Cuyahoga Arts and Culture, comments that “growing up in Cleveland, 
one just assumes that great cities have great cultural institutions” (K. 
Gahl-Mills, personal communication, July 7, 2011). Her experiences in 
different parts of the country, however, suggest that this is not always 
true of other American cities of comparable size. It is clear that these 
major organizations can play a role in attracting the young professionals 
Cleveland needs in order to increase its size and dynamism, but they are 
not sufﬁcient. 
Additional Cultural Assets 
Indeed, Cleveland has signiﬁcant riches beyond the big ﬁve. The 
city, for example, is the birthplace of “rock and roll,” and the presence 
of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame indicates the importance of that 
musical genre to the community. The popular music scene in Cleveland 
is alive and well, with exciting performance venues, such as the Grog 
Shop, the Beachland Ballroom, and the Happy Dog, regularly featuring 
a large selection of musical choices to a local audience that Sean Water-
son, co-owner of the Happy Dog, ﬁnds to be very sophisticated in its 
musical tastes (S. Waterson, personal communication, July 26, 2011). 
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In addition, Cleveland has a large number of nonproﬁt arts organi-
zations that sponsor a wide variety of arts experiences. Cuyahoga Arts 
and Culture, for example, funds 150 different arts organizations, and 
more than half of these have budgets of under $1 million (K. Gahl-
Mills, personal communication, July 7, 2011). Thomas Schorgl com-
mented that Cleveland is indeed a kind of laboratory for small-scale 
arts development. 
Another distinctive element to Cleveland’s cultural ecosystem is 
that it is not concentrated in one area. Of the big ﬁve, only the Rock 
and Roll Hall of Fame and Playhouse Square are located in downtown 
Cleveland. The Cleveland Orchestra and the Cleveland Museum of Art 
are ﬁve miles to the east in University Circle. As a part of the City 
Beautiful campaign in the early twentieth century, Cleveland’s leaders 
chose to develop University Circle to house the community’s new arts 
establishments, as well as some of its major educational institutions. 
University Circle was chosen because of its pastoral setting, which pre-
sented a sharp contrast to the industrialized sector to the west. Accord-
ing to Charles Michener, former senior editor of The New Yorker and 
Seattle, this decision created in effect two centers, which has made it 
harder to unite the city (C. Michener, personal communication, June 
20, 2011). 
In addition to downtown and University Circle, other small pock-
ets of arts activity are scattered throughout the city. Three such 
centers on Cleveland’s near West Side are the Gordon Square dis-
trict, which is home to Cleveland Public Theatre and the Capitol 
Theater; the Tremont area, which is now bustling with visitors to 
new upscale restaurants; and the Ohio City area, which is con-
centrated around the West Side Market and is now dense with 
new bars and restaurants, including Great Lakes Brewery. There 
are others; there is no single arts and culture center to Cleveland, 
and this poses a problem when one raises the question of where 
Cleveland’s development dollars should be spent. Some observ-
ers see this dispersal as a major disadvantage, complaining that 
Cleveland’s cultural ecosystem lacks coherence and connectiv-
ity. Others, like Evan Lieberman, Professor of Film at Cleveland 
State University and guitarist with the rock group Poland Invasion, 
ﬁnd this to be an attractive aspect of the city [E. Lieberman, per-
sonal communication, July 14, 2011]. A native of Atlanta, Geor-
gia, Lieberman has become one of Cleveland’s most enthusiastic 
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supporters. Lieberman ﬁnds the arts ubiquitous in Cleveland, part 
of the terrain and cultural landscape, and as a musician and ﬁlm-
maker, he could not be happier. 
Other Unique Features 
Cleveland is also a place of binary divisions. The famed East 
Side-West Side split is perhaps the most entrenched, as it goes back 
to the very earliest days of the city and the legendary battle between 
Cleveland and Ohio City over competing bridges in 1836 (Miller and 
Wheeler 1997). Beyond the obvious topographical distinctions, the two 
sides ﬁnd themselves divided along lines of class, race, and ethnic cul-
tures. But this is also true for the cultural ecosystem. Raymond Bobgan, 
Director of Cleveland Public Theatre, for example, ﬁnds a signiﬁcant 
difference in arts funding opportunities between the two areas. He ﬁnds 
the established institutions on the East Side to be “massively capital-
ized,” while the newer arts organizations on the West Side struggle (R. 
Bobgan, personal communication, August 4, 2011). 
Michener sees this difference as an opposition between the old 
East-Side elites and Cleveland’s working classes. Society members of 
the East Side were descendants of Cleveland’s early industrial tycoons, 
who viewed the city as the last outpost of the great Northeast and looked 
toward New York for their ideas of good art and culture. On the West 
Side are the descendants of the men and women who labored in the 
tycoons’ factories and plants, often of various ethnicities recently emi-
grated from Europe. It is probably an oversimpliﬁcation to see the East 
Side-West Side divide as reﬂecting only Michener’s binaries, but those 
elements certainly have played a role in creating this situation. 
What does seem to be true is that the arts scene in the University 
Circle area is largely more established and has a more formal atmo-
sphere. Other parts of the Cleveland cultural ecosystem are more con-
temporary and edgy. The Museum of Contemporary Art Cleveland 
(MOCA) in its new and strikingly contemporary building (designed 
by Farshid Moussavi and located in University Circle) is, perhaps, the 
exception that proves the rule (Museum of Contemporary Art Cleve-
land, n.d.). Cleveland Public Theatre (CPT), located on the West Side, 
is also dedicated to the work of contemporary artists, speciﬁ cally those 
from Northeast Ohio. 
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The story of the founding of CPT is perhaps one of the best exam-
ples of arts helping to revitalize a neighborhood. In 1982, James Levin 
founded a New York–style experimental theater in Cleveland, and he 
was encouraged to look to the East Side, particularly to University 
Circle, as a place to begin (J. Levin, personal communication, July 
14, 2011). In those days, it was difﬁcult for people to imagine a major 
cultural organization being located outside of University Circle. Levin 
rejected that notion and wanted his theater to have a part in city rejuve-
nation. He settled on the Gordon Square District, which in those days 
was a run-down, crime-infested neighborhood. His venue was to be 
an old vaudeville theater, which was then a used-furniture store. He 
launched the project, made progress, and, in 2005, handed over the 
leadership of CPT to Raymond Bobgan. 
According to Bobgan, no other market in the United States has a 
theatre exactly like CPT. Across the street is the refurbished Capitol 
Theater, which is the sole arts cinema on Cleveland’s West Side. Build-
ing on momentum, a $3 million dollar streetscape project visually uni-
ﬁed the neighborhood (Gordon Square Arts District 2012). Today, the 
square is home to a variety of attractive businesses, and CPT’s major 
fund-raising event, Pandemonium, in Gordon Square each fall, is a night 
of raucous carnival and a feast of contemporary arts of all sorts. In sum, 
Gordon Square has become the kind of hip and authentic neighborhood 
that draws young professionals back to the city, and its transformation 
began with an investment in the arts. 
Two other aspects of Cleveland’s arts scene differentiate it from 
larger, better-known destinations. First, as noted earlier, the town’s 
affordability is a major attractive feature for the creative class. Second, 
unlike New York and Los Angeles, Cleveland is not a leading center for 
the arts and entertainment industries, although work by Ivan Schwarz 
and the Cleveland Film Commission, especially on the promotion of 
the Ohio ﬁlm tax incentive, has recently been paying dividends (E. 
Lieberman, personal communication, July 14, 2011). In 2011 alone, 
seven major movies were shot in Cleveland, and notable producers on 
the West Coast are starting to look to the city as a venue for ﬁlming. 
Lieberman notes that Cleveland is rich in different kinds of topography 
and architecture, making it ideal for just about any kind of ﬁ lm. The 
same attributes that attract individual artists to Cleveland also appeal to 
commercial studios. Cleveland is an affordable place to make motion 
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pictures, and the city works diligently to ensure that it is easy for ﬁlm 
companies to obtain the required permits. 
The fact that Cleveland is not an industry center is especially 
important to Evan Lieberman, who has lived and worked in Los 
Angeles. In Los Angeles, he argues, the industry and the bottom 
line dictate what artists write. In Cleveland, because artists are not 
tied directly to the commercial entertainment industry, they can be 
more authentic. Indeed, “authenticity” is a common theme when 
talking about the Cleveland cultural ecosystem and the neighbor-
hoods in which it resides [e.g., T. Schorgl and M. Van Voorhis, 
personal communication, August 26, 2011]. In Cleveland, artists 
don’t have to take a stand either for or against commercialism, and 
they are less likely to obtain huge contracts. Instead, they are more 
inclined to simply want to translate their life experiences into art. 
Indeed, Lieberman insists that the value that the arts contribute to 
the quality of life goes well beyond the economic. Arts, he argues, 
give us new ways of viewing the world, and they help us to lose 
ourselves in the artistic moment. They either surround our worlds 
in beauty or help us explore life’s misery and problems, and in the 
end, they help us to imagine new possibilities. In a culturally rich 
city like Cleveland, especially one that is not tied directly to the 
commercial entertainment industry, these noneconomic aspects of 
the arts also directly improve the everyday lives of the region’s 
citizens. (J. Michener, personal communication) 
Cleveland, then, has a base in the arts that can be used to attract 
members of the creative class, but what needs to happen to make that 
base stronger? When asked what could be done to improve Cleveland’s 
arts scene, Michener remarked that “the cultural institutions need to do 
a better job of knitting the city together.” Indeed, the need to increase 
connectivity—bridging Cleveland’s geographical and social divisions, 
creating new partnerships among arts organizations, and bringing peo-
ple together with art—was high on the list of most of the experts we 
interviewed. In Cleveland, art is everywhere, but it needs to be drawn 
together more coherently and efﬁciently. Schorgl, for example, spoke 
of the need to grow cross-sectional partnerships between various seg-
ments of the city’s economy. In addition, the established institutions 
need to attract wider (and younger) audiences, and the smaller, more 
popular arts institutions need to further the sense of community in their 
own neighborhoods. 
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The good news for Cleveland is that the arts community under-
stands these imperatives. The more established organizations, for 
example, have developed aggressive outreach and educational pro-
grams. With a lead endowment of $20 million from the Maltz Fam-
ily Foundation, the Cleveland Orchestra has created an initiative, the 
Center for Future Audiences, to draw a new generation of patrons to its 
concerts (Cleveland Orchestra, n.d.). The goal is to create the youngest 
symphony audience worldwide by 2018 (Suttel 2011, p. 12). During the 
summers, the orchestra performs at Blossom Music Center, located in 
Cuyahoga Valley National Park, just south of Cleveland. This venue is 
much more family friendly than Severance Hall, and it has an expan-
sive grass campus on which people can picnic and listen to the orches-
tra play. The Orchestra’s Director of Communications, Ana Papakhian, 
revealed that, as of the summer of 2011, anyone under 18 years old has 
been able to attend these summer concerts for free, a key strategy for 
building a new and younger audience (A. Papakhian, personal commu-
nication, August 18, 2011). The hope is that an even more dynamic and 
youthful arts scene will be the catalyst not only to retain young artists 
and professionals in Cleveland but also to draw additional members of 
the creative class to make Cleveland their home. 
INITIATIVES FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ARTS 
The arts leaders we interviewed were optimistic about Cleveland’s 
future: there is a sense that the Cleveland cultural ecosystem is part 
of a larger movement toward a more vibrant city. As noted, although 
Cleveland’s population again dropped in the 2010 census, key areas 
of the city, downtown and University Circle, deﬁed that trend. Indeed, 
downtown is alive with new additions like the Global Center for Health 
Innovation and the Horseshoe Casino on Public Square, and these point 
the way to greater density and trafﬁc in the downtown area. Euclid Ave-
nue has been fully renovated with a sleek new rapid transit system, the 
Health Line, running down the center, linking downtown with Univer-
sity Circle. In the concluding pages, we highlight four important initia-
tives, both large and small, that are creating a more dynamic arts scene 
for Cleveland and, thus, hope for Cleveland’s further development. 
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Classical Music Moves West 
Sean Waterson moved back to Cleveland several years ago with the 
intent to have a direct positive impact on his community. The result was 
Happy Dog, a music venue that serves specialty hot dogs to accompany 
upbeat music. Waterson’s goal is to help build a community on the near 
West Side, and he wants Happy Dog to be the Gordon Square District’s 
“living room.” Happy Dog features live music ﬁve nights a week, and 
85 percent of its repertoire is rock. But what makes this venue so spe-
cial is that it also offers classical music and polka on a regular basis. “If 
New Orleans is jazz, Cleveland is rock and classical,” says Waterson, 
and his programming reﬂects that belief. 
Waterson started offering classical music at the Happy Dog after 
meeting Cleveland Orchestra ﬂutist Joshua Smith. Together they 
invented “Orchestral Manoeuvres at the Dog,” a regular series of clas-
sical concerts. The ﬁrst concert was a sellout, with lines of interested 
customers running out the front door and down the block. Waterson 
thought that the risk inherent in playing in a less-than-perfect environ-
ment actually created a palpable energy in the bar. In his blog, Smith 
(2010) agrees that the evening was a big success, but he points out 
that playing classical music in bars is not a new idea. Nevertheless, 
the concept seems to have caught on particularly well at the Happy 
Dog, and the promise is that this classical music programming will con-
tinue. If a major problem in Cleveland arts is interconnectivity, Water-
son has found a way to link West Side residents with the classical music 
scene, which heretofore has been largely an East Side, Severance Hall 
phenomenon. 
Sean Waterson was not satisﬁed, however, with his success in 
“Orchestral Manoeuvres at the Dog.” He wanted to build more 
bridges between West Side audiences and the heritage arts institu-
tions on the East Side. Thus was born “Gordon Square Goes to the 
Orchestra” and “Gordon Square Goes to the Art Museum.” Both 
of these efforts were organized through Facebook. The idea was 
to gather an audience from the Gordon Square area, hire a bus, 
and transport the participants to East Side art institutions. After the 
visits, the group dined at Happy Dog. Both trips were sold out in 
24 hours. (Smith 2010) 
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Public Support for the Arts 
A second reason for hope is the availability of signiﬁcant public arts 
funding in Cuyahoga County, which includes Cleveland and its sub-
urbs. Michener describes past funding of the Cleveland arts community 
as basically top-down, the result of a sense of noblesse oblige on the 
part of the East Side elite toward the entire community, but this, he 
says, is changing. Cleveland has a long history of active grant-making 
organizations, such as the Cleveland Foundation and the George Gund 
Foundation, but what is new and absolutely essential for the community 
is the advent of a public arts ﬁ nancing mechanism. 
In 2006, the citizens of Cuyahoga County passed a 10-year ciga-
rette tax to be used to fund the arts. As a result of this ballot initiative, 
Cuyahoga Arts and Culture (CAC) was born, with a mandate to spend 
approximately $20 million each year to promote the arts in the county. 
The scale is massive. Schorgl commented that, if Cuyahoga County 
were a state, it would have the third-largest public state budget for the 
arts in the country, just behind New York and Minnesota. This large 
infusion of funds has been transformative. 
As noted earlier, CAC assists about 150 arts organizations. In addi-
tion, although CAC is not permitted to ﬁnance individual artists di-
rectly, the organization does play a role in cultivating local artists 
through the agencies it supports. Cleveland’s Creative Workforce Fel-
lowship, for example, which is funded by CAC, gives out $20,000 fel-
lowships to individual artists on an annual basis. Gahl-Mills argues 
that, if you want to ﬁnd the best indicator of the city’s distinct arts and 
culture scene, you need to look at what is happening in the neighbor-
hoods; there Cleveland offers a rich variety of experiences, many at 
least partially ﬁnanced by public tax dollars. 
Arts and Education Partnerships 
The growth of creative partnerships among arts and educational 
institutions provides a third positive force. These collaborations will 
be important components in the bid to make the city’s arts scene even 
more vibrant. Downtown Cleveland has a concentrated theater center 
located just blocks east of Public Square, with massive venues from 
the heyday of classic movies in the early twentieth century. Forty years 
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ago, this neighborhood was run-down, and all the theaters except the 
Hanna were closed. Because of the pioneering efforts of people like 
Raymond Shephardson and Joseph Geary, the Cleveland community 
rallied to save this area and created Playhouse Square, making it the 
world’s largest theater-restoration project. 
Today, with all the theaters going through at least one round of sig-
niﬁcant renovations, Playhouse Square is the second-largest live thea-
ter district in the country, right behind Lincoln Center in New York. 
Nine separate performance spaces, including the State, the Ohio, and 
the Palace Theaters, are currently in operation. Playhouse Square draws 
1 million visitors per year, and it is estimated that it has a $43 million 
impact on the city economy (Playhouse Square 2011). 
One of these spaces, the Allen Theater, a classical old movie house 
in Italian Renaissance style, was underutilized, being occupied only 
about 90 days per year (Collins 2011). At the same time, two other 
community players were facing operational challenges. The art and dra-
ma programs at Cleveland State University (CSU), located just east of 
Playhouse Square, were operating in antiquated, substandard buildings, 
and university leaders wanted to build a new Fine and Performing Arts 
Center to house both disciplines. The cost of such a new building, how-
ever, was prohibitive. The state’s capital budget would not sustain such 
expenditures, and only two major community donors came forward to 
offer support for the plan. The university was caught in a difﬁ cult situ-
ation. Sixty blocks to the east of Cleveland State was the Cleveland 
Play House, the oldest and perhaps most prestigious regional theater 
in the country. Located near the world-famous Cleveland Clinic, the 
Cleveland Play House found itself with an extensive physical plant to 
maintain and diminishing audiences. Michael Bloom, former Artistic 
Director of the Cleveland Play House, commented that the organization 
was facing a very uncertain future. 
Faced with the Great Recession of 2008–2009, the leaders of these 
three organizations came to realize that a partnership could be a cost-
effective way to solve their problems. The vision was to move both 
the Cleveland Play House and CSU’s drama and dance programs into 
a remodeled Allen Theater. Through cooperation, both organizations 
could move into affordable new space right in the middle of a thriving 
arts district in downtown Cleveland, building upon the critical mass of 
live theater that was already available there. 
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This visionary project is now complete, but many obstacles had 
to be overcome to make it happen. First, money needed to be raised 
to remodel the Allen Theater into a contemporary venue with multiple 
performance areas. As it was, the Allen had a relatively new and well 
equipped stage house, whose existence would save the project about 
$10 million in construction costs. However, the theater itself was much 
too large for the kind of intimate experience envisioned by CSU and 
the Cleveland Play House. Its 2,500-seat theater had to be cut back to 
about 500. In addition, two theater venues needed to be created in the 
parking lot adjacent to the Allen. These would be a new lab theater and 
a 250-seat highly adjustable Second Stage, a novel performance space 
that would not have been possible if each of the partners had tried to 
accomplish this separately. 
A team of seasoned fundraisers from all three partners, called “The 
Power of Three,” was assembled, with the goal of raising $32 million. 
But a second building was needed to house ofﬁces, classrooms, and 
rehearsal spaces for both CSU and the Cleveland Play House. Located 
around the corner from the Allen is the Middough Building, a ﬁve-story 
ediﬁce, in which two ﬂoors were completely vacant. The “Power of 
Three” team then created yet another partnership, with Middough Inc., 
one of Cleveland’s most distinguished architectural and engineering 
ﬁrms. As a result of this arrangement, all of the partners, excluding 
Playhouse Square but including CSU’s art department, now ﬁ ll Mid-
dough’s ﬁve large ﬂoors, and a new CSU Fine Arts campus has been 
created. The campus includes not only the Allen Theater and the Mid-
dough Building, but also a structure on the corner of 13th Street and 
Euclid, which gives CSU’s art gallery, now called the Galleries at CSU, 
storefront space in Playhouse Square. All in all, several powerful part-
nerships will boost Playhouse Square’s artistic proﬁle, and make this 
region a national model for creating synergies between education and 
entertainment. Playhouse Square is certainly one more element that will 
transform Cleveland into a major attraction city. 
Arts Festivals 
A fourth encouraging factor that is helping to create a more dy-
namic arts scene is the growth of distinctive arts festivals in Cleveland. 
These events are important because they draw large numbers of people 
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together from different parts of the city. Two programs that are espe-
cially noteworthy are the Cleveland International Film Festival and the 
Ingenuity Festival. 
In 1977, Jonathan Forman inaugurated the Cleveland International 
Film Festival, screening eight ﬁlms from seven countries at the Cedar 
Lee Theater (Cleveland International Film Festival 2013). Over the 
years, the festival, supported by the Cleveland and George Gund Foun-
dations, as well as CAC, grew signiﬁcantly, and in 1991, it moved to 
Tower City, located downtown in Cleveland’s iconic Terminal Tower. 
By 2011, the festival was screening approximately 150 feature ﬁlms, 
grouped thematically, from 60 different countries. It had a budget of 
over $1.5 million and about 1,000 members (Magaw 2011). Filmmak-
ers from around the world were drawn to Cleveland, and there was 
also a markedly engaged audience of about 78,000 fans, a 122 per-
cent increase in attendance over the past eight years (Blackaby 2011; 
Magaw 2011). 
Meanwhile, the Ingenuityfest was created in 2005 by James Levin 
and Thomas Mulready as a celebration of creativity at the nexus of 
arts and technology (Brown 2010). Over the years, it has continuously 
moved: from the Warehouse District to Playhouse Square to the lower 
deck of the Detroit-Superior Bridge, and, ﬁ nally, to Piers 30 and 32 of 
the Port of Cleveland. At its current location, it literally brings together 
Cleveland’s East and West Sides. In 2011 it drew about 40,000 people 
to the center for three days of festivities (Ewinger 2011). Some exhibi-
tions are pure art; others focus squarely on technology; and still others, 
like Jared Bendis’s surround-sound audio game, “Treasure of the Wum-
pus,” combine both in interesting ways (Rosenberg 2011).
 In some respects, there is no more appropriate way to celebrate the 
existence and achievements of what Florida (2002) has called the cre-
ative class, and this festival continues to draw ever-larger crowds pay-
ing homage to creativity, in whatever form it takes. Like the ArtPrize 
contest in Grand Rapids, both Ingenuityfest and the Film Festival are 
well on their way to becoming iconic attractions, drawing more and 
more people into the heart of the city. 
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THE ARTS AS A PATH TO REVITALIZATION 
A dean of the Levin College of Urban Affairs at CSU once 
remarked that Cleveland’s size put it in a sweet spot—large enough 
to enjoy major league sports and many other big-city amenities, but 
small enough not to suffer from a variety of urban problems, especially 
the curse of gridlock and giant trafﬁc jams. Whether or not this is true 
generally—Cleveland still has plenty of big city challenges—it does 
seem to be the case with respect to the arts. On one hand, Cleveland 
has world-class arts organizations that are the envy of many other cities 
its size or even bigger. On the other, Cleveland is small enough for one 
man or one woman, like James Levin, to make a signiﬁ cant difference 
by building upon the arts to promote city development. 
As in Grand Rapids and Milwaukee, the arts are playing a crucial 
role in community revitalization, but Cleveland’s path to greater pros-
perity is building upon its own distinctive amenities, iconic attractions, 
and arts proﬁle. Nevertheless, several critical aspects of this momentum 
are transferable. As we have seen, the multiple Cleveland strategies for 
urban development through the arts include 
• having a thoughtful and detailed strategic plan, 
• strengthening the city’s major artistic infrastructure and cultivat-
ing new initiatives, 
• making purposeful efforts not only to tie together widely dis-
persed artistic venues but also to capture younger audiences for 
the ﬁ ne arts, 
• creating signiﬁcant arts and education partnerships, 
• supporting art through signiﬁcant public funding, 
• providing artists and arts organizations an affordable and wel-
coming place to work, and 
• creating multiple festivals to highlight the arts and draw audi-
ences from the suburbs and beyond into the city.  
It may well be that the broad scope and unique proﬁle of these com-
bined efforts is the most distinctive aspect of Cleveland’s arts develop-
ment strategy. 
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Rocco Landesman, Chairman of the National Endowment for the 
Arts, has offered independent conﬁrmation of the importance of the arts 
to Cleveland’s redevelopment efforts. Appointed by President Obama 
in 2009, Landesman has made the linkage between artistic activity 
and economic development a centerpiece of his strategy to build the 
Endowment (Litt 2011). After visiting Cleveland and touring its arts 
attractions, he concluded that local arts organizations were indeed help-
ing to revitalize the city. “We’re talking about it; you’re doing it,” he 
said. Overall, Landesman believes that Cleveland is “an arts city,” and 
that other cities would do well to follow its lead. 
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1. As of 2012 there is also a juried prize. 
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How Energy Policy Enabled 
the Decline of Midwestern Cities, 
and How It Can Contribute 
to Their Rehabilitation 
Andrew R. Thomas 
Cleveland State University 
Globalization can’t be seen as the sole factor that led to the decline 
in cities in the upper Midwest. Another contributing factor is 
homegrown: domestic energy policy. For instance, subsidies for 
rural electricity, funded by midwestern cities, made it possible for 
manufacturing to move to the Sunbelt. Similarly, subsidies for an 
interstate highway system established a permanent preference for 
trucking over the Great Lakes shipping ports and railroad centers. 
However, there are a number of energy policies that, if adopted, 
could foster rather than impede economic growth in declining Rust 
Belt cities. 
In 1986 Michael Kinsley wrote an essay in The New Republic that 
helped popularize the word schadenfreude in America. Schadenfreude
is a German word meaning “glee at the misery of others,” a word 
Kinsley noted that only the Germans, with their grim humor, could 
invent. Kinsley speculated that, after more than a decade of watch-
ing vast amounts of wealth being transferred from the Northeast to the 
Texas Gulf Coast, the Northeast would enjoy watching the collapse of 
the oil and gas industry, and with it, the Texas economy. Indeed, in 
the late 1980s prices for natural gas dropped from over $4 per thou-
sand cubic feet (mcf) to below $1.50 per mcf, and prices for oil fell 
from nearly $40 per barrel (bbl) to below $15 per bbl (1980 dollars). 
As a result, the oil and gas industry began a major contraction in the 
late 1980s that continued through the 1990s. But the Texas economy, 
147 
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while damaged, did not collapse. Nor did the Rust Belt economies of 
the Midwest and the Northeast fully recover when oil and gas prices 
remained low throughout the 1990s. 
For those of us who grew up in the Midwest, the 1970s were a 
difﬁ cult time. The cost of fuel at the pump had skyrocketed overnight. 
Families waited in long lines to buy gasoline. Ford station wagons 
were abandoned for Volkswagen Beetles. The expense of heating the 
family home with natural gas was even more painful, as prices rose 
from around $0.20 per mcf to over $3 per mcf in a decade. With the 
rapid increase in energy costs came rampant inﬂation. Life in the Mid-
west was forever changed, with the perception that Texas cowboys had 
hijacked our way of life—and in the process pocketed billions of our 
hard-earned dollars. So it is small wonder that residents of the Midwest 
and Northeast experienced schadenfreude when increased production 
and decreased consumption inevitably led to an oversupply of oil and 
natural gas and a price collapse in the 1990s. 
To be sure, the advent of the Rust Belt economies of the Midwest 
had many causes. We have heard much about them: bloated unions, 
high taxes, globalization, and underperforming education are the most 
cited. However, there can be little doubt that the energy crisis of the 
1970s was a principal catalyst for the decline of the cities in and around 
the Great Lakes region. It decimated the American automobile indus-
try, as Japanese and European automakers stole market share with their 
smaller, more energy-efﬁcient models. The effects cascaded throughout 
the Midwest but were particularly hard felt in the Great Lakes region, 
where automobile and steel manufacturing formed a large part of the 
economy. 
The American Midwest was suffering from what economist Gail 
Tverberg subsequently described as the “high-priced fuel syndrome” 
(Tverberg 2012). In short, consumers are required to pay more for a 
necessity, and as a result they cut back on discretionary goods and ser-
vices. If oil and gas prices go up, so do food prices, which are dependent 
on oil for transportation and natural gas for fertilizers. Commuting costs, 
electricity prices, and business expenses increase. The result is lay-
offs, cutbacks, and more pressure on discretionary goods and services. 
Property values and tax revenues decline, and the follow-on effects are 
magniﬁed. Figure 7.1 shows how acute the problem with oil prices was 
for the Midwest in the late 1970s. 
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Figure 7.1  Historic Oil Prices, 1900–2011 (2011$) 
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NOTE: “Brent equivalency” is the accepted international benchmark for crude oil pricing. 
SOURCE: Tverberg (2012). 
The result of the “high-priced fuel syndrome” in the late 1970s was 
an exodus out of the Midwest and the Northeast, especially of young 
people. A comparison of a timeline of inﬂation-adjusted oil prices with 
demographic change in the Northeast, Midwest, and the South demon-
strates this: after decades of double-digit population growth, growth 
in the Northeast and the Midwest plummeted after the oil shock of the 
1970s. In the South, on the other hand, population growth continued 
unabated, as shown in Table 7.1. 
Yet when oil and gas prices crashed in the 1990s, the Northeast and 
the Midwest failed to regain their pre-energy-crisis population growth 
levels—clearly there were other forces at work. Some of these were 
energy related and are discussed later in this chapter. Others were not, 
although arguably the initial oil shock set in motion some of the pathol-
ogies that prevented a reversal of the trend. As of 2012, however, as 
shown in Figure 7.1, oil prices were again at near historic highs (trading 
at around $100 per bbl in 2011 dollars). The midwestern and northeast-
ern economies are once more under the threat of the “high price fuel 
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Table 7.1  A Comparison of Oil Prices with Population Change in the 
Northeast, Midwest, and South, 1930–2010 
Price of oil per % change in population 
barrel (2011$) Northeast Midwest South 
1930 19.00 16 14 14 
1940 18.00 5 5 10 
1950 17.00 10 11 13 
1960 18.00 13 16 16 
1970 17.00 10 10 14 
1980 45.00 0 4 20 
1990 38.00 3 2 14 
2000 28.00 5 8 17 
2010 90.00 4 4 14 
NOTE: Oil prices are per barrel and based upon Brent Crude equivalencies. 
SOURCE: Tverberg (2012); U.S. Census Bureau (2010). 
syndrome,” as they export more and more wealth to import expensive 
oil. 
However, the advent of shale development promises some future 
relief. In 2010 oil imports accounted for over half of the American trade 
deﬁ cit (Economist 2010). For the Midwest, which reached “peak oil” 
(the inﬂection point at which oil consumption becomes permanently 
greater than concurrent reserve addition) long before the nation did, this 
deﬁcit is even higher. While oil prices have not yet dropped, American 
oil imports have—principally as a result of the Bakken Shale in North 
Dakota. In Ohio, there is likewise potential for oil production from the 
Utica Shale. More importantly, domestic natural gas production has 
increased dramatically because of shale drilling, and natural gas prices 
are at historic lows. Indeed, for the ﬁrst time ever, natural gas prices 
are completely decoupled from oil prices, creating a migration of truck 
ﬂeets from gasoline-powered to natural-gas-powered engines. For the 
reasons discussed later, shale development provides considerable hope 
for an economic recovery in the American Midwest. 
The volatility in oil and gas prices has hardly been the only energy 
problem facing midwestern cities since the 1970s—it has just been the 
most visible. This chapter will explore energy policies that have con-
tributed to the decline of these cities and will consider strategies that 
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might reverse some of the pathologies that have become so common-
place in the Midwest. 
Some policies have had an adverse impact on cities in general; 
other policies have had a deleterious effect speciﬁcally on the Mid-
west. Presumably all of these were unintended consequences: the poli-
cies were intended to produce desirable outcomes, but eventually had 
results that society did not necessarily want. Those energy policies that 
have affected cities in general will be considered ﬁrst, and then those 
that have negatively affected cities speciﬁcally in the Midwest. 
POLICIES THAT HAVE TENDED TO HARM CITIES 
IN GENERAL
Low-Cost Gasoline 
There can be little doubt that the American migration to the sub-
urbs has been enabled by cheap gasoline. There is also little question 
that federal and state policies have played a part in keeping gasoline 
inexpensive. The debate, rather, is about how much government sup-
port there really is. In other words, what is the actual cost of a gallon of 
gasoline at the pump, if you include all the externalities? Regardless of 
how one calculates this, it is clear that cheap gasoline has been a signiﬁ-
cant incentive for the exodus from the inner cities. 
The public policy that can be most easily identiﬁed that has led to 
inexpensive gasoline in the United States is the relatively low excise 
tax on gasoline at the pump. Many people would agree that excise taxes 
on gasoline are necessary to generate funds for building and maintain-
ing roads, and that those who drive the most ought to bear the highest 
burden of those costs. Many would probably also concur that we are 
currently undertaxed on gasoline at the pump; in 2010, for the ﬁ rst time 
since President Eisenhower signed the Federal-Aid Highway Act into 
law in 1956, the U.S. Highway Trust Fund was broke. Congress had 
to infuse $8 billion in general revenue funds into the Trust to keep it 
solvent. In 2011 Congress was forced to place another $19.5 billion 
into a fund that is supposed to be self-sustaining through gasoline taxes 
(Segedy, n.d.). 
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The issue that is most often debated now is not whether we should 
raise gasoline taxes, but rather when and by how much they should be 
increased. These taxes vary from state to state, but they average around 
$0.49 per gallon (American Petroleum Institute 2013).1 In Europe, 
where migration from the central city has not devastated urban areas as 
severely as it has in the United States, gasoline taxes are as much as 10 
times greater, and prices at the pump are typically double what they are 
in America (New York Times 2011). Figure 7.2 provides a comparison 
of gasoline prices internationally. 
It is no coincidence that Europeans tend to live closer to their jobs 
than do Americans, or that Europe, as a result, tends not to suffer from 
as much residential abandonment of the inner city as does the United 
States. In short, the policy of making the cost of commuting by private 
vehicle inexpensive has also made it easier for Americans to ﬂ ee urban 
problems rather than to solve them. 
Of course, Americans today would choose to pay just about any 
price for gasoline if it means not having to live next to urban blight. 
But the difference in living conditions that has engendered the migra-
tion to the suburbs has been created gradually. When the migration ﬁrst 
began, it was not a matter of escaping urban blight: it was about choos-
ing to live in a marginally better environment. We might, for instance, 
expect a working-class family to stay in an inner-ring suburb, rather 
than to move further away from employers, if faced with the incremen-
tal increase in cost. With gasoline taxes at levels similar to those in the 
United Kingdom, moving 15 miles farther from the job might mean an 
extra $4,000 per year in commuting costs, rather than an extra $2,000 
per year. For a working-class family, that would be a powerful incentive 
to stay put. 
However, low gasoline taxes are only a part of the energy policies 
associated with inexpensive gasoline. A more difﬁcult consideration 
is the so-called oil and gas subsidy, the tax incentives that President 
Obama called for an end to in his 2011 State of the Union address. Any 
government subsidy for oil inevitably makes it easier for commuters to 
move away from the downtown areas toward ever-longer commutes. 
Critics of U.S. energy policy have for years called for the termination 
of what they argue are massive subsidies to the oil and gas industry 
through federal tax policies. Unfortunately, energy policy is largely set 
in the United States through advocacy, and as a result it is hard even for 
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Figure 7.2  Global Gasoline Price Comparison, January 2011 
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experts, let alone the general public, to understand exactly what subsi-
dies actually exist for oil and gas. Indeed, established energy interests 
frequently express outrage over subsidies granted to “clean energy,” 
even as fossil fuel technologies enjoy over 10 times as much govern-
ment support as do these newer approaches (Plummer 2010). 
The American Petroleum Institute (API), not surprisingly, argues 
that there are no such subsidies. The ability to amortize investments, 
accelerate depletion allowances, and offset “intangible drilling costs” 
from tax obligations are, according to the API, standard accounting 
practices in the mining industry (American Petroleum Institute, n.d.). 
API points out that these accounting strategies are necessary to encour-
age the sort of massive investments required for such a high-risk busi-
ness, and there is no reason to treat the oil and gas industry differently 
from other mining industries. 
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In the end, we can reasonably differ about what subsidies may or 
may not exist in the Internal Revenue code, how big those subsidies 
might be, and which of them are really necessary. But it probably does 
not matter, because we do know that one massive subsidy exists for 
imported oil that dwarfs all others: the United States spends billions 
of dollars every year policing the world’s oceans, and it has done so 
for a long time. The total U.S. yearly military expenditure to patrol the 
world’s petroleum supply has been estimated to range anywhere from 
$47.6 to $113.1 billion in 2003 U.S. dollars (International Center for 
Technology Assessment 2005). 
It is this policy that makes the shipping of inexpensive oil from the 
Middle East possible. If this cost were passed along to the purchasers 
of gasoline at the pump, there is little doubt that the price of gasoline 
would be several times what it is today. Such an undertaking would also 
be a boon to domestic oil production, which would be competing with 
the actual cost of delivering foreign oil to the United States rather than 
the subsidized cost. However, we are unlikely to see this “external” cost 
realized at the pump. The notion that much of our defense budget is in 
fact a massive subsidy to Saudi Aramco is not easy to understand or 
accept. Nevertheless, the price of gasoline at the pump is artiﬁ cially low 
as a result of this subsidy, and this reduction has enabled mass migra-
tion to the suburbs. 
Inexpensive gasoline and the resultant increase in automobile com-
muting have created another troubling consequence for urban centers 
that has led to outmigration: a rise in pollution. Suspended particulate 
matter, in the form of soot, dust, smoke, and other pollutants, has been 
distributed into the air by trafﬁc exhaust fumes. In the United States, 
measures have been taken to reduce the air pollution generated by auto-
mobiles, including the banning of lead-based gasoline. Indeed, com-
pared to other major urban areas of the world, American inner cities 
today have good air quality, or at least not greatly worse than that of 
suburban areas. Unfortunately, many of these measures were taken after 
the exodus from the central city had already begun. 
Public Policies Encouraging Rural Electriﬁcation 
We often hear that the solution to our energy problems is another of 
America’s great collaborative undertakings in ingenuity and initiative, 
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usually discussed in terms of either the Manhattan or Apollo projects. It 
has been posed, for instance, that if we undertook a major Apollo-type 
effort to develop a hydrogen ﬁlling-station infrastructure, we could shift 
to a new transportation economy. This would be based on ultraefﬁcient 
fuel cells, which rely on cleaner, locally produced natural gas as the 
feedstock, and which produce clean water as a byproduct. 
In fact, however, in the last century the United States has under-
taken two “Manhattan-type” energy policy initiatives that have had 
a signiﬁcant impact on midwestern cities. The ﬁrst was the develop-
ment of the interstate highway system, now fundamental to the fabric 
of American society. This program subsidized a nationwide preference 
for automobiles and trucks over railroads and waterways and will be 
discussed later as among those energy policies that have been particu-
larly problematic for the Great Lakes cities. The second great American 
energy policy undertaking was the program to bring electricity to rural 
areas. It is this latter policy that has, over time, done the most to encour-
age migration out of the cities (and, as will be discussed later, out of 
cities in the Midwest, speciﬁcally). 
In the early 1930s rural electriﬁcation was stalled, leaving what 
was then a majority of Americans, literally, in the dark. The reason why 
rural markets had failed was manifest: the infrastructure to connect 
widely dispersed houses to the grid had proven too costly. The Great 
Depression further delayed investment in rural electriﬁcation. The 
growing gap between living standards in rural and urban areas, a lag in 
productivity growth in the agricultural sector, and the untapped poten-
tial rural demand for manufactured items such as household appliances 
and telephones led President Roosevelt to create the Rural Electriﬁca-
tion Administration (REA) in 1935. The REA (now the Rural Utilities 
Service) has since been touted as one of the most profoundly successful 
public policy initiatives in U.S. history. Some $410 million dollars were 
set aside by Congress in 1936 for a 10-year program subsidizing loans 
to construct the rural electrical supply infrastructure. Federally funded 
public works programs such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the 
Hoover Dam were set in motion, designed not only to create jobs, but 
also to generate and deliver cheap electricity. Rural electrical coopera-
tives were granted preference in purchasing the cheapest power avail-
able, such as that generated by the Tennessee Valley Authority. 
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The result was that, just two years after the creation of the REA, 
electricity was being delivered to 1.5 million farms in 45 states. By the 
mid-1950s, almost all U.S. farms had electricity service. The cultural, 
educational, and commercial disparity between rural and urban America 
shrank considerably as electriﬁcation spurred growth in demand for 
electrical appliances, plumbing, and information media such as radio 
and television (Malone 2001). 
But as with all social engineering, an unintended consequence 
inevitably followed: subsidized power in the suburbs meant people 
could abandon the city. The initial movement outward from city centers 
began with the rapid expansion of the streetcar system, itself a product 
of rural electriﬁ cation. The ﬁrst suburbs that developed in the 1920s 
and 1930s were laid out along streetcar lines. With the electriﬁ cation of 
rural America, streetcar lines extended further, creating the next ring of 
suburbs, and a migration outward has continued to this day (El Nasser 
2011; Shumsky 1996). 
The absorption of much of the costs of rural electriﬁcation by those 
who lived in urban areas made possible the exodus to the suburbs. It 
became feasible for much of America to move “to the country”—and 
to leave behind them the developing urban pathologies. Amazingly, 
although the problem of rural electriﬁcation has been resolved for some 
50 years, subsidies for rural electriﬁ cation continue. Today our federal 
government subsidizes rural electricity with billions of dollars of tax-
payer money through an assortment of guaranteed loans, grants, and 
preferred treatment; the most controversial of these strategies is support 
for new coal-burning plants—while the rest of the country is trying to 
cut back carbon emissions (Slivinski 2009).2 
An Artiﬁcially High Cost of Electricity in Urban Areas 
The energy cost increases in the 1970s and 1980s were not restricted 
to oil and gas: electricity prices also rose signiﬁcantly. For decades U.S. 
electricity generation, transmission, and distribution were all regulated, 
with utilities enjoying “cost plus” rate recovery for nearly all of their 
expenditures, regardless of their folly. The cost-plus strategy invited not 
only technology stagnation, but also bloated utility budgets, since there 
was no incentive to constrain costs. Inevitably, rates soared under this 
paradigm; average U.S. electricity rates rose 60 percent between 1969 
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and 1984, adjusted for inﬂation (Vaitheeswaran 2004). The biggest cul-
prit for this problem lay with massive cost overruns associated with 
the building of large centralized nuclear generation plants (D’Ambrosio 
and O’Brien 2009). 
Skyrocketing electricity prices were a major blow to urban areas 
throughout America because those economies, especially in the Mid-
west, relied heavily upon a healthy manufacturing base. Manufacturing, 
which even today consumes 30 percent of the nation’s electricity (Ohio 
Manufacturers’Association 2010), was severely damaged by this, even-
tually leading to energy-intensive manufacturers championing electric-
ity policy reform through deregulation. Ultimately this resulted in what 
one energy writer calls the “Quiet Revolution”: governments around 
the world began liberalizing their energy markets for both natural gas 
and electricity (Vaitheeswaran 2004). 
This regulatory reform, unfortunately, has not been uniformly 
enacted throughout the United States, and even when it has, it has been 
too late for many struggling urban areas that depended upon manu-
facturing jobs for their economic health. Even worse, many cities that 
reside in deregulated electricity markets are captive to transmission and 
peak capacity constraints, leading to excessive capacity (grid standby 
power) and other charges by utilities, passed through on wholesale 
power costs via regional transmission organizations. These capacity 
charges threaten the value proposition provided by deregulation. 
Energy reform legislation 
The reform was motivated in part by the energy shocks of the 1970s 
and the resulting legislation: the Natural Gas Policy Act (1978) and the 
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (1978). Both laws were passed to 
deal with the energy crisis that had gripped the nation and catalyzed the 
onset of the Rust Belt in the Great Lakes region. The Natural Gas Policy 
Act froze “old” gas sold on the interstate market at unsustainable prices 
but rewarded companies that drilled for new natural gas production with 
market prices, thereby eventually alleviating the natural gas crisis. The 
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act, however, was less successful in 
resolving electricity problems. Its goal was to resolve electricity short-
falls by encouraging conservation and mandating that utilities purchase 
power from independent wholesale power producers. Nevertheless, the 
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existing regulatory framework caused electricity prices to continue to 
rise even as new generation was brought on line. 
Under the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act the individual 
states were to encourage new generation from small (below 80 mega-
watts [MW]) facilities that used something other than fossil fuels, or 
used waste heat. Utilities were required to purchase power from these 
producers at “avoided cost,” the cost the utility would have had to pay if 
it had built new, centralized electricity generation of a like amount. But 
avoided costs were not based on market prices; there was no wholesale 
market for electricity at the time. Instead, prices were based on “but 
for” forecasts, that is, the generation cost expected to be incurred had 
no such new generation been developed, and regulators soon found that 
electricity prices had no relation to market realities. Independent power 
producers had no incentive to innovate or to provide electricity at a 
lower cost (Lesser and Giacchino 2007). 
By the 1990s a wholesale electricity market was beginning to 
develop (partly in response to the Energy Policy Act of 1992). Further, 
because of a sluggish economy, demand for electricity was stagnant, 
and surplus capacity developed. Yet power costs remained high because 
of the massive cost overruns and the cost-plus regulatory recovery 
schemes. Residential and commercial end users, with limited voice for 
advocacy at the time, could do little about this. Energy-intensive indus-
trial users, on the other hand, had the wherewithal to inﬂuence energy 
policy in the United States and began to lobby for the right to bypass 
utilities and to take their loads to an open wholesale generation market. 
As a result, in 1994 deregulation was introduced to America through 
sweeping regulatory reform in California (Lesser and Giacchino 2007).3 
Deregulation thereafter spread throughout the nation and continues to 
develop to this day. 
The impact of deregulation on electricity production 
and distribution 
It has taken nearly 20 years for wholesale markets to develop for 
electricity, and the jury is still out on how well deregulation will work. 
Ohio, which ﬁrst deregulated in 2001, suffered through a deep recession 
before wholesale electricity prices ﬁnally began to drop. Even then, 
states like Ohio that have restructured their energy markets continue to 
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have electricity prices higher than those that did not (American Public 
Power Association 2012). 
One reason why deregulation has failed in some urban areas is that 
the regional transmission organization (RTO) remains captured by con-
strained transmission. As a result, utilities are forced to maintain large 
and expensive amounts of standby (backup) power for peak periods of 
use. This results in an RTO capacity charge passed through with the 
wholesale price that can be on the same order of magnitude as the actual 
cost of electricity. Nowhere is this problem more evident than in the 
urban areas of northern Ohio, where a 2012 capacity auction held by 
the RTO resulted in an increase in capacity charges by 2015 that will 
approach or exceed in magnitude the wholesale price of power actu-
ally delivered. In theory, these high capacity charges should encourage 
utilities to build more local capacity. In fact they do not: utilities do 
not build new generation in an unregulated environment in response 
to short-term price signals, since there is no guarantee of a return on 
their investment. If anything, high capacity charges have the oppo-
site effect—they encourage utilities to underinvest, thereby distorting 
the generation technology mix toward more expensive peaking units 
(Meunier 2010). The result is that utilities will pass through capacity 
charges—the cost of expensive standby generation—onto wholesale 
power costs that can be nearly as much as the cost of the power actually 
consumed. 
But for Ohio and other midwestern states, the damage was already 
done before deregulation. Electricity-intensive manufacturing—e.g., 
steel, aluminum, glass, and chemical industries—has traditionally made 
up a large part of the urban workforce in Ohio. These industries strug-
gled to remain competitive in the face of high electricity prices, and the 
loss of jobs severely damaged urban areas throughout the Midwest. 
Yet even while generation has been deregulated, the transmission 
and distribution side continues to be devoid of competition. Electricity, 
natural gas, and telephone grids fall into what are traditionally consid-
ered to be “natural monopolies,” instances where we cannot build and 
maintain multiple grids. The best we can do is to provide alternatives 
to the grid. Indeed, this was exactly what happened in the telephone 
industry: wireless networks provided the competition that drove down 
the cost of wired phone systems. 
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For electricity, however, utilities have no desire to see their princi-
pal asset—the grid—devalued. Not surprisingly, utilities have lobbied 
hard to protect this resource. For instance, one way of introducing com-
petition for the grid is for end users to generate their own electricity on 
site. Utilities have perceived on-site generation, the most common form 
of distributed generation (DG), as a threat to the grid and have not wel-
comed it. Utilities have been very successful in advancing regulatory 
barriers to DG that continue intact to this day. 
Generation alternatives 
Nevertheless, the next “quiet revolution” will be the introduc-
tion of competition to the regulated side of electricity. The ﬁrst place 
this is likely to happen will be in the shift from centralized to dis-
tributed electricity generation. It has long been thought that energy-
intensive industries like steel, glass, and chemical manufacturing could 
be “ground zero” for rethinking how energy is generated and used in the 
United States. These industries consume large amounts of fossil fuels 
and electricity to melt scrap iron, iron ore, and sand, and to produce 
chemicals. Recycling the waste heat from these industries could itself 
generate some 5 percent of America’s electricity needs. Likewise, in 
Gothenburg, Sweden, two reﬁneries use waste heat to provide nearly 
half the 450,000 residents of that town with district heating. None of 
the 150 reﬁ neries in America recycles waste heat for use in residential 
heating (Vaitheeswaran 2004). 
Utilities initially disfavored DG because they found value in econo-
mies of scale: large-scale coal plants in particular were more efﬁcient 
and capable of producing less-expensive power than smaller plants. 
However, large-scale coal plants were not amenable to being located 
in crowded urban areas, rendering the waste heat produced from such 
plants difﬁcult to use. Waste heat has a limited value unless buildings 
and homes are spaced closely together and are located near the source 
of the heat. 
Once utilities became heavily invested in the grid, they had little 
interest in local generation. What’s more, deregulation of the generation 
market cemented the utilities’ distaste for DG. Utilities today nearly 
always favor investment in the grid, with its guaranteed return, to risky 
generation ventures. Indeed, the bigger the grid became, the more money 
utilities made. So when large-scale power users began to push for 
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opportunities to self-generate, utilities pushed back with an assortment 
of obstacles, ranging from exit and standby fees to heavy-handed inter-
connection standards. DG was simply not cost effective except for very 
large industrial users. 
The effects on cities were twofold. First, because cogeneration (also 
called “combined heat and power,” or CHP) was not cost effective, few 
cities developed heating networks to use waste heat. And second, as 
large industrial users departed from the grid through the deregulation 
of power generation, captured urban residential and commercial users 
were left behind to pay a larger share of the cost overruns associated 
with nuclear and other expensive power. Rural residents, on the other 
hand, were able to avoid this capture through their cooperatives. 
Successful lobbying by the clean energy industry and others, 
including smaller industrial users and new aggregated power purchas-
ing cooperatives, has led to some regulatory reform. Most notably, net 
metering (where meters run backward when excess power from DG 
is placed into the grid) rules have enabled a recent increase in small-
scale renewable DG. However CHP, the most cost-effective form of 
DG, continues to be ineligible for net metering in most jurisdictions, 
and standby fees continue to render most CHP projects uneconomical. 
Moreover, the changes that have been made have been mostly too little 
too late: the longtime preference for centralized power has made it dif-
ﬁcult for cities now to develop waste heat networks similar to those that 
exist in Europe. A hostile regulatory environment and a lack of a heat 
transportation infrastructure have colluded to play a role in the decline 
of urban economies. 
ENERGY POLICIES THAT HAVE TENDED TO
SPECIFICALLY HARM MIDWESTERN CITIES 
Cheap Air Conditioning 
For all the angst over public policies that have led to the exodus 
from the Midwest to the South and Southwest, none would matter but 
for the advent of inexpensive air conditioning. Around the same time 
that the energy crisis gripped the Midwest, air conditioning had begun 
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to be widely available, cheap, and commonplace throughout the United 
States. Until this transformation, the climates of the American South 
and Southwest were miserable to live in year-round. 
It is difﬁcult to overstate how cheap air-conditioning has changed 
U.S. society. It catalyzed the population boom in the South and South-
west (Cooper 1998), and it reformed the American political landscape 
(Pﬁ ffner 2009).4 We have become so dependent on air conditioning that 
some have likened it to a drug. Anyone who has stepped into an air-
conditioned store on a hot summer day can attest to the sense of instant 
gratiﬁcation climate control can provide. Fifty years ago a third of the 
U.S. population resided in the South and Southwest; now it is over half. 
The relocation of manufacturing, businesses, and jobs to the American 
South is a direct result of air conditioning and of the energy policies that 
made it cheap (Evans 2005). 
The policy that has most enabled this transformation has been the 
Rural Electriﬁcation Act (REA), which provided the largely rural south 
with the favorable electricity rates that allowed it to grow (Diamond 
and Moezzi, n.d.). Without the REA, it would have taken generations 
longer for air conditioning to become affordable in the South, if ever. 
But it is hardly the only energy policy that enabled cheap air condi-
tioning: the failure to account for external environmental costs asso-
ciated with the emission of refrigerants has also served to artiﬁcially 
suppress the cost of air conditioning. In the 1980s, wealthier countries, 
such as the United States, moved away from using chloroﬂuorocarbons 
(CFCs) for air conditioning to save the atmosphere’s ozone layer, but 
the replacement refrigerants are still highly potent greenhouse gases. 
North America, with 6 percent of the world’s people, accounts for 40 
percent of the world refrigerant market (Cox 2007). The South and the 
Southwest represent the vast majority of this usage—and our policies 
ignoring the actual cost of air conditioning have made it easier for busi-
nesses and manufacturing to move there. 
In the Midwest, summers can be uncomfortably hot for short peri-
ods, but brief spans of heat are not debilitating to labor. Long periods 
of cold, on the other hand, can be inexpensively managed with proper 
clothing and heating systems. Manufacturing has historically thrived 
in cold climates and could not have been successfully implemented in 
a climate where intense heat dominated for half the year. Cities like 
Houston, Dallas, Atlanta, and New Orleans in the past were home to 
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sleepy societies where work often shut down during the long summer. 
There was no interest by captains of industry to relocate manufactur-
ing to the U.S. South or Southwest—or to Mexico or other subtropical 
countries, for that matter—due to the toll taken on both the workforce 
and machinery. 
Cheap air conditioning changed all of that. With the emergence 
of mechanical cooling, working conditions in factories improved and 
entire manufacturing industries rose up in the South, facilitating the 
explosive economic development and population growth in the Sunbelt 
region. Air conditioning did more than make the workplace bearable; 
it also enabled the South to manufacture products sensitive to heat and 
humidity, such as textiles, color printing, pharmaceuticals, and food 
processing. In addition, the ofﬁce environment improved, with air con-
ditioning becoming an important factor in workplace efﬁ ciency (Stein-
metz 2010). One study tested federal employees and found a 24 percent 
increase in output by typists when transferred from an environment 
without air conditioning to one with it (Cooper 1998). 
Before air conditioning, the extreme heat in the South was not only 
uncomfortable and counterproductive, it was also a major health con-
cern, as it facilitated the spread of disease. With the introduction of 
air conditioning, infant mortality was reduced and malaria eliminated 
(Arsenault 1984). The South became a more pleasant and attractive 
place to live as air conditioning and technological advances brought 
about improvements in public health. 
Air conditioning was originally implemented in industrial and 
commercial settings but eventually proliferated in residential homes 
and automobiles, as the technology became not only cheaper, but also 
smaller and less dangerous with the development of nontoxic coolants. 
Several types of air conditioners were available on the market starting 
in the 1930s, but as they were both expensive and cumbersome, they 
remained a novelty for home use for the next 20 years. In 1951, an inex-
pensive, efﬁcient window air conditioning unit was ﬁ nally introduced 
and became popular. By 1965, central air conditioning had entered the 
market and could be found in 10 percent of homes in the United States 
(Carrier, n.d.). With technology steadily improving, most new homes 
were being built with central air conditioning, and window air condi-
tioners were increasingly ﬁnancially accessible (Great Achievements 
2013). By 1975, air conditioning existed in 50 percent of American 
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homes. By the 1980s, when depopulation of the Rust Belt in favor of 
the Sunbelt had begun in earnest, 90 percent of new homes in the South 
had adopted central air conditioning (Pipe Doctor Plumbing, Heating, 
and Air Conditioning, n.d.). 
Paralleling this development was air conditioning in cars. Air 
conditioning in automobiles was ﬁrst available as a factory-installed 
accessory in 1940 with the Packard line, but with the onset of World 
War II, growth in this sector was stunted along with the rest of the air-
conditioning market. Even in the 1950s, the air-conditioned car was 
considered an extraordinary luxury and the ultimate status symbol, to 
the degree that some people in Texas drove around with their windows 
rolled up in the 100-degree heat just to give the impression that their 
car had air conditioning installed. By 1973, however, more than 80 per-
cent of new cars in the South were being outﬁtted with air conditioning 
(Fergusson 2006). 
Today we live in a very different world, where the hot climate 
is considered a reason to live permanently in the South rather than a 
reason to avoid it. This is more than a little bit due to the advent of 
inexpensive air conditioning. Most Americans prefer suffering through 
a short walk in intense heat from their air-conditioned house to their 
air-conditioned car to digging out of a snow drift and scraping ice off 
their car windows. Corporations are eager to blame their decisions to 
relocate manufacturing to the Sunbelt on unfavorable tax rates, unions, 
and other dollars and cents considerations. But one wonders how much 
executive distaste for midwestern winters controls decisions about relo-
cations for manufacturing. So long as air conditioning is cheap and 
readily available, no amount of tax incentives or union concessions can 
compete with a lifestyle preference for mild winters. 
Promotion of Trucking over Railroads and Waterways 
The U.S. government undertook a major social initiative in the 
1950s and 1960s designed to make interstate transportation by auto-
mobile easier and less expensive. This energy policy would have inter-
esting and momentous consequences for the American Midwest. The 
program was promulgated during the Eisenhower Administration as 
the American Federal-Aid Highway Act. The initiative consisted of 
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the development of a national trust for the purchase, through eminent 
domain, of large amounts of private land, and the subsequent building 
of an interstate highway system unlike anything ever seen. In short, the 
United States embarked upon a strategy to build a highway and bridge 
infrastructure that would transform the American landscape forever, 
making travel across the country easier, faster, and less expensive. 
Change the landscape it did—and a great deal more: it forever 
altered American culture. Trucking beneﬁted relative to railroads and 
waterways, helping it to become the transportation mode of choice for 
shipping a wide range of goods and materials throughout America. This 
contributed to the decline of the traditional midwestern transportation 
economy—railroads and waterways—and with it, to the decline of the 
Great Lakes port communities. 
Developing a network of major interstate highways was certainly 
a laudable public policy: driving time and costs were reduced signiﬁ-
cantly, and travel efﬁciencies inured to the beneﬁt of all, as the expenses 
of transporting goods dropped. Moreover, the indirect subsidy to the 
automobile industry was a short-term boost to the Great Lakes cities 
that manufactured trucks, automobiles, and parts. However, the long-
term effect on these cities manifested itself later in another, less desir-
able manner: Great Lakes shipping ports and railroad terminals became 
largely obsolete. The advent of subsidized high-speed interstate high-
ways, combined with subsidized cheap gasoline and diesel fuel, inevi-
tably led trucking to become the preferred method of transportation of 
goods and materials across America. From Duluth to Buffalo, Great 
Lake cities watched their once-busy harbors turn into ghost ports. Rail-
road terminals across the Midwest also shut down, and with them disap-
peared the livelihoods of many Midwestern families who had worked 
on those trains for generations. 
Although the majority of the people in America at that time were 
located in the Midwest or the Northeast, the new superhighways criss-
crossed the country in equally spaced patterns without regard to popula-
tion. The goal of the new interstate system was, after all, to make travel 
among the states easier—and this included crossing the underpopulated 
regions of the South and Southwest. The consequence, however, was 
to indirectly support migration to the rural South and Southwest. The 
new interstate highway system not only helped render obsolete the tra-
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ditional transportation economy of the Midwest, it also subsidized the 
inevitable movement of workers to the South and Southwest by making 
it cheaper to transport goods and materials to and from those regions. 
Failure to Embrace Change in Energy Policy 
A third category of energy policy that generally has had a troubling 
result for midwestern cities stems from a behavioral disorder common 
to all leaders who set public policy: the failure to identify and under-
stand social change, and to respond to that change in a timely way. The 
general reason for this shortcoming is that vested interests, especially in 
the trillion-dollar-a-year energy business, usually resist change might-
ily. Steps that may be good for society in general may not be good for a 
particular sector of the economy, and that segment may be particularly 
persuasive in helping government leaders to set public policy. In a soci-
ety where policy is made by competing advocacy groups, alignment 
with the status quo has a signiﬁ cant advantage. 
The best example of how this culture can be shortsighted relates 
to the political resistance to the adoption of Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) standards. These guidelines were originally estab-
lished as a means of improving automobile efﬁciency in response to the 
1973–1974 Arab oil embargo, which caused crude oil prices to triple 
and exposed the United States to vulnerabilities in relying on imported 
petroleum. In the period leading up to this ﬁrst oil shock, new-car ﬂeet 
fuel economy had dipped from 14.8 miles per gallon (mpg) in 1967 to 
12.9 mpg in 1974. With the Energy Policy Conservation Act of 1975, 
CAFE standards required the passenger-car program to achieve new-
car ﬂeet fuel economy standards of 27.5 mpg by 1985. 
Control over the passenger-car program remained in the hands of 
the Secretary of Transportation, and standards could be adjusted with-
in a range of 26 to 27.5 mpg without requiring Energy Policy Con-
servation Act amendments and the subsequent approval of Congress. 
Under the same act, the National Highway Trafﬁc Safety Administra-
tion (NHTSA) was given authority over the structure and alterations 
of the light-truck program (Yacobucchi and Bamberger 2007). CAFE 
standards set by the NHTSA were only held to the “maximum feasible 
fuel economy standards,” broadly deﬁned by Congress as having tech-
nological feasibility, economic practicability, and consideration for the 
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effect of other standards on fuel economy and the need of the nation to 
conserve energy (Moulton, n.d.). 
The predictable reaction from the automobile and petroleum indus-
tries was to resist any change as long as possible. This strategy worked. 
Since achieving the ﬁrst target of improving fuel economy to 27.5 mpg 
in 1985, no improvement in standards has been made, and none is antic-
ipated until 2017. Further, those energy efﬁciency standards that were 
adopted were easily circumvented. A sport utility vehicle (SUV) loop-
hole was exploited that encouraged American families to buy trucks 
(including SUVS) instead of cars. Light trucks with a gross vehicle 
weight rating of 8,500 pounds are exempt from CAFE standards. For 
light trucks under this weight, fuel economy standards only increased 
by 2 mpg, from 20.2 to 22.2, during the 15 years between 1992 and 
2007 (NHTSA 2013). Buoyed by the SUV market, truck sales in Amer-
ica exploded, eventually overtaking car sales by the late 1990s. 
Unfortunately, this only served to put the U.S. automobile industry 
at a competitive disadvantage to its European and Japanese counter-
parts, who continued to build more efﬁcient cars. As oil prices rose 
sharply in the mid-2000s, truck sales faltered (see Figure 7.3). By 2008, 
with the economy in free fall, car sales caught up with truck sales for 
the ﬁrst time in over a decade, as sales for trucks dropped to half of 
their 1990 numbers. American car companies, notably the Detroit Three 
(GM, Ford, and Chrysler), were in no position to weather the storm, 
as proﬁts had become heavily dependent on SUV and truck sales, and 
these ﬁrms required government support to stay aﬂoat. Resistance to 
the CAFE standards, in response to a perceived threat to the viability of 
the American automobile industry, contributed to the near bankruptcy 
of this entire U.S. industry. Midwestern cities, especially Great Lakes 
cities, suffered grievously in the process. 
The resistance to deregulation of electricity markets and to DG pro-
vides other examples where vested interests have conspired to thwart 
job creation in the Midwest, especially in traditional manufacturing 
industries such as steel, glass, and chemicals. The overall dependence 
of centralized generation upon the importation of fossil fuels has inten-
siﬁed the high cost of power for midwestern urban areas, insofar as this 
region has traditionally been an importer of coal, oil, and gas. DG, on 
the other hand, tends to rely on local fuels such as waste heat, solar, and 
wind, and as a result usually returns more money to the local economy. 
Bowen.indb 168  12/16/2013 2:14:17 PM   
 
  
168 Thomas 
Figure 7.3  U.S. Car and Truck Sales, 1950–2010 
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According to one expert, as much as 50 percent of every dollar spent on 
conventional centralized generation leaves the community. However, 
for renewable DG, about $1.40 is returned to the local community for 
every dollar spent (Sovacool and Watts 2009). 
There will always be resistance to change by those who stand to 
lose from it. But when it comes to energy, policymakers are particularly 
vulnerable to short-sighted decisions. The stakes for energy genera-
tion choice are enormous. We can expect parties to aggressively advo-
cate their own interests in the status quo. Unfortunately for midwest-
ern cities, this intransigence has too frequently been harmful to local 
economies. 
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ENERGY POLICES THAT WILL HELP MIDWESTERN 
CITIES RECOVER 
U.S. energy policy in the past 70 years has encouraged migration 
of jobs and residents out of the Midwest, and this needs to change. Yet 
we do not want to rebuild midwestern cities at the expense of rural 
areas, or at the expense of the South or Southwest. Certainly no one 
would advocate a return to poverty and misery for the South so that 
the Midwest could once again enjoy a more robust economy. Similarly, 
with so much of our commercial activity now moved to the suburbs, we 
cannot abandon those spaces. But we can at least try to redress some 
of the imbalances in our energy policies that have so decimated the 
cities in the Great Lakes region. New approaches that do not directly 
encourage migration out of the cities certainly would help. Some of the 
most important energy strategies that could be deployed are those that 
can help deliver clean, inexpensive energy to midwestern communities. 
Several of those policies are set forth in the following discussion. 
Policies That Encourage DG 
The shift to clean and high-efﬁciency energy systems is key to both 
sustainability and economic growth. This change will transform virtu-
ally every aspect of the economy, transportation systems, and construc-
tion, as well as the conﬁguration of human settlements in the twenty-
ﬁrst century. Urban areas in particular are highly vulnerable to paradigm 
shifts in technology. Technological innovation is the “principal mecha-
nism underlying the successive epochs of urban evolution.” Through-
out the history of American cities, changes in transportation and energy 
have been the root cause of fundamental transformation (Berry 1991). 
Forces are working together now that will transform the structure of 
urban society.5 Cities throughout the United States need to understand 
these forces and prepare themselves for the changes that are coming. 
One of those fundamental transformations will be the shift away 
from centralized generation toward a DG model. Developing a regula-
tory environment that is friendly to DG will help position communities 
for growth and sustainability. This will not only reduce the costs of 
energy in the inner city through such mechanisms as CHP, but will also 
Bowen.indb 170  12/16/2013 2:14:18 PM   
 
  
 
 
 
  
170 Thomas 
create jobs locally. Moreover, since DG tends to be cleaner than central-
ized generation, it also tends to make for a more pleasant environment 
in which to live and work. 
Advantages of DG for the Midwest 
Midwestern cities are well placed to play a leading role in the devel-
opment of DG. That is because the many locations where DG is likely 
to ﬁrst become economical are those involving generation at industrial 
sites, and midwestern cities are among the nation’s leaders in generation 
capability from industrial waste heat. According to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), Ohio, for instance, produces enough waste 
heat to “generate the equivalent power of 8 nuclear power plants” (Mar-
gonelli 2010). The Oak Ridge National Laboratory projects that waste-
heat recovery systems can be available for around $1,500 per kilowatt 
(kW) installed (Margonelli 2010)—a price that should be attractive for 
electricity-intensive manufacturing. The potential to avoid future car-
bon taxes and to create jobs also makes this of considerable interest to 
midwestern cities.6 
Three other factors will likely lead to the advancement of DG in 
the Midwest. The ﬁrst is the April 2012 adoption of new federal EPA
Clean Air Act pollution standards (the so-called Boiler MACT regula-
tions [EPA 2013]) that will cause area-wide capital investment into new, 
cleaner steam-generation capacity.7 Many midwestern industries have 
big, old coal boilers producing large volumes (over 100,000 pounds 
per hour) of steam. These boilers tend to work continuously, are inefﬁ-
cient, and require as fuel low-sulfur “compliance coal” (Casten 2012).8 
Industrial users that are considering an upgrade of their coal boilers in 
order to comply with the new rules may ﬁnd this to be a convenient time 
to convert to more efﬁcient heat-creating systems, such as CHP. With 
this approach, electricity made as a byproduct of generating heat can 
be converted for use on site, thereby dramatically improving systemic 
efﬁ ciency. 
The second factor relates to grid congestion, especially in the Great 
Lakes areas. Northern Ohio, for example, has been grid constrained for 
a number of years. As a result, and in anticipation of retiring old coal-
burning generation facilities, First Energy now plans to undertake a $1 
billion transmission upgrade (Funk 2012). Indeed, the regional trans-
mission organization (RTO) that Ohio utilities belong to, PJM, antici-
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pates that there will be changes in the next several years to the genera-
tion ﬂeet producing power for Ohio on an “unprecedented scale.” PJM 
announced in May 2012 that it had purchased in an auction a “record 
amount of new generation” for 2015–2016. Northern Ohio suffered the 
highest prices in the PJM capacity market—$357 per MW, more than 
twice the PJM unconstrained price of $136 per MW (PJM 2012). All of 
these costs will be passed through to urban residents and businesses in 
the form of capacity charges on wholesale electricity bills. One expert 
projects that capacity costs alone in First Energy’s Ohio region will 
increase by 700 percent by 2014 over today’s charges, reaching $0.0317 
per kilowatt-hour (kWh) by 2015 for a user with a 50 percent load fac-
tor (Brakey 2012). Such costs could be avoided if DG were strategically 
adopted in response to the constrained grid. 
The third factor relates to another threat midwestern urban econo-
mies face: carbon regulation. Driven in part by EPA requirements to 
either clean up or shut down old coal plants and in part by a depressed 
natural gas market, much of coal electricity generation will be replaced 
by natural gas in the coming years. According to one recent study, 
even accounting for a marginal increase in life-cycle greenhouse gases 
generated through hydraulic fracturing, burning natural gas emits less 
than half the carbon that burning coal does (Hultman et al. 2011). This 
reduction in carbon emissions will likely become a critical element to 
the viability of midwestern economies, especially in urban areas that 
are so dependent on manufacturing, as increasing restrictions are placed 
on carbon emissions. CHP will in all likelihood become the most com-
pelling solution to the problem of reducing greenhouse gas emissions: it 
not only uses natural gas (or biomass) as its principal fuel, it is also far 
more efﬁcient than centralized generation. 
CHP systems, however, do not as a rule enjoy the beneﬁts of net 
metering. Utilities do not have to pay the full value of electricity when 
taking power back onto the grid. Instead, they pay what they consider to 
be the value of displaced power, calculated at the cost of generation at 
some distant centralized point. The actual electrons may be delivered to 
a manufacturer down the road 100 yards, but the utility is not required 
to compensate for the strategic location of the power generation.9 
This policy, along with the general one of guaranteeing a “cost 
plus” recovery on expenditures on the still-regulated grid, has led to 
the traditional utility being incentivized to allocate as much of its costs 
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as possible to building and operating the grid, and as little as possible 
to generateing electricity. Not surprisingly, we see as a result widely 
disparate estimates for the cost of power production from central-
ized generation. Utility accounting under this system, which may not 
include such things as the anticipated cost of decommissioning a power 
plant, typically sets a low generation cost for nuclear power. Yet the 
cost for nuclear energy generation, by most measurements, is very high 
(Vaitheeswaran 2004).10 
Needed changes in policies 
As noted by energy pundit Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain 
Institute, the old model of centralized generation with a ubiquitous grid 
was based upon the twentieth-century idea that generation was less reli-
able than the grid. But the twenty-ﬁrst century reality turns this model 
on its head: today, generation, especially gas turbine, is more reliable 
than the grid. Accordingly, one of the fundamental reasons for central-
ized generation no longer exists. As Lovins (2001) notes, today “the 
cheapest, most reliable power” is that which is “produced at or near the 
customers” (p. xiii). 
For DG to take hold in the Midwest, several policy changes will be 
required. 
• Net metering and/or improved sales options for excess genera-
tion. Currently, in most jurisdictions excess generation cannot be 
“net metered” (i.e., the meter does not run backward), and must 
be sold back into the grid at the unbundled “generation rate” 
(i.e., the generation charge, without the transmission or distribu-
tion charge) for power. Under such circumstances, the return for 
generation is signiﬁcantly diminished: there is no value attrib-
uted to the strategic location of the generation near a market. For 
smaller systems (below 138 kilovolts [kV]), however, utilities 
are often required to purchase the power only at the displaced 
generation price (i.e., the “avoided cost of generation.”) In Ohio, 
the avoided cost has been set as low as $0.012 per kWh (Wiss-
man 2012). Accordingly, smaller systems will likely not even 
recover the going rate for unbundled wholesale generation. Net-
metering rules should be established for CHP, or at least regula-
tions should allow for better sales options for excess power. 
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• Reduced standby rates. At the outset, it should be noted that the 
public policy case for the assessment of any standby fee is by no 
means clear. A strong argument can be made that both utilities 
and consumers beneﬁt greatly from DG, and it is counterproduc-
tive to charge standby fees (Casten 2003). Any measures that 
reduce the need for repair or construction of distribution and 
transmission assets inures to the beneﬁt of all users, not just the 
DG end users (Casten 2003; Miller 2012). Nevertheless, regu-
latory bodies are inclined to accept the utility arguments for 
the need for standby fees. The problem, then, is to determine 
what charges are reasonable under the circumstances—and what 
charges can be borne by distributed generators without rendering 
the project unviable. The EPA has determined that, unless the 
customer can avoid at least 90 percent of its otherwise applicable 
rate costs, CHP will not be viable (Weston et al. 2009). Unfortu-
nately, this number is one that is not commonly met with existing 
standby charges in most jurisdictions. In a study by the Mid-
west Clean Energy Application Center, avoided-cost percentages 
from utilities in Iowa, for instance, ranged from a low of 74 to a 
high of 81 percent among Iowa investor-owned utilities (Miller 
2012). Policies need to be established either doing away with or 
making manageable standby charges. 
• Microgrid development. One way to capture the full poten-
tial of DG is through a distribution system architecture called 
a “microgrid.” Unlike DG, a microgrid consists of more than 
a single point of generation. Like DG, however, a microgrid 
should have the ability to isolate itself (islanding) from the util-
ity’s distribution system during a grid disturbance. Islanding has 
the potential to give a higher level of reliability to end users than 
that provided by the macrogrid system as a whole.11 The typi-
cal microgrid uses DG and cogeneration to provide both elec-
tricity and heat to multiple customers joined together on a local 
network. Microgrids also offer potential advantages in power 
quality and reliability over macrogrids, which tend to provide 
homogeneous power quality when customers may have hetero-
geneous requirements (Neville 2008). There is currently consid-
erable uncertainty over how microgrids will be regulated, but 
under most jurisdictions, it appears that only utilities can operate 
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microgrids. There will need to be clarity in the regulations over 
how microgrids may be operated and who may operate them 
before they can be deployed. 
However, the policies necessary to enable DG are not just regulatory 
in nature. Urban universities, for instance, can play a critical leader-
ship role in preparing cities for a transition to DG. To accomplish this, 
universities should change their approach toward technical education 
for the energy industry, and federal and state governments need to sup-
port this shift. Policies that promote DG will have little value if there is 
not a workforce that is capable of deploying the new technologies, and, 
importantly, of understanding the value proposition associated with 
DG. Without such a workforce, transactional costs threaten to slow the 
advancement of DG. 
For centralized generation, professional services have traditionally 
comprised a small percentage of the total project cost. Accordingly, 
utilities have engaged the biggest and most expensive law ﬁ rms, banks, 
architectural and engineering ﬁrms—and money has been no object. 
But in the world of DG, projects may cost $300,000 instead of $300 
million. Yet many of the same legal, regulatory, ﬁnancial, and engineer-
ing issues arise in small projects as in large projects; transactional costs 
do not go down in proportion to project size. Today’s energy-systems 
professional needs to be nimble, trained in multiple disciplines, and 
capable of assessing value inexpensively. 
State and federal resources should be brought to bear on urban 
four-year engineering and engineering technology programs through-
out America, but especially in the Midwest, to create comprehensive, 
cross-disciplinary energy-systems training. Under current university 
models, applied technology is not a priority, and certainly the social 
sciences are not. Universities are rewarded with large research grants 
with generous overhead compensation for energy technology, espe-
cially through federally funded programs such as the National Science 
Foundation. But applied engineering programs and research on social 
impediments to the adoption of advanced energy do not generally get 
this same sort of support. 
Midwestern urban areas have the most to lose if a transition to DG 
is not enabled. Ohio, for instance, is highly vulnerable to a carbon tax or 
a cap and trade system. Roughly 88 percent of Ohio’s power generation 
comes from burning coal. In the meantime, Ohio, which is ranked sev-
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enth nationally in population, is ranked sixth in total energy consump-
tion, fourth in industrial energy consumption, and fourth in greenhouse 
gas emissions (Consortium for Energy, Economics, and the Environ-
ment 2008). In short, Ohio’s economy is dependent on traditional forms 
of energy generation that are patently unsustainable. Urban universities 
in Ohio and other midwestern states must take the lead in helping to 
rewrite regulatory law and in retraining their workforces for the inevi-
table paradigm shift from central to distributed power generation. State 
and federal resources need to enable this transition to be made without 
a massive disruption of midwestern economies. 
Exploitation of Shale Formations 
One of the most exciting and promising developments for the urban 
economies of both the Midwest and the Northeast has been improve-
ments in drilling and completion techniques in the oil and gas industry. 
Speciﬁcally, horizontal drilling and new hydrofracturing technologies 
have enabled oil and gas companies to produce hydrocarbons from 
organically rich shale deposits that were laid down in sedimentary 
basins hundreds of millions of years ago. Previously, shale formations 
had been too impermeable to produce hydrocarbons in commercial 
quantities. Now, suddenly, vast commercially producible oil and gas 
reserves exist in areas of Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, North 
Dakota, and other places around the world. For the ﬁrst time since the 
1800s, the Midwest is poised to not only be self-sufﬁcient, but even to 
export oil and gas. 
This will of course be a badly needed shot in the arm for the ﬂag-
ging economies of the Midwest. Related job creation in ﬁ nancial and 
legal centers such as Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Columbus, Akron, Canton, 
and Youngstown has already begun. More will be coming as drilling 
picks up. In addition, shale development tends to be more service-
industry intensive than traditional oil and gas exploration because of 
the relatively high cost of drilling and completing wells, and the high 
rate of production decline (requiring more drilling). In other words, 
there will be more wells and more completions, yet fewer failures, driv-
ing a robust new oil and gas service industry. Even though much of the 
early wealth to be generated from this industry will be for rural land-
owners, inevitably the urban areas of the Midwest will beneﬁ t greatly, 
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not only from the reduced hydrocarbon prices, but also from profes-
sional service companies locating in cities to be close to a skilled work-
force and to transportation hubs. 
Pennsylvania has been the forerunner in economic development as 
a result of shale drilling. According to one study by Penn State Univer-
sity, the Marcellus Shale development has led directly to 44,000 jobs in 
2009 in that state, creating around $3.9 billion in economic value added 
to Pennsylvania, with $8 billion more in 2010 and $10 billion more 
in 2011 (Considine, Watson, and Blumsack 2010). Likewise, in Ohio, 
economists have estimated that by 2014, 64,000 jobs will be supported 
as a result of developing the Utica Shale, adding some $4.9 billion to 
the state’s gross domestic product (Thomas et al. 2012) 
But setting aside these promising employment numbers resulting 
directly from oil and gas exploration, perhaps the best news for mid-
western urban economies will be the long-term source of cheap natural 
gas. Shale gas has transformed the American energy landscape almost 
overnight: between 2006 and 2011, natural gas prices dropped from 
over $10 per mcf to under $4 per mcf (U.S. Energy Information Agency 
2012a). Shale gas, which comprised less than 2 percent of the gas pro-
duced in the United States in 2000, now comprises 37 percent—and is 
rising (Yergin 2012). In the meantime, U.S. greenhouse gas emissions 
in 2012 were the lowest since 1992, due in principal part to the rapid 
replacement of coal with natural gas as a source of electricity (U.S. 
Energy Information Agency 2012b).12 
States such as Ohio will no longer be experiencing huge trade deﬁ-
cits due to the purchase of oil from the Middle East. This newfound 
source of oil and gas promises a stable, 20–30-year supply of inexpen-
sive hydrocarbons to heat homes, to generate electricity, and to fuel 
transportation. The Energy Information Agency projects natural gas 
prices of between $4 and $8 per mcf through 2035 as a result of the 
“shale gale” (U.S. Energy Information Agency 2012a). Further, petro-
chemical companies, which also rely on long-term, inexpensive and 
stable supplies of natural gas for feedstock, can justify the ﬁnancial 
commitment to locate or expand manufacturing in the Midwest. 
State and federal policies should encourage shale development. 
Regulation of the industry must be tight, sure, and comprehensive; any 
spills or contamination from wastewater generated by drilling will set 
back development enormously. State regulatory agencies and state geo-
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logical surveys must be completely independent from the oil and gas 
industry under their purview and be fully funded. This can be done 
through severance and other taxes generated by oil and gas produc-
tion and also through long-overdue taxes on imported oil, especially 
from those locations where U.S. military presence is required to safely 
transport oil to American ports. This latter policy, more than any, has 
the potential to provide ample resources to enable the safe production of 
U.S. oil and gas supplies from unconventional sources while restoring 
wealth to American cities. 
Importantly, midwestern cities should not use the newfound hydro-
carbon wealth to go back to business as usual. While the oil and gas 
reserves located in shale beds in the Midwest and the Northeast pro-
vide a more climate-friendly alternative to burning coal, they are still 
an exhaustible resource that emits large amounts of carbon into the 
atmosphere. These reserves should be considered as a bridge to an eco-
nomy based on hydrogen, electric transportation, and renewable energy 
generation—an economy where oil and gas are used primarily in the 
petrochemical sector rather than the energy sector. Policymakers in the 
Midwest have an opportunity to do something that their counterparts 
in Texas, Louisiana, and even the federal government have failed to do 
with their respective oil and gas largesse: plan for the inevitable transi-
tion to alternative energy supplies without a massive disruption of the 
economy. 
Policies That Reﬂect the Actual Costs of Transportation 
and Power Delivery 
For some 80 years our energy policies have placed the burden of 
growth in rural locales on the urban areas. That policy must be reversed. 
Now it is time for the rural areas, or at least the suburbs, to support 
growth in the inner city. The same sort of program that led to the devel-
opment of rural electriﬁcation should now be put into place in our inner 
cities: subsidized loans and grants for DG and access to cheap, feder-
ally supported electricity. Municipal utilities in particular would beneﬁt 
from having priority for the cheapest electricity available, from which 
savings could be used to attract business, industry, and residents back 
to the city. 
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Monetizing some of the external costs of power generation and 
gasoline consumption would also help cities, especially in the Midwest. 
For instance, if the actual cost of air conditioning were passed on to 
consumers, manufacturing management might reach a different conclu-
sion about the beneﬁts of relocating operations from the Midwest to the 
South or Southwest. Similarly, if the total cost of transportation were 
passed on to commuters, residents might reach a different conclusion 
about the beneﬁts of moving ever farther from the city. 
Just as we have seen decades of policy subsidizing rural electriﬁca-
tion over urban electriﬁcation, we have also seen decades of policy sub-
sidizing rural transportation over urban transportation. This is another 
policy that must be reversed. We cannot now abandon our reliance on 
interstate highways. However, we can fund programs that make life 
easier for residents of midwestern cities. This begins with better trans-
portation systems. 
Better, faster, and more comfortable public transportation would 
certainly be a major ﬁrst step. It will require a signiﬁcant and continu-
ous subsidy to sustain such a program, because it will take decades to 
see the demographic response. In many of the Great Lakes cities, the 
hardest part about transportation is driving in snow. Public transporta-
tion could alleviate much of this problem. 
Winter travel is problematic not just for commuting, however; it 
is also a problem for walking in the city. Many midwestern cities can-
not afford to effectively plow and salt roads and sidewalks, and walk-
ing becomes an adventure. Funds should be directed to cities to enable 
them to respond quickly to winter storms. Sidewalks and crosswalks 
can be heated by underground steam systems to keep them free of ice. 
Better still, underground passageways can be built connecting down-
town urban centers such as universities, museums, sports venues, com-
mercial districts, arts districts, and ofﬁce parks. Houston has such an 
underground tunnel system in its downtown, and it is used mostly in 
the hot, humid summer. A number of Canadian cities have downtown 
indoor walkways; Montreal’s underground complex is so vast that it is 
known as the ville intérieure, the “indoor city.” Midwestern cities could 
have a similar system in their downtown areas for winter activities. To
be sure, these sorts of programs are not easily accomplished, especially 
in a bad economy. But the rural electriﬁcation program was established 
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in a far worse economy. It will take the same sort of effort to rebuild 
midwestern cities to their former glory. 
Regional Energy Planning 
The Midwest today has an opportunity to reimagine sustainable 
industrialization. More than anything else, a return to a healthy manu-
facturing base would lead to a revitalization of urban areas. Manufac-
turing has long been the lifeblood of the midwestern urban economy, 
but it is also an energy-intensive business, especially for such indus-
tries that produce aluminum, steel, chemicals, and glass. Manufacturers 
account for roughly one-half of U.S. natural gas and 30 percent of its 
electricity consumption. Accordingly, a secure, reliable, and affordable 
source of electricity is a top priority for midwestern manufacturers. 
Those manufacturers for which electricity costs make up an especially 
signiﬁcant portion of their product costs are most vulnerable to rapid 
rate increases (Ohio Manufacturers’ Association 2010). The ongoing 
decline in manufacturing jobs throughout America has accelerated 
in recent years, reﬂecting not just high electricity costs, but also the 
return to $100 per bbl oil and the “high priced fuel syndrome.” Ohio has 
lost some 117,000 manufacturing jobs in the the period of 2008–2012 
alone—the second highest total in America (Thomas 2012). 
With foresight and planning, the Midwest can develop energy poli-
cies to help reverse this trend. As outlined in this chapter, forces are 
coming together today that necessitate rethinking industrialization in 
the Midwest. Rising electricity capacity charges, EPA Boiler MACT
laws, carbon emission reduction mandates, and the development of 
shale gas all demand that midwestern policymakers formulate strate-
gies for enabling DG and a conversion of transportation ﬂeets to natural 
gas or electricity. 
Urban areas would beneﬁt from collaboration between local gov-
ernments and industries to develop regional energy-planning scenarios. 
This will be especially important in older, more densely populated areas 
of the Great Lakes and the Midwest, where DG holds so much promise. 
DG, especially CHP, will not be a “one size ﬁts all” application; every 
situation requires an analysis speciﬁc to those circumstances. How-
ever, planning can help manufacturers identify strategies to use “off the 
shelf” technologies when possible. 
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In particular, for regions with a large variety of manufacturing and 
other electricity-intensive users, a coordinated CHP program can be 
useful to organizations trying to ﬁ nd a ﬁt for their power and heat needs. 
Such a program might be set up to address three strategic areas: 
1) commercial buildings and small industrial applications—deploy-
ing similar equipment and similar ﬁnancial goals and capabilities; 
2) institutional facilities—usually with larger power and heat 
requirements and with much longer-term ﬁnancing abilities, 
which are more amenable to Energy Savings Company (ESCO) 
savings structures (arrangements whereby energy savings real-
ized are used to fund efﬁciency upgrades); and 
3) major industrial and district heating CHPs, where large-scale 
power is generated, visibility is high, and the returns to the dis-
tricts and industries involved are potentially great. 
The development of an energy master plan might begin with a Geo-
graphical Information System–based “energy map” that is prepared at a 
neighborhood, local authority, or subregional scale. It would include an 
assessment of existing building energy demands as a baseline, identify 
likely locations for new business development, and assess effects on 
energy demand. It might also include a “heat map,” identifying anchor 
heat loads, such as large public buildings (King and Shaw 2010). 
These energy maps could reveal CHP-generated district heating 
opportunities that local authorities or project managers might be willing 
to support. They may also inform growth options and serve as the start-
ing point for energy planning for developers. A decentralized energy 
master plan could include technical, planning, ﬁnancial, and legal sup-
port—all better enabling manufacturers to evaluate DG opportunities. 
Local energy planning can provide a road map for manufactur-
ing to identify strategies for developing on-site DG opportunities. For 
the reasons discussed earlier, transactional costs threaten small-scale 
generation. Manufacturers are generally unwilling to spend hundreds 
of thousands of dollars identifying potential DG projects. Regional 
energy planning reduces these costs for manufacturers by identifying 
not only potential projects, but also possible collaborators and sources 
of funding. 
Traditionally, regional energy plans have been developed in the 
United States to address climate action plans and to decrease reliance 
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on fossil fuels.13 However, the type of energy-mapping strategies that 
were developed for London, England, will be required to enable manu-
facturing to identify opportunities to provide district heating through 
CHP projects. That approach included a 10-stage undertaking with, 
among other things, data gathering, project identiﬁcation, ﬁnancial 
modeling, and feasibility studies (King and Shaw 2010). This sort of 
information would signiﬁcantly enhance manufacturing’s appetite for 
undertaking DG. 
Finally, any regional energy study should include an investigation 
into the transformation of transportation ﬂeets to compressed or lique-
ﬁed natural gas and to electric vehicles. Notwithstanding the advent of 
oil development from shale formations such as the Bakken in North 
Dakota and the Utica in Ohio, the United States will continue to be an 
oil-importing nation. By substituting natural gas or electricity for gaso-
line and diesel for our transportation ﬂeets, we can reduce our nearly 
billion-dollar-per-day trade deﬁcit (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2013), 
and in the process decrease greenhouse gas emissions. With natural gas 
trading for a fraction of the cost of oil for the foreseeable future, this 
transition would save money and repatriate dollars domestically. 
Urban areas can facilitate this change by identifying infrastructure 
needs and by developing strategic locations for refueling and recharg-
ing stations. In areas where shale gas is abundant, additional planning 
may enable the development of refueling stations near gathering, trans-
portation, compression, storage, and distribution infrastructure. Water 
use and discharge planning would further enhance shale development, 
as would road use and maintenance planning. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In American society, policy is set by advocacy. Unfortunately, 
under this system, those entities with a preference toward maintain-
ing the status quo have a signiﬁcant advantage in setting policy—even 
when that course of action is not in the general public interest. No 
ﬁeld of enterprise suffers from this problem more than does the energy 
industry, in which the stakes are enormous, and change can be disrup-
tive. Incumbent industries have propagated the notion that we cannot 
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replace our current energy models with new ones. Even when unbiased 
information is set forth, the public struggles to understand it; an unsus-
pecting citizenry is unable to differentiate between a vested interest and 
an independent expert. 
This problem helps to explain why programs such as subsidies for 
rural electriﬁcation continue to exist some 40 years after 99 percent of 
American farms have been connected to the grid. It also is a caution-
ary message to policymakers who may want to rectify the imbalance: 
energy policies that enable and encourage migration from the cities, 
especially from those in the Midwest, will be very difﬁcult to change. 
Not only do these cities face the problem of overcoming vested inter-
ests, they are also dealing with reduced political might as a result of 
decades of population and wealth ﬂight. It will require considerable 
political courage for policymakers to undertake the sort of long-term 
commitments to energy policy that will be needed for midwestern cities 
to return to the robust economies they once enjoyed. But this starts by 
recognizing the complicity that long-existing energy policies have had 
in creating the decline of urban economies in the ﬁ rst place. 
Notes 
The author gratefully acknowledges research and editing support for this chapter from 
Su Gao and Srikanth Sivashankaran. 
1. The federal portion of this does not vary; it is around $0.18 per gallon. For a dis-
cussion of the history of the excise tax, see Pirog (2010). 
2. As noted in Slivinski (2009), rural electricity is just one of a number of utility 
services subsidized by urban dwellers. 
3. California was also the location for the ﬁrst failures in deregulation. A combina-
tion of ﬁxed retail prices and rising costs of generation, together with some market 
manipulation by Enron and others, nearly left several California utilities insolvent. 
4. Pﬁffner (2009) argues that the current partisan culture has its roots in the demo-
graphic change brought on by the advent of air conditioning. 
5. Berry (1991) argues that massive change following technical innovation acceler-
ates during times of “stagﬂation,” such as we are arguably experiencing in America 
today. This acceleration in growth comes as a result of a combination of investors 
recognizing opportunity in depressed prices and public ofﬁcials recognizing that 
help is needed to get the economy moving again. Both forces are at work today. 
6. According to Policy Matters Ohio (2012), as many as 20,000 jobs could be created 
from cogeneration, and the release into the atmosphere of 13 metric tons of carbon 
dioxide would be avoided. 
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7. The Ohio Public Utilities Commission resolved in February 2012 to develop an 
educational forum to begin a pilot program to advance and share information 
about combined heat and power as a strategy for compliance with the new Boiler 
MACT rules. “Boiler MACT” refers to the set of adjustments to the Clean Air 
Act that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency instituted December 20, 2012, 
speciﬁc to certain categories of boilers and solid waste incinerators. The adjust-
ments made include emission limits for certain pollutants speciﬁcally targeted at 
categories of boilers and solid waste incinerators, changes to the subcategories of 
boilers in establishing standards, a revised implementation timeline, and adhering 
to established standards for the “highest emitting of the highest 0.4 percent of 
boilers” (EPA 2013). 
8. Compliance coals run around $90 per ton, or $3.60 per mmbtu (million British 
Thermal Units, which measure energy content); 1 million btus are roughly equiva-
lent to 1,000 cubic fee (mcf) of natural gas. If a boiler were 75 percent efﬁcient, 
this means that the cost of delivered steam would be $4.80 per mmbtu. 
9. Ohio’s original net-metering law was enacted in 1999 as part of the state’s 
electric-industry restructuring legislation. The Public Utilities Commission of 
OHIO (PUCO) later revised its net-metering rules in March 2007, prompted by 
the federal Energy Policy Act of 2005. Initially, PUCO required utilities to credit 
customers’ net excess generation at the utility’s full retail rate. However, in June 
2002, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that each utility must credit excess generation 
to the customer at the utility’s unbundled generation rate. See http://energy.gov/ 
savings/net-metering-29 (accessed October 24, 2013). 
10. This policy of allocating costs when possible to the grid rather than to generation, 
in addition to ensuring the cost-plus return, makes certain that the utility genera-
tion is highly competitive in the wholesale market. 
11. For purposes of this discussion, nongrid-connected microgrids are not considered, 
although these may have some application in more isolated areas. 
12. Not all observers agree that shale gas has been a signiﬁcant contributor to this 
trend. See Howarth (2011). 
13. See, for example, Kane County (2011) and San Diego Association of Governments 
(1994). 
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Entrepreneurial Initiatives 
in Chinese Markets 
Why They Are Important 
and What Firms Need to Know 
Chieh-Chen Bowen 
Cleveland State University 
As China’s role in the world economy grows, American ﬁrms and 
entrepreneurs—including those in Rust Belt cities—will need to 
ﬁnd ways to gain entreé to its growing domestic marketplace. 
Understanding the culture, language, and economic mechanisms 
in place are crucial to gain access and establish a foothold. 
Throughout the twentieth century, no single nation or block of 
nations had nearly as much economic power and inﬂuence as the United 
States. During much of that period, no region had as much industrial 
might as the Midwest. Now, however, as the early part of the twenty-
ﬁrst century unfolds, the age of total U.S. world supremacy is end-
ing, so has the era of midwestern industrial superiority ended within 
the United States. China in particular is a vastly more prosperous and 
vibrant country than it was even 20 years ago. According to the World 
Bank, between 2007 and 2010 China’s real GDP growth was at an aver-
age rate of 10.85 percent per year, as compared to 0.54 percent per 
year over the same period in the United States (World Bank 2012). 
China is now the second-largest economy in the world and is expected 
to become the largest around 2016 (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2013). China’s growth and development 
are an inexorable and major aspect of the economic context within 
which any renewal in midwestern prosperity must occur. 
191 
Bowen.indb 192  12/16/2013 2:14:22 PM   
 
 
 
 
  
192 Bowen 
At current growth rates, China’s economy is doubling in real terms 
every seven or eight years. Between 2001 and 2010 average household 
income in China grew by more than 125 percent in inﬂation-adjusted 
terms (Rodriguez 2012). This was the fastest period of economic 
growth over a single decade of any nation in recorded history. China’s 
ascendency is, moreover, not just seen in its growth rate but also in its 
immensely large population. As a consequence, we have started to wit-
ness a totally different structure in the world’s economy, in which the 
United States and all of its cities and regions play a different and less 
inﬂuential role than in the past century. 
While the economic context within which midwestern industrial 
cities must adapt and compete has changed, this is not necessarily a bad 
thing. It simply means that industry in these cities must take a few steps 
back and rebalance inside and out. They must become more efﬁcient 
and successful at anticipating the jobs of the future, moving resources 
into new areas, redeﬁning prosperity, and putting far more emphasis 
upon investments and exports to other countries, especially China. 
Prosperity is created and renewed at the margin. It requires pro-
duction and exchange of the goods and services people value. For 
midwestern industrial cities, this emerging economic context means, 
among other things, that the renewal of prosperity depends on how well 
local entrepreneurs and ﬁrms understand the economic, legal, social, 
and political environments in China. Such comprehension is neces-
sary to successfully export and invest in new Chinese markets. In this 
author’s view, export and investment are among the most important 
keys to renewed prosperity in midwestern industrial cities. The old saw 
rings true that one can buy in one’s own language, but one must sell in 
the language of the buyer. Nowhere is this more important than when 
doing business with the Chinese. 
This chapter aims to contribute to the renewal of prosperity in 
midwestern industrial cities by discussing and giving practical advice 
regarding the culture and traditions one must know about to success-
fully export to—and invest in—Chinese markets. The implications of 
understanding this environment are explained using the examples of the 
failure of Google when it was forced to pull its operation out of main-
land China in 2010, and the success of Rupert Murdoch when the Chi-
nese government granted him the ﬁrst “landing rights” to sell foreign 
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programs to cable system prime-time slots, then later, rights to provide 
media content to mobile users. 
THE GROWING MARKET IN CHINA AND OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR U.S. AND MIDWEST INDUSTRY 
There are many reasons for the surging U.S. interest in China, 
involving not only its pace of economic growth but also its sheer size 
of population, territory, and foreign reserves. China has quickly trans-
formed from one of the largest suppliers of cheap labor and inexpensive 
goods to one of the largest consumer markets, where multinational cor-
porations compete to grow their market shares (McGregor 2005). The 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become one of the most popular 
host countries for global ﬁrms and the most appealing market for for-
eign investors since 2002, according to A. T. Kearney’s Foreign Direct 
Investment Conﬁdence Index (Laudicina 2010). China joined the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2011, as a condition of enter-
ing the WTO, China also agreed to open its markets to global produ-
cers without requiring technology transfer, a condition on which it used 
to insist. Thus, PRC’s exports and imports of goods and services have 
been growing explosively. Even during 2011, when the world economy 
was mired in European economic crises and global slowdowns, PRC’s 
total export value was $1,898.60 billion, a 20.3 percent increase from 
the previous year. The total value of imports was $1,743.46 billion, a 
24.9 percent increase from the previous year (Ministry of Commerce of 
the People’s Republic of China 2011). It is also worth noting that the 
PRC’s imports are rising at a faster pace than its exports. This growth in 
imports signals enormous market needs that are not fulﬁlled by China’s 
local producers, and its urge to reach outside its borders to purchase 
goods and services. The rapid growth rate of imports provides evidence 
of the PRC’s interest in growing its consumer economy. 
The fast-growing import and export sectors attract many U.S. com-
panies to do business with China. According to U.S. Census data, China 
has become the second-largest trading partner with the United States; in 
2012 the value of imports from China was $426 billion, and the value 
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of exports to China was $110 billion (U.S. Census Bureau 2013). Trade 
stimulates growth in economic activities and creates jobs. Moreover, 
as the world economy globalizes, the effects of trade are increasing. 
In Ohio, 21.2 percent of jobs depended on trade in 2008, up from 10.5 
percent in 1992. Also, exporting companies grew faster, paid higher 
salaries, and had broader consumer bases than did nonexporting com-
panies. Furthermore, overseas competition tended to stimulate higher 
growth and development rates (Business Roundtable 2010). 
China’s burgeoning economy and expanding middle class have cre-
ated a huge appetite for U.S. goods and services, including business 
technological solutions, construction materials, and consumer products. 
U.S. exports to China grew from $27.5 billion in 2003 to $108.6 billion 
in 2012, a 294 percent increase in a decade. During the same period of 
time, Ohio’s exports to China grew from $823 million in 2003 to $3.656 
billion in 2012, an impressive 344 percent increase in a decade. Ohio 
ranked eighth in exporting goods and services to China among all states 
in 2012. Other midwestern states also enjoyed a much faster growth 
rate in exports to China than that of the United States overall, as shown 
in Table 8.1. In many midwestern states, China ranks third among all 
foreign trading countries in export markets, trailing only the two large 
border countries of Canada and Mexico (U.S.-China Business Council 
2013). 
Knowing that the Chinese people are buying is only the ﬁ rst step. 
Figuring out what they are buying, exporting it, and selling it to them 
require deeper understanding of the cultural and social norms in China. 
Making products and services for the Chinese market necessitates 
knowledge of the entire business system, including the local social, 
cultural, legal, and political environment. All of these elements are 
interconnected, and changes in one are not isolated from changes in the 
others. 
Numerous corporations have entered the Chinese market without 
substantial knowledge of the nation’s business environment and prac-
tices, and have thus encountered many failures. The renewal of pros-
perity in midwestern industrial cities depends, in no small measure, on 
learning from these failures to improve the chance of success when 
doing business in China. Consequently, in the following sections, dif-
ferent key aspects of China’s economic, political, legal, and social envi-
ronment will be discussed. 
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Table 8.1  Exports to China from the United States and from Midwestern States, 2003 and 2012 (2003$) 
United States Illinois Indiana Iowa Michigan Missouri Ohio 
2003 ($, millions) 27,500 1,167 454 566 439 463 823 
2012 ($, millions) 108,600 6,092 2,601 3,151 3,703 2,227 3,656 
% increase, 2003–2012 294 422 473 457 743 381 344 
China’s ranking in export 3rd 3rd 3rd 2nd 3rd 2nd 3rd 
market, 2012 
NOTE: Percentages calculated from unrounded data. 
SOURCE: U.S.-China Business Council (2013). 
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CHINA’S ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
China’s economic reform was launched in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping 
when he pushed to open up and modernize the old and closed commu-
nist economy to improve the quality of life for the ordinary people. For 
the next three decades until 2010, the economic growth rate averaged 
10.0 percent per year for real GDP growth (World Bank 2012). China 
has changed from a centrally planned and organized economy to a 
market-oriented one. Before the reform, the state directed and monitored 
a large share of the country’s output and production goals, controlled 
prices, and allocated resources throughout most of the economy. China 
has also been transformed from an isolated economy with virtually no 
international trade and foreign investments to the top-ranked exporting 
country and the second-ranked importing country in global trade, as 
well as a very powerful player in foreign investment and exchange. Its 
high level of monetary reserves makes it a major force during world-
wide economic crises (Central Intelligence Agency 2013). 
The newest ﬁve-year economic and social development plan has 
continued China’s commitment to open up the market, optimize foreign 
trade structure, and develop economic relations with mutual beneﬁts 
and win-win results (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of 
China 2012). To get close to this market, many companies have set up 
operations or joint ventures in China, which are practically impossible 
without ﬁrst understanding how business functions in China. 
The Chinese people have developed special principles for doing 
business using their own customs. Chinese business models are quite 
distinct from those in the United States. Research has shown that fail-
ing to recognize cultural differences in doing business is the most fre-
quently cited reason for failures experienced by multinational corpora-
tions (Pan and Zhang 2004). Knowing the cultural norms and business 
practices in China is much more important for U. S. companies today, 
when they are trying to get a piece of the fast-growing Chinese market, 
than when they were mostly buying Chinese goods and services. 
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CHINA’S POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
The political system in China plays an important role in control-
ling business activities. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took 
power in 1949 and has since had a strong hold on the central govern-
ment. Not only does it control all political activities, it also controls all 
commercial ones, and runs the All China Federation of Trade Unions 
at the municipal, provincial, and national levels. Not recognizing and 
understanding the important part played by the CCP and by central and 
local government ofﬁcials and authorities may stall business progress 
in China (Manners 2005). 
Firms are expected to establish and maintain good relationships with 
governmental ofﬁcials to ensure business transactions run smoothly. 
The combination of centralized political power and emphasis on the 
principle of the “rule of people” creates a potentially ripe environment 
for government ofﬁcials to use public power for personal gain (Luo 
2008). The principle of the rule of people is the opposite of the rule of 
law. The rule of people refers to “society operating on cultural norms 
rather than formal legal rules” (Chew 2005). Unpredictable and arbi-
trary human indiscretions are likely to enter into authoritative decisions 
which are made and executed by people at the top of the hierarchy. 
Therefore, whenever there is a shift in the power structure at the top, 
there will be major changes in how decisions are made. The uncertain 
nature of how things get done makes trade, foreign investment, and 
economic development more difﬁcult than in societies that operate by 
the rule of law (Chew 2005). 
The CCP has tight control over the central government and military 
and also has an iron ﬁst over business activities, in a way that goes 
beyond regulation. It presides over large, wealthy, state-owned ﬁrms, 
and it exercises control over the selection of senior executives of all 
state-run ﬁrms, many of which are in the top tier of the Fortune Global 
500 list. Multinational corporations are often confused and frustrated by 
the dual roles of regulator and competitor assumed by the same Chinese 
governmental agency. On one hand, foreign companies are mandated 
to disclose information to comply with Chinese regulations, but on the 
other hand, Chinese competitors can utilize this information to gain an 
advantage in the market. This conﬂict of interest is impossible to sort 
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out when dual roles are assumed by the same individuals (McGregor 
2010). 
CHINA’S LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
The Chinese legal tradition developed from both Confucianism and 
Legalism, two inﬂuential, though adversarial, schools of thought. Con-
fucianism assumes human nature is fundamentally good. Social order 
can be achieved by observing customs, morals, and norms rather than 
through governmental regulations and laws, which should be used min-
imally and only for the worst offenses against public well-being. Legal-
ism assumes that moral order is inadequate in maintaining social order 
because innate human malevolence would constantly drive people into 
trouble. A well-ordered society can be established and maintained only 
through a set of formally and publically announced harsh rules. Heads 
of state had the duty to establish and enforce law with uniformity, cer-
tainty, celerity, and severity (Ren 1997). Unfortunately, the inﬂ uence of 
Legalism has often been overlooked historically because of its associa-
tion with despotism and cruelty during the Qin Dynasty, which lasted 
from 221 BCE to 206 BCE. 
In the past, the legal system in China has not played an important 
role in keeping social order. However, the legal landscape in China has 
changed rapidly in recent years. More and more business legislation, 
law ofﬁ ces, and attorneys have emerged in China in the past couple of 
decades. This trend is due partially to an effort to present Western inves-
tors with an image of a stable and predictable business environment 
with legal protection and security (China Knowledge Press 2004), and 
partially to fulﬁll membership requirements of the WTO. 
China has strengthened its legal framework and amended its intel-
lectual property rights and related laws and regulations to comply with 
the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights. There have been important updates and amendments regard-
ing intellectual property rights: patent, trademark, and copyright laws. 
However, both patent and trademark laws adopt the “ﬁrst to register” 
rule instead of the “ﬁrst to invent” rule, even if the ﬁrst ﬁlers are not 
the original inventors. In a situation where an estimated 20 percent of 
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all consumer products in the Chinese market are counterfeit, companies 
are encouraged to ﬁle trademark applications with the Chinese Trade-
mark Ofﬁce and ﬁle patent applications with the Chinese State Intel-
lectual Property Ofﬁce to register their products even when they don’t 
have plans to sell their product in China (U.S. Department of Com-
merce 2003). 
However, having intellectual property rights does not provide nec-
essary protection from commercial piracy. For example, China has 
more than 950 million mobile phone users. The demand for iPhones 
is so strong that the smuggling of real iPhones and sales of fakes are 
skyrocketing. Stores masquerading as real Apple outlets and selling 
smuggled genuine Apple products have sprouted up everywhere from 
Beijing in the northeast to Kunming in the southwest (Reuters 2011). 
The Kunming government eventually ordered two of the fake Apple 
stores to shut down for operating a business without a license, instead 
of based on concerns regarding any copyright violation, piracy, smug-
gling or intellectual property theft (Today’s Zaman 2011). 
In reality, no matter how modernized and Western-like the Chinese 
legal system may appear, and how similar the structure and process 
of business arbitration, dispute resolution, and mediation are, laws and 
business contracts alone will not, in the foreseeable future, bring in 
successful business deals for multinational corporations in China. The 
social outcome of implementing a codiﬁed law is often determined not 
by the form and language used in the statute or process that executes 
law, but by people’s attitudes, expectations, and value systems regarding 
what ought to be restrained and what otherwise ought to be rewarded or 
compromised (Ren 1997). Legal rights and protections may mean very 
little in practical terms when legislation in China tends to be vaguely 
written and rarely enforced (Orts 2001). China’s legal system is consid-
ered to be underdeveloped (Parekh 2005) and inefﬁcient (Guvenli and 
Sanyal 2003), and has been criticized for its vague, ambiguous wording 
for decades (Lee 1999). To survive a weak, ambiguous, and inefﬁcient 
legal system, the Chinese people tend to stay within a tightly connected 
group to seek reassurance, support, and protection as well as to adhere 
to the rule of people (ren zhi) principle. 
Law in China bears the birthmark of its own history, culture, and 
tradition. This heritage is sometimes a force more powerful than the rule 
of law in foretelling the consequences of law and in dictating people’s 
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thinking about the role of law and legal authority (Ren 1997). Even if 
a company can convince the court and win a judgment, reluctance to 
enforce arbitration from provincial or district courts is a long-existing 
problem (Economist 2005; Kivela and Leung 2005). It is estimated 
that, at best, only 60 percent of court rulings are enforced, and that can 
drop to 10 percent when courts entrust ofﬁcers in other jurisdictions to 
enforce rulings for them (Economist 2005). 
In contrast, Americans tend to accept and, in a relatively large mea-
sure, to follow the principle of the rule of law (fa zhi) that legal rules are 
publicly known, consistently enforced, and fairly applied (Orts 2001). 
Law in the United States is designed to be applicable to everyone con-
sistently. Laws and business contracts tend to be respected as well as 
enforced in the U.S. business environment. Accordingly, reliance on 
laws and business contracts guides business activities. The need for 
clear and explicit business terms and conditions stems from core cul-
tural values. Individualistic Americans are likely to behave in a self-
serving manner to maximize their personal gains from business oppor-
tunities. Such individualistically oriented social norms allow a wide 
range of acceptable behaviors for asserting persons’ own particular 
rights (Doney, Cannon, and Mullen 1998). Under the assumption that 
everyone will maximize their own self-interests whenever they can, 
business transactions need to be regulated and sanctioned with explicit 
legal terms to clearly deﬁne the boundaries of individuals’ rights and 
responsibilities and to provide equal protection for all parties involved. 
U.S. ﬁrms rely on legal protection and expect to follow contracts to the 
letter in case of any business disputes (Coulson 1984). 
CHINA’S SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
In Chinese culture, the concept of the self is conceived as an inte-
gral part of the collective. This interdependent view grants primacy 
to the relationship between the self and others. Traditionally, Chinese 
people do not have an independent individual identity. Their self-
identity is heavily interdependent with their family, and this makes 
them more likely to act in accordance with the anticipated expectations 
of others (Chuang 1998). 
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The Chinese are known to be highly favorable toward insiders and 
extremely guarded toward outsiders. Friendships and trust are the foun-
dations for doing business. Proﬁts may not be the only consideration 
when making business deals. Extensive connections and trust building 
with local and central government ofﬁcials seem to create proﬁtable 
business opportunities at the right time (Economist 2004). Business 
deals are much more likely to be made with friends or people within the 
web of connections than with strangers solely based on mathematical 
reasoning and proﬁt/loss analysis. Lam (2000) mentions that Americans 
use mathematical reasoning and utility analysis in business negotiation, 
but the Chinese use feelings, personal connections, and trust. Failing to 
address these different concerns in doing business may very well leave 
both sides empty-handed. 
The collectivistic Chinese people tend to view themselves as 
tightly connected in a social web of relations, in which their own self-
interests are suppressed and woven into the greater good of the group 
with which they identify. Overtly self-serving behavior is thus likely 
to be curbed by social sanctions. People who are perceived as acting 
solely in their own interests tend to be ostracized for acting selﬁ shly. A
narrow range of acceptable behavior is prescribed by one’s social roles, 
and people act in unison to achieve order and harmony (Doney, Can-
non, and Mullen 1998). Consequently, there is relatively little need for 
laws and business contracts to protect individual rights in Chinese soci-
eties. Instead, cultivating, sustaining, and maintaining long-term recip-
rocal relationships with individuals who are a part of a web of relations 
are guiding principles for business activities among the Chinese people. 
The Chinese show more subordination to in-group hierarchy than to 
outside authorities, which they often ﬁnd ways to circumvent or ignore 
(Triandis, Brislin, and Hui 1988).  
The rule of people principle depicts the basic Chinese social mech-
anism and can be described as a set of implicit and unspoken guidelines 
governing social interactions and relationships, and serving as a social 
control mechanism for survival in a legally, politically, and economi-
cally complex and uncertain environment. This set of rules allows 
social actors to behave in a more or less predictable way, which mini-
mizes unnecessary conﬂicts and enhances social harmony (Cheng and 
Farh 2001). Davies et al. (2003) assert that, in Chinese business and 
social life, rule of people is of paramount importance. This principle is 
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composed of the following three highly related elements: 1) guanxi, 2) 
renqing, and 3) mianzi. The boundaries among the three are blurred, as 
can be seen in the overlapping of each one’s deﬁnition. 
Guanxi
The Chinese characters for guanxi can be directly translated as con-
nections and relationships. Guanxi is deﬁned as “the process of using 
personal connections for political, social and economic beneﬁ t” (Fan 
2002, p. 551). It determines one’s place in the social structure and pro-
vides security, trust, and a prescribed role (Hammond and Glenn 2004). 
The art of guanxi is deﬁned by Yang (1994, p. 109) as “involving the 
exchange of gifts, favors and banquets; the cultivation of personal rela-
tionships; networks of mutual dependence; and manufacturing of obli-
gation and indebtedness.” The Chinese are thus more likely to favor 
insiders with whom they have developed guanxi than outsiders with 
whom they have not. 
Guthrie (1998) argues that guanxi is an inevitable characteristic of 
most societies, while the stickiness of guanxi practice in China, given 
modernization and globalization, is seen as arising from institutional 
underdevelopment. The practice of guanxi helps form self-sufﬁcient 
circles of reciprocity and obligations to protect people from state con-
trol and reduce their dependency on the state for material resources and 
social sustenance during periods of political and economic uncertainty 
or hardship (Yang 1994). Guanxi is commonly used as a means of sur-
vival as well as obtaining prosperity in Chinese societies. 
Renqing 
The two Chinese characters for renqing can be directly translated as 
human and affection. Renqing is deﬁned as “a normative standard for 
regulating social exchanges and a set of reciprocity rules to strive for 
desirable outcomes within a stable and structured web of social rela-
tions” (Hwang 1987, p. 946). It is typically based on ingratiation and 
contains affective components in addition to guanxi. To succeed in Chi-
nese society, the receiver must understand and abide by the reciprocity 
rule and the necessary commitment to pay back in similar kind and 
extent. 
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Because of the expectation of future return, the Chinese may dole 
out renqing to others as a form of social investment, expecting to have 
more effective interactions with the receivers in the future. Renqing 
also implies a moral obligation to maintain the exchange relationship. 
Renqing could be either concrete or abstract, such as money, gifts, ser-
vices, information, and/or affection (Hwang 1987). Renqing involves 
deliberated and calculated engineering of social interactions for future 
personal gains. 
Mianzi 
The third element is mianzi, whose Chinese characters can be 
directly translated as face. Mianzi is deﬁned as “an individual’s social 
position or prestige, gained by successfully performing one or more 
speciﬁc social roles that are well recognized by others” (Hwang 1987, 
p. 960). It involves constant consciousness of one’s status in the web 
of social relations, the probability of being accepted by others, and the 
special power or privilege one enjoys for being recognized by others. In 
Chinese social relations, maintaining face is essential because it trans-
lates into power and inﬂuence. A loss of mianzi would likely result in a 
loss of prestige. 
The common thread of these three elements is continuing and 
complex social interactions. Guanxi, renqing, and mianzi not only are 
unique and ubiquitous products of Chinese culture, they are also efﬁ-
cient means to maintain social order. The rule of people principle is 
philosophically in line with Confucius’s teaching to maintain relation-
ships, help those in need, and fully reciprocate favors. It forms the basis 
for collective pressure to maintain social harmony and thus sets the usu-
ally unspoken expectations of cooperation and lowers the transaction 
costs of doing business. Through implicit mutual agreement, this prin-
ciple establishes a restrictive, even coercive, power upon every member 
of the web of social relations. These members enjoy privileges and at 
the same time incur obligations. The Chinese rely on this concept when 
conducting their daily activities. 
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The Rule of Law, the Rule of People, and Governmental Inﬂuence 
on Business Activities 
The principles of the rule of law and the rule of people seem to 
operate at the opposite ends of the spectrum, and it is thus assumed that 
most people would use one as a substitute for the other. However, peo-
ple function on different assumptions, traditions, customs, and values 
in different cultures. It is prudent to rely on empirical evidence instead 
of common sense when dealing with cross-cultural differences. Bowen 
et al. (2009) conducted such an empirical cross-cultural compari-
son between U.S. and Chinese societies on the rule of law, the rule of 
people, and governmental inﬂuence on business activities. The survey 
respondents were university students from the United States and China. 
The results, presented in Table 8.2, show that there are no differ-
ences between how Americans and Chinese perceive the rule of law or 
the governmental inﬂuence on business activities. But signiﬁcant dif-
ferences exist in the perceptions of the impact of the rule of people. 
The Chinese perceive the rule of people to be more important than 
do Americans. A possible explanation for this is that the Chinese are 
known to be ﬂ exible and highly adaptable. They have learned to func-
tion in a global environment in which the rule of law principle needs 
to be respected and followed. In the attempt to modernize the Chinese 
business environment, the Chinese did not totally abandon the rule of 
people principle, either. As expected, the Chinese people’s daily life is 
much more tied to the complex web of social interactions than is that 
of Americans. 
Also interesting is that the rule of law and rule of people principles 
are found to be independent of each other, as illustrated by the correla-
tion of these two principles, −0.04 among Chinese people and −0.08 
among Americans. These nonsigniﬁcant correlations could be inter-
preted as the emphasis on trust, reciprocity, and long-term relationships 
to encourage cooperation may either substitute for or complement the 
equalizing and homogenizing power of laws and contracts. The empiri-
cal data indicate that the rule of law has not replaced the rule of people 
in modern Chinese societies. In practice, both principles are used as 
parallel systems to achieve business goals and objectives. The rule of 
people has worked smoothly in Chinese societies for millennia, and 
it is reasonable to expect such practice to persist into the future. It is 
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Table 8.2  Perceptions of the Inﬂuence of the Rule of Law, the Rule of People, and Government Inﬂ uence on 
Business Activities, by U.S. and Chinese Respondents 
Governmental 
U.S. mean Chinese mean 
Rule of people 
Chinese correlation 
inﬂ uence Chinese 
correlation 
Scale (s.d.) (s.d.) t-value (U.S. correlation) (U.S. correlation) 
Rule of law 3.59 3.59 0.06 −0.04 −0.30*** 
(0.49) (0.48) (−0.08) (−0.42***) 
Rule of people 3.53 
(0.34) 
3.67 
(0.41) 
−4.50*** 0.44*** 
(0.26***) 
Governmental inﬂuence 3.30 3.32 −0.35 
(0.57) (0.63) 
NOTE: U.S. sample size = 233. Chinese sample size = 449. Perceptions were measured by a 5-point Likert scale with higher numbers 
representing more applicable the concept in the society. * = signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; ** = signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level; *** = signiﬁ-
cant at the 0.01 level. 
SOURCE: Primary data collected by the author. 
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valuable for any company that wants to conduct business in China to 
be familiar with this approach and to learn to practice the basic social 
mechanisms of guanxi, renqing, and mianzi. 
The signiﬁcant negative correlations in the perceptions of the rule 
of law and governmental inﬂuence among both Chinese and Americans 
support the belief that when laws are consistently applied to everyone 
involved, there is little room for governmental inﬂuence on business 
activities. However, the signiﬁcant positive correlations in the percep-
tions of the rule of people and the governmental inﬂuence on business 
activities among both Chinese and Americans support the notion that 
the perception of the rule of people and the perception of governmental 
inﬂuence on business activities usually go hand-in-hand. This pattern 
is stronger among Chinese than among Americans. The combination 
of highly concentrated political power and the rule of people principle 
makes navigating Chinese markets particularly confusing for foreign 
companies. I will use two examples of big multinational corporations 
to illustrate this point. 
Two Contrasting Experiences 
There are plenty of examples of successful multinational corpo-
rations that sailed into China with unshakable conﬁdence but were 
defeated either by their Chinese competitors, the Chinese govern-
ment, or both. One such tale involves Google pulling its operations 
out of mainland China in 2010 (BBC News 2010). The other tale is 
Box 8.1 Google and Star TV 
Google. When Google.cn began operating in China in 2006, Google 
agreed to self-censor and to remove sensitive information before it 
reached Internet users. Google had to compromise the principle of free-
dom of speech in order to cash in on the fast-expanding Chinese market. 
Four years later, in January 2010, Google’s Web site stated that the 
company had decided to stop internal censoring of Internet search infor-
mation so that it could provide unbiased and equal access to all of its 
users. Google waged a public battle against the Chinese government’s 
media censorship (Economist 2010). 
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Box 8.1 (continued) 
However, the Chinese government insisted that controlling media 
content was one of its centralized strategic policies along with national 
sovereignty, and it accused Google of violating a written agreement 
and politicizing an economic issue. Whenever the Chinese government 
responded to an event by citing controlling media content and national 
sovereignty at the same time, it clearly had no intention of backing 
down. At the end, even under pressure from U.S. Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton, China refused to budge. “Foreign companies must abide 
by Chinese laws and regulations when they operate in China” (China 
.org.cn 2010). Two months after the standoff between Google and the 
Chinese government, Google stopped its operation in mainland China 
and moved it to Hong Kong. 
The incident might have had a different outcome had Google execu-
tives taken the time and effort to enlist support from high-level Chinese 
government ofﬁcials and to frame the win-win beneﬁts resulting from 
free and open content on the Internet without exerting pressure from the 
U.S. Secretary of State to evoke the national sovereignty concern. 
Star TV. The success of another media mogul, Rupert Murdoch, 
can serve as an exemplary model of doing business in China. His strong 
ﬁnancial resources, patience, and adaptability to change proved to be the 
key to his success in China. 
Murdoch’s initial foray into China was disastrous. Shortly after he 
purchased the satellite broadcaster Star TV in Hong Kong for nearly 
US$1 billion in 1993, he made a speech in London that enraged the 
Chinese leadership. He said that modern communications technology 
had “proven an unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere.” 
However, the Chinese government promptly retaliated by outlawing pri-
vate ownership of satellite dishes, which had proliferated on rooftops. 
Star TV thereby faced a threat to its viability (Kahn 2007). Although it 
took several years to repair the damaged relationship, Murdoch quickly 
changed his way of doing business in China. He masterfully selected 
partners with strong ties to the Chinese leadership and media regulatory 
agencies. He cultivated political ties to insulate his business ventures 
from regulatory interferences. Once he gained access to the web of com-
plex social relationships, he abided by the principle of the rule of people 
and earned social prestige by building trust, reciprocating favors, fulﬁll-
ing obligations, and enjoying privileges. 
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Box 8.1 (continued) 
Murdoch cooperated closely with China’s censors and state broad-
casters. Star TV mindfully overhauled its programming to suit Chinese 
tastes. In 1994, it dropped BBC News, which had frequently angered 
Chinese ofﬁcials with its reports on mainland China affairs (Kahn 
2007). Murdoch adeptly provided highly desired access to Western news 
media to the Chinese government to present its own face to the world. 
He showed that Chinese media could become more sophisticated and 
dynamic without threatening the Communist Party’s power. In exchange 
for permission to broadcast foreign programming in China, he also 
agreed to broadcast China-made English-language programming to the 
United States and Britain. Murdoch’s helping hand in mentoring and 
modernizing the Chinese news media was recognized and rewarded by 
the government by granting him the ﬁrst “landing rights” to sell foreign 
programs to cable system prime-time slots, and later, rights to provide 
media content to its mobile users (Kahn 2007; McGregor 2005).
how Rupert Murdoch expanded Star TV from Hong Kong to Mainland 
China (Kahn 2007). 
LESSONS LEARNED 
The stark contrasts between Google’s and Murdoch’s media ven-
tures provide the following lessons for everyone who wants to initiate 
entrepreneurial effort in Chinese markets. 
• It is a good idea to enlist help from people who understand the 
Chinese culture and have local connections. Neither the Google 
Translate nor a self-paced international culture software pro-
gram would be adequate in preparing an American professional 
to do business in China. Hiring Chinese people educated in 
the United States seems to be a popular and wise option for 
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corporate executives in starting this process. Not only do such 
individuals need to be ﬂuent in both English and Chinese, they 
have to understand the business and be loyal to the company. 
Their connections in China might provide an access point into 
the complex web of social relationships. 
• It is important to pay attention to government regulations and to 
understand that rules can change at any time and that they can 
either work for or against a company. Politics should be left out 
of business. Making negative comments about the CCP or the 
Chinese government in public should be avoided, especially 
regarding China’s sensitive issues such as media censorship, 
human rights, the Tiananmen Square Incident, Fa Lun Gong, 
and oppression in Tibet. 
• When conﬂicts arise, they should be dealt with quietly. It is 
much better to try to solve the conﬂicts behind closed doors 
by enlisting help from politically connected insiders privately 
than it is to enlist help from high-level U.S. ofﬁ cials. An all-out 
public ﬁght with the Chinese government leaves no room for 
compromise. The Chinese government is not known to back 
down on central issues, such as media content censorship and 
national sovereignty. 
• It is important to realize and to bear in mind that both the rule 
of law and the rule of people are applicable in Chinese culture. 
Americans who want to succeed in doing business in China 
should be prepared to invest and cultivate long-term social rela-
tionships. Becoming familiar with the rule of people principle 
and the complex web of social relationships is one of the best 
ways to enhance opportunities, smooth business processes, and 
lower transaction costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental business and economic principles for renew-
ing prosperity in midwestern industrial cities are straightforward. The 
opportunities to generate income and wealth occur through individual 
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business transactions, some of which start with new products and inno-
vations, and some of which start with identifying demands, producing 
goods and services people value, and matching the demands with the 
supply of goods and services. These goods and services are then traded 
in exchanges in which both parties expect their well-being to improve. 
Wealth and prosperity within midwestern urban economies will be 
generated when production and exchange occur over and over again. 
The top exports to China from midwestern states were crop produc-
tion, machinery, chemicals, transportation equipment, and second-hand 
scrap and recycled material, which are used in China for rebar steel 
and packaging (U.S.-China Business Council 2013). The ascendency 
of a vast and wealthy Chinese population brings tremendous possibili-
ties for exports from the Midwest, but only if the basic Chinese social 
mechanism is understood and accepted as a crucial factor in the social 
and business environment.
 Cultural differences can pose seemingly insurmountable obstacles 
for those wanting to get into Chinese markets. The basic Chinese social 
mechanism is a deeply ingrained part of daily life not likely to change 
any time soon. Westerners seeking to do business in China may ﬁnd 
out the hard way that the American business model will not achieve 
their goals. While it takes relatively large up-front investments of time, 
effort, and other resources to search out potential business partners, 
negotiate trades, and close sales with Chinese ﬁrms, there is no other 
path to success in that social environment. The associated costs may be 
high, but the potential beneﬁts in terms of generating wealth and pros-
perity are even greater. 
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Manufacturing served as the main source of economic activity in 
many of the cities of the Midwest until its decline led to the creation 
of the term “Rust Belt.” While entrepreneurship offers the promise 
of economic growth, Midwest regions need assistance to foster a 
sustainable entrepreneurial ecosystem and launch new businesses. 
Postwar prosperity was built on the production of goods needed 
to satisfy pent-up demand from Americans, who wanted to improve 
their lives after World War II, and demand from Europe and Asia, 
where the populations were physically rebuilding their countries. This 
period of economic growth was concentrated in several leading indus-
tries—automobiles, steel, aluminum, tires, and chemicals—each with 
large dominant companies with signiﬁcant market shares. The role of 
small businesses and entrepreneurship was diminished during the post-
war decades; small companies were found to be less productive and 
innovative than larger corporations, and they offered lower wages. The 
industrial revolution of the early twentieth century, characterized as an 
entrepreneurial and individualistic era, had been replaced by an envi-
ronment of large, structured, and hierarchical corporations. However, 
even with these developments, U.S. policy still tended to preserve small 
enterprises, and in 1953 Congress created the Small Business Admini-
stration. This policy was in stark contrast to Europe and the Soviet 
Union, which discouraged such ventures in order to focus on national 
industrial policies. 
215 
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The recovery of Japan and Europe and the ensuing movement of 
labor to cheaper markets outside of the United States through globaliza-
tion brought to an end the complete advantage the nation had enjoyed 
after World War II. Since the 1970s, the United States and its regions 
have been undergoing a dramatic transformation from manufacturing 
to knowledge- and information-based economies, shifting the focus 
from physical to human capital. By the 1980s, innovation and entrepre-
neurship emerged as the main components in the engine of economic 
growth, causing many scholars and policymakers to look to the factor 
of knowledge as a primary source of competitiveness. With this para-
digm shift, national and regional decision makers needed to change 
public policy to ensure a more hospitable and nurturing environment 
for innovators and entrepreneurs. 
This chapter links the assertion that entrepreneurship is associated 
with regional growth to the need for public policy that stimulates entre-
preneurship in declining industrial areas. The discussion reviews some 
of the literature on the general role of innovation and entrepreneurship 
in economic growth, the barriers to entrepreneurship in older industrial 
regions, and the role that the nonproﬁt and public sectors play in accel-
erating entrepreneurship in these regions. Then examples are given of 
how private-sector-led organizations encourage the development of 
an entrepreneurial ecosystem and culture that could lead to economic 
growth in older industrial regions. 
Entrepreneurship has been investigated as a potential means for eco-
nomic growth throughout economic history. But with the recent frame-
work of endogenous growth theory showing that technology advances 
lead to higher economic output, many people today are increasingly 
looking to entrepreneurs to facilitate these advances. In addition, some 
authors ﬁnd that higher participation rates of entrepreneurial activity 
are strongly positively correlated with higher growth rates, even when 
establishment size and agglomeration effects are statistically controlled 
(Caree and Thurik 2010). Moreover, additional studies show that entre-
preneurs are needed to bring new ideas to market because large existing 
ﬁrms do not have the capabilities to take advantage of the innovations 
that address market gaps (Audretsch, Bönte, and Keilbach 2008). With 
this concept in mind, it is important to ask what happens to regions that 
have been dependent on large ﬁrms throughout their recent economic 
history and that do not have the entrepreneurial culture to take advan-
tage of innovations because individuals are risk averse. 
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These issues lead to the examination of the entrepreneurial makeup 
of lagging regions in the United States, speciﬁcally older industrial 
regions with a legacy of large and declining manufacturing ﬁ rms. Much 
has been written about this topic in the literature for economic develop-
ment practitioners, but little has been published in the academic litera-
ture. It is the hope that this chapter will begin to bridge the divide in 
order to provide adequate frameworks for practitioners implementing 
entrepreneurial policies, as well as to contribute to the academic litera-
ture on entrepreneurship and regional growth. 
INNOVATION, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
There is a vast amount of academic literature on entrepreneurship 
and its ability to revitalize regions (Acs and Armington 2004; Audretsch 
and Keilbach 2004; Baptista and Preto 2011; Caree and Thurik 2010; 
Dejardin 2011; Fritsch and Schroeter 2011; Mueller 2007). The eco-
nomic fundamentals of entrepreneurship stem from the building blocks 
that economists have put forward over the last 200 years. In the begin-
ning, neoclassical economic growth was the only model, and it was 
based on the idea that development occurs through an increase in pro-
ductivity, by making more goods in a given amount of time. As econo-
mists began to investigate this relationship, they found a phenomenon 
that was spurring growth but could not be explained by neoclassical 
theory (Lerner 2009). It was not until 1956, when Abramovitz examined 
gross output in the U.S. economy from 1870 to 1950, that it became 
evident that 85 percent of the growth experienced during this period 
was due to innovation and increased productivity (Abramovitz 1956; 
Lerner 2009). According to Lerner (2009), Abramovitz showed, “there 
are ultimately only two ways of increasing the output of an economy: 
1) increasing the number of inputs that go into the productive process 
(e.g., by having workers employed until the age of sixty-seven, instead 
of retiring at sixty two) or 2) developing new ways to get more output 
from the same inputs” (p. 44). In other words, Abramovitz’s work indi-
cated that it was the innovation and knowledge that transformed the 
economy, not traditional productivity increases. 
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Building on the work of Abramovitz, Solow (1956) found that 
economic growth is determined by the use of classical factors of pro-
duction, especially capital and labor (Lerner 2009; Solow 1956). What 
Solow found was that “classical factors of production barely explained 
half the variance in national economic growth” (Stough, Desai, and 
Nijkamp 2011, p. 3). 
Later in the 1980s, Romer (1988) and Lucas (1994) developed the 
endogenous growth theory, showing that innovation and technological 
progress have regional dimensions (Stough, Desai, and Nijkamp 2011), 
and may also be connected to entrepreneurship (Taylor 2008). Since 
knowledge and innovation are endogenous to the individual, entrepre-
neurship is a way in which there is a spillover of knowledge through 
commercialization (Thurik 2009). Stough, Desai, and Nijkamp (2011) 
state, “Only recently has the entrepreneur been envisioned as agent of 
regional economic growth” (p. 6). Through the entrepreneur as an indi-
vidual actor, demonstration of innovation can take place and therefore 
build and spawn collective economic growth within regions. There 
has been a long tradition of examining the beneﬁt of entrepreneurs as 
contributors to economic development, as in The Theory of Economic 
Development (Schumpeter 1934). 
The Concept of Entrepreneurship 
Even with this extensive entrepreneurial literature, there are mul-
tiple ways of deﬁning who is an entrepreneur and what is entrepreneur-
ship. In addition, there are confounding deﬁnitions of how to measure 
and deﬁne entrepreneurship. McQuaid (2011) discusses the perplexing 
deﬁnitions of entrepreneurship. He ﬁnds that entrepreneurs as individu-
als are absent in the theory, and that there are ﬁve perspectives on entre-
preneurship: 1) entrepreneurship as new business creation, 2) entrepre-
neurship as the role of the owner/manager of a small or medium-sized 
company, 3) entrepreneurship as an economic function to allocate 
resources and capitalize on opportunities, 4) entrepreneurship as a per-
sonal behavior of an individual in the quest of a prospect, and 5) charac-
teristics of entrepreneurs. This chapter is based on McQuaid’s deﬁnition 
of entrepreneurship as new business creation, since a large amount of 
the literature focuses on business starts as entrepreneurship, and these 
provide a quantiﬁ able metric. 
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The act of creating a new ﬁrm is risky for individuals because many 
times they leave behind the security and known career paths at existing 
companies. These factors make entrepreneurs unique. They do not only 
become engines of economic growth through their start-ups, but they 
facilitate knowledge growth by doing something that would not other-
wise be accomplished (Audretsch, Bönte, and Keilbach 2008). Entre-
preneurs are set apart from the common person by the act of taking risk 
in their ventures, and through this risk they enhance the economy by 
functioning to diffuse knowledge, innovation, and change (McQuaid 
2011). “The reason for this positive assessment of entrepreneurial 
activity is the belief that entrepreneurship does not only create jobs and 
wealth for entrepreneurs but that there are substantial societal spill-over 
effects” (Rønning, Ljunggren, and Wiklund 2010, p. 195). 
Spillover Effects 
The risk taken by entrepreneurs beneﬁts not only themselves, but 
also society through knowledge spillovers. It is important to begin to 
understand these spillovers, because they are the vehicle through which 
entrepreneurial processes can take root. According to Harris (2011), 
spillovers were ﬁ rst identiﬁed by Marshall, Arrow, and Romer (and are 
thus known as MAR spillovers), and they stem from efforts to minimize 
transaction costs attributable to ﬁrms that collocate near other ﬁrms of 
similar nature, in an agglomeration effect. Harris (2011) shows that 
these spillovers are greatly related to industrial specialization. 
Many articles have built on the Knowledge Spillover Theory of 
Entrepreneurship (Audretsch 1995), which shows that individuals start 
a new ﬁrm because they are not able to translate their new idea into a 
product within their current ﬁrm, and therefore they start their own ﬁrm; 
and the spillover of knowledge from the old ﬁrm to the new ﬁrm takes 
place. In addition, knowledge spillovers created outside the ﬁrm allow 
the entrepreneur to capitalize on opportunities (Acs et al. 2009). This 
theory has evolved to show that spillovers of interﬁrm and intraﬁrm 
knowledge are important agents in the regional economy. Audretsch 
and Lehmann (2005) demonstrate that the presence of young high-tech 
ﬁrms in close proximity to a university advances the knowledge capac-
ity in the region. 
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Moreover, there is a signiﬁcant amount of literature that links the 
entry of ﬁrms in the economy to positive regional growth within the 
United States (Acs and Armington 2004; Mueller 2007) and in inter-
national cities (Audretsch and Keilbach 2004; Baptista and Preto 2011; 
Dejardin 2011). It is these new companies, and the entrepreneurs that 
run them, that take on the risk. Lerner (2009) points out that large ﬁrms 
do not provide incentives to innovate, while new entities may choose 
riskier projects than established ﬁrms. Mueller (2007) examines the 
impact of entrepreneurship on growth and ﬁnds that existing ﬁrms do 
not fully take advantage of new knowledge and that innovative start-
ups are more effective effective at capturing this knowledge. 
Examining start-up rates in the United States and internationally 
demonstrates that they contribute to a more vibrant regional economy. 
In a path-breaking article, Acs and Armington (2004) study business 
birth rates in 394 local market areas and ﬁnd that “higher rates of 
entrepreneurial activity were strongly associated with faster growth of 
local economies” (p. 924). Their results provide strong evidence of the 
importance of regional entreprenuership in the United States. The solid 
positive association between entrepreneurship and economic growth 
points to the importance of looking at how entrepreneurship can help 
lagging regions, primarily in the Rust Belt, where manufacturing has 
been such a predominant industry sector. Moretti (2012) makes the 
argument that if the economic market were based solely around cost, 
then lagging regions would attract jobs because places like San Fran-
cisco would be hindered by their high costs. But he suggests that this is 
not the case, rather the opposite. It is a multitude of actors and agents 
within an ecosystem that helps commercialize knowledge into products 
(Fritsch 2011; Moretti 2012). 
There have been a few academic articles written on entrepreneur-
ship in the Great Lakes region. Using county-level data in Ohio, Acs, 
Plummer, and Sutter (2009) examine the role of new and incumbent 
ﬁrms in terms of translating “new knowledge (produced by research 
activities) into economic knowledge. This translation process has been 
referred to as the ‘knowledge ﬁlter’” (p. 994). They ﬁnd that new ﬁrms 
are more able to pass through the knowledge ﬁlter, turning ideas into 
products. Additionally, Faberman (2002) analyzes Rust Belt metropoli-
tan statistical areas (MSAs), looking at employment and wages from 
1992 to 2000. He ﬁnds that high-growth MSAs tend to be comprised 
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of establishments that are larger and younger, while MSAs with low 
growth have establishments that are older and smaller. Faberman’s 
results show a different entrepreneurial culture in the Rust Belt region. 
BARRIERS TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN OLDER 
INDUSTRIAL REGIONS 
As we have shown, the economic literature reveals strong con-
nections among technological progress, innovation, and growing eco-
nomic wealth. The linkages are especially impressive when innovations 
include both scientiﬁc discoveries and incremental changes in the way 
manufacturers and service providers work. However, the literature is 
inconclusive on whether innovations have primarily been created by 
large or small companies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the size 
of highly innovative companies may differ by industry. In some cases, 
the enabling processes—such as in biotechnology and the Internet— 
were developed at universities with federal funding, but it is the 
entrepreneur and his or her small company that saw the potential for 
commercialization. 
The Regional Impact of Entrepreneurship 
A study conducted for the U.S. Small Business Administration 
(2005) ﬁnds that the most entrepreneurial regions in the nation expe-
rience greater growth in employment, wages, and productivity when 
compared with the least entrepreneurial regions. Moreover, that research 
noted that since innovation may be portable, by itself it is not sufﬁcient 
for economic growth. Moreover entrepreneurship culture is place-based 
and can be inﬂuenced by local and regional policies. In other words, 
entrepreneurship enhances the regional economic impact of invest-
ments in innovations, and commercializing activities undertaken by 
local entrepreneurs are necessary to convert a region’s innovation assets 
to long-term economic gain. This suggests that interventions aimed at 
increasing entrepreneurial activities, especially in regions where the 
birth rate of new start-ups is low, could contribute to increased eco-
nomic growth. 
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The Regional Dashboard of Economic Indicators’ framework, 
based on a study of 136 MSAs, suggests a positive relationship between 
entrepreneurship and growth in regional per-capita income, gross 
regional product, and productivity (Austrian, Yamoah, and Clouse 
2009). This research compares the performance of Leading, Midwest, 
and northeast Ohio MSAs and monitors the economic performance 
of regions.1 Austrian, Yamoah, and Clouse (2009) address the vital-
ity of regions by including two entrepreneurship metrics (two of nine 
factors): 1) individual entrepreneurship, containing the percentage 
of self-employed among total employment and the share of business 
establishments with under 20 employees; and 2) business dynamics, 
encompassing the ratio of business openings and closings. The fac-
tor on individual entrepreneurship for the Midwest and northeast Ohio 
MSAs consistently ranks in the third and fourth quartiles from 2005 
to 2007 (Austrian, Yamoah, and Clouse 2009). The business dynamics 
factor displays northeast Ohio MSAs solidly in the fourth quartile from 
2005 to 2007, and the other Midwest MSAs scattered from the second 
quartile to the fourth. This study empirically illustrates that, in entre-
preneurship metrics, localities in northeast Ohio and other Midwest 
regions lag behind the remainder of the cohort MSAs. 
Regional Variations in Entrepreneurship 
Globally, the entrepreneurial environment varies among coun-
tries, and within the United States, it varies signiﬁcantly across regions 
(Caree and Thurik 2010). Why has the Midwest Rust Belt region been 
slow in the creation of start-ups? The Midwest was known for its inno-
vation and entrepreneurship in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. 
As a result, many ﬁrms were established in the Midwest, and some 
grew to become among the country’s largest corporations, primarily in 
manufacturing industries. These companies were able to mass-produce 
record numbers of goods by taking advantage of economies of scale, 
with very high levels of efﬁciency. The dominance of large manufac-
turing companies in the Midwest provided lifelong job opportunities 
to both low-skilled and high-skilled employees. As a result, economic 
and social norms did not encourage individuals to see entrepreneurship 
as a career option. Therefore, over the past several decades many in 
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the Midwest may have lost the spark, energy, and resources needed for 
innovation and entrepreneurship. 
Several factors may have contributed to the relatively weak entre-
preneurial environment in the Midwest during the second half of the 
twentieth century: 
• the ability to get a job in large, established companies allowed 
individuals to have a comfortable standard of living; 
• cultural and social norms did not favor postsecondary education 
since many manufacturing jobs available to high school gradu-
ates offered economic success; 
• risk aversion discouraged potential entrepreneurs, employees, 
and the ﬁnancial system from starting new companies (Booth 
1986); 
• culture in which one business failure was seen as an indication 
that an individual was not capable of starting a new ﬁ rm, which 
prevented entrepreneurs from establishing additional companies; 
• the lack of large numbers of start-ups and experienced entrepre-
neurs to encourage and assist future entrepreneurs; 
• the difﬁculty of recruiting individuals, especially for leadership 
and professional positions, to work in start-ups when not many 
start-ups exist; 
• the unwillingness of employees who work in large ﬁrms to leave 
their jobs for start-ups because of unfamiliarity with young com-
panies and the higher risk of not being compensated; 
• lack of a strong business support system for entrepreneurs, 
including banks, equity ﬁnancing, and business services; and 
• insufﬁcient access to capital for start-ups in their different phases 
of development. 
Access to capital is deemed by many to be one of the primary bar-
riers to a successful start-up, and it merits more discussion. Generally, 
sources of ﬁnancing for entrepreneurs include family and friends, owner 
equity, the Small Business Administration through its Small Business 
Innovation Research grant program, bank lending, angel investors, and 
venture capital. Traditionally, the wealth assembled and inherited in the 
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Midwest has been based on the success and proﬁts of manufacturing 
companies. Many of the regions’ afﬂuent individuals have been less 
knowledgeable about the technologies being developed on the East and 
West Coasts, and thus, have been less inclined to become angel inves-
tors in these types of start-ups. 
Angel investors are people who make investments from their 
own funds in private companies.2 They not only provide an important 
source of early stage funding to start-ups, but they also provide value 
by having access to key stakeholders, offering strategic advice, provid-
ing operational assistance, and serving as conﬁdants to entrepreneurs. 
Angels, individually or in groups, invest mainly in companies located 
in their region. Historically, Midwest regions had fewer angel investors 
than on the coasts, where angel groups grew organically as a result of 
a rich entrepreneurial ecosystem; in the Midwest, angel groups needed 
to be organized by either the public or the nonproﬁt sector. The rela-
tionship between angel investors and entrepreneurs is like “the chicken 
and the egg”; entrepreneurs need angel investors, but angel investors 
prefer to invest in companies that are located in a region with seasoned 
entrepreneurs, a relevant industrial base, strong universities, an entre-
preneurship culture, and talent experienced with start-ups. Thus, in the 
Midwest region, the development of angel networks did not happen by 
market forces alone and required special policies or jump-starting. 
Venture capital ﬁrms bring with them funds as well as knowledge 
and management expertise of how to grow start-up companies. How-
ever, being actively involved in the company’s management or sitting 
on its board requires the venture capitalist to be in close proximity. As 
a result, an area has to achieve a critical mass in terms of deal volume 
before a venture capital ﬁrm will visit the region or locate a partner 
there. Even though some venture capital ﬁrms have opened ofﬁces in 
midwestern states and venture capital has started to ﬂow to these regions, 
the industry has changed following the Great Recession. Venture capi-
tal is increasingly concentrated in a few industries and geographic 
regions, and it began funding companies in the latter phases on the con-
tinuum of seed money. In 2011, venture capital investments at the seed-
funding stage in the United States declined about 48 percent over the 
prior year, and investments were concentrated in social media and soft-
ware and less in biotechnology, genomics, and clean technology, par-
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ticularly solar (Holstein 2012). Venture capital companies invest more 
in companies that do not require equipment or physical infrastructure so 
that the time to bring products to market is shorter. Consequently, with 
the early stage funding system in turmoil, the Midwest regions have 
suffered even more than the two coasts. 
In addition, traditionally there has been imperfect information 
between banks and entrepreneurs when applying for credit, because 
entrepreneurs know the risk of their projects but banks do not (Stiglitz 
and Weiss 1981). This has been even more prevalent in the Midwest. 
The more such professionals become familiar with speciﬁc high-tech 
industries and early stage ﬁnancing mechanisms, the better assistance 
and advice they can offer nascent entrepreneurs and ﬁnanciers. 
OLDER INDUSTRIAL REGIONS LAG BEHIND LEADING 
REGIONS IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP METRICS 
Older industrial regions are believed to lag behind leading regions 
in terms of entrepreneurship because of their legacy and historical costs. 
An investigation of entrepreneurship and innovation metrics reinforces 
this argument empirically. 
Thompson and Walstad (2012) have created the State Entrepreneur-
ship Index, which includes information on income of entrepreneurs, 
business formation, innovation, and the increase in the number of entre-
preneurs. This research is a continuation of previous analysis conducted 
on the state of Nebraska (Thompson and Walstad 2012; Tran, Thomp-
son, and Walstad 2011). To create the index, the authors combined ﬁve 
components: 1) percent growth in employer establishments, 2) percent 
growth in employer establishments per person, 3) establishment births 
per person, 4) patents per thousand persons, and 5) average income per 
nonfarm proprietor (Thompson and Walstad 2012). 
Table 9.1 shows the State Entrepreneurship Index for states con-
sidered to be innovative coastal states and industrial states for the years 
2008, 2010, and 2011. The overall index value reveals that the raw 
scores between groups of states differ. In 2011, Washington had the 
lowest index value among the innovative coastal states (1.38), which 
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Table 9.1  State Entrepreneurship Index, 2008, 2010, and 2011 
2008 2010 2011 
Index Index Index 
Rank value Rank value Rank value 
Innovative coastal states 
California 4 1.81 6 1.77 3 2.39 
Massachusetts 9 1.54 1 2.46 1 3.01 
New Jersey 12 1.40 4 2.13 7 1.68 
New York 1 2.04 3 2.24 4 2.23 
Texas 34 0.82 11 1.61 8 1.61 
Washington 3 1.88 2 2.38 13 1.38 
Industrial states 
Illinois 11 1.42 12 1.60 9 1.59 
Indiana 39 0.73 45 0.59 40 0.75 
Michigan 33 0.93 42 0.62 49 0.10 
Minnesota 23 1.14 24 1.12 5 1.79 
Ohio 27 1.06 40 0.68 22 1.09 
Pennsylvania 28 1.06 15 1.39 11 1.54 
Wisconsin 38 0.73 34 0.90 18 1.19 
SOURCE: Rankings produced by Thompson and Walstad (2012); Tran, Thompson, 
and Walstad (2011). 
was higher than four of the Industrial States. In the cases of Indiana, 
Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, their 2011 index values 
were the best performance they have marked. 
There is no doubt that the economic crisis hit hard in the industrial 
states, as seen in the entrepreneurial index data between 2008 and 2010. 
The Great Recession caused some of them to slide backwards; Michi-
gan is an example. Ranking 33 in 2008, Michigan had an Entrepreneur-
ial Index score of 0.93, but by 2011, it showed an index of 0.10 with a 
ranking of 49. In contrast, between 2010 and 2011, all of the industrial 
states, except for Michigan, improved their rankings. As shown later in 
the chapter, some of these states have intermediaries tasked with build-
ing regional entrepreneurial ecosystems, and they may have contributed 
to the observed rise in rankings. More than ever, continued efforts to 
increase economic development capacity through entrepreneurial facil-
itation are needed. 
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Evaluating all metrics in Table 9.1 shows that the industrial states 
lag behind innovative costal states for entrepreneurship and innovation 
indices. Illinois in 2008 and 2011 and Minnesota and Pennsylvania in 
2011 are exceptions to the lagging midwestern trend. One might infer 
that this shows the importance of dedicated policies to overcome the 
barriers resulting from the legacy costs of older industrial regions. One 
way to accomplish this is through tax policy and tax incentives, and 
another is through the development of intermediaries in these regions 
to help facilitate entrepreneurship. The following two sections of the 
chapter will examine tax policies in states and best practice approaches 
that foster and enhance entrepreneurship in older industrial regions. 
TAX POLICIES AFFECTING ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
In Chapter 11 of this book, David Elkins examines the overall role 
of taxation in entrepreneurial behavior. In regard to the Great Lakes 
region, Elkins concludes that policymakers must address the issue of 
high tax burdens and the low proportion of foreign born because these 
policy mechanisms spur entrepreneurship. In order to make the Great 
Lakes region more attractive to entrepreneurs, policymakers need to 
address the issue of high tax burdens (Elkins 2014). A study from the 
Goldwater Institute also shows that at a state level, a high percentage 
of taxes as a percentage of personal income lowers the rate of entrepre-
neurship (Slivinski 2012). This section presents a different aspect of 
taxation, as it looks speciﬁcally at state policies pertaining to investment 
tax credits targeted at enhancing investments in start-up companies. 
States, like businesses, must remain competitive in luring invest-
ments so that entrepreneurs can obtain the early stage funding that is 
critical to facilitate business growth. Many states look to tax policy 
to help facilitate this investment since the environment for early stage 
lending has increasingly become risk averse. 
Entrepreneurs looking for funding for their start-up companies face 
a different situation than existing small businesses; there is a heightened 
sense of risk on behalf of the investor, which in turns makes standard 
ﬁnancing difﬁcult for startups. As Keuschnigga and Nielsen (2002) 
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state, “Financing early stage businesses involves special problems and 
is fundamentally different from ﬁnancing mature and well established 
companies. Because of the lack of collateral and the absence of any 
past track record, and due to their informational advantages, pioneer-
ing entrepreneurs often face severe difﬁculties in convincing banks to 
ﬁnance projects with potentially high returns but high risks as well” 
(pp. 175–176). 
Investment tax credits are a policy instrument used to foster invest-
ment and risk capital within a state. An examination of early stage 
investment tax credits by states shows that 22 states offer tax incen-
tives to investors (Table 9.2).3 Many states established these policies 
in recent years; ﬁve states initiated these tax credits in 2010, with three 
more in 2011. The earliest enactment was by Maine in 1988. Tax credit 
policies vary by state, but most are not for the full investment amount. 
Generally, states reimburse 25–50 percent of the investment, and this 
amount may be subject to a cap. 
THE ROLE NONPROFIT INTERMEDIARIES PLAY IN 
ACCELERATING ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
The shift from investment in physical capital to human and knowl-
edge capital was not as seamless as the new growth theory implies. 
Despite investments in scientiﬁc research, many regions in the United 
States fell behind in economic growth, and not all of the newly cre-
ated knowledge resulted in commercialized innovations. Many barriers 
prevent individuals from bringing their products to market. In order to 
overcome these hurdles, lagging regions need mechanisms and infra-
structure to link ideas, knowledge, and creativity. 
Four elements have contributed to the early lead in technology-
based entrepreneurial activity on the East and West Coasts: 1) access 
to cutting-edge research, 2) access to early stage funding and venture 
capital, 3) a culture that encourages experimentation and risk taking 
versus looking down at failure, and 4) a national regulatory structure 
that enables ﬁrms to start up and enter new markets while making it 
possible for less-productive ﬁrms to exit (Council on Competitiveness 
2007). Entrepreneurship is an activity that feeds on itself. In some parts 
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Table 9.2  Early Stage Investment Tax Credits, by State 
Credit Year 
Name of tax credit (%) established 
Arizona Arizona Angel Investor’s Tax Credit 30–35 2007 
Arkansas Arkansas Equity Investment Tax Credit Incentive 33.3 2007 
Program 
Connecticut Connecticut Angel Investor Tax Credit 25 2012 
Georgia Georgia Angel Investor Tax Credit 35 2010 
Illinois The Angel Investment Tax Credit 25 2010 
Indiana Venture Capital Investment Tax Credit 20 2010 
Iowa Community-Based Seed Capital Funds 20 2011 
Kansas Angel Investor Tax Credit 50 2005 
Louisiana Angel Investor Tax Credit 35 2011 
Maine Maine Seed Capital Tax Credit Program 50–60 1988 
Maryland Biotechnology Investment Tax Credit 50 2005 
Michigan Michigan Small Business Investment Tax Credit 25 2003 
Minnesota Angel Tax Credit 25 2010 
Nebraska Nebraska Angel Investment Tax Credit Act 35–40 2011 
New Mexico Angel Investment Tax Credit 25 2007 
North Carolina Qualiﬁed Business Tax Credit Program 25 2002 
North Dakota Angel Fund Investment Credit 45 2003 
Ohio Technology Investment Tax Credit 25–30 1996 
Rhode Island Rhode Island Innovation Tax Credit 50 2006 
Virginia Virginia Qualiﬁed Equity and Subordinated Debt 50 2003 
Investment Credit 
West Virginia High Growth Business Investment Tax Credit 50 2004 
Wisconsin Wisconsin Angel Investor Tax Credit 25 2002 
SOURCE: Individual state Web sites (accessed September 2012). 
of the country, entrepreneurship developed organically, which may pro-
vide support to the view that capitalistic mechanisms offer the greatest 
promise of prosperity. 
However, because of the economic history of other regions, such 
as those in the Midwest, and the barriers to entrepreneurship that have 
resulted from that legacy, these locations arguably need public tax dol-
lars and philanthropic funding to “jump-start” the entrepreneurial eco-
system. Lerner (2002) highlights two arguments on why public invest-
ments in start-up companies are required: the certiﬁ cation hypothesis 
and the presence of R&D spillovers. Innovations and entrepreneur-
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ship create knowledge spillovers that are critical to regional economic 
growth and beneﬁt the public at large. Start-ups bring new products 
and services to the market and often create industries that result in a 
social beneﬁt beyond the returns to the individual ﬁrms. These social 
advantages, which many times happen down the road, justify public 
investments in innovation and entrepreneurship: the social beneﬁts are 
not accounted for in the market price of the new company and are often 
greater than the private return of the individual ﬁ rm. The development 
of a vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystem requires a long-term horizon. 
In recent years, several states and regions have implemented initia-
tives designed to accelerate the ﬁrst three of the four elements listed 
above. These approaches have an important role in cultivating a net-
work to stimulate entrepreneurship that has not developed naturally. 
The objectives of these initiatives, which were established through 
nonproﬁt organizations, are to promote and support innovative start-
up companies by providing pre–seed funding, developing networks of 
angel investors, and connecting new companies with follow-on fund-
ing through either private equity and/or venture capital ﬁrms. Many of 
these programs also provide technical assistance and support by helping 
entrepreneurs develop business plans, connect to mentors, and ﬁ nd the 
talent to manage and grow their company. 
Table 9.3 highlights three nonproﬁt entrepreneurial-intermediary 
organizations that promise to help ﬁll the gap the market left behind. 
They are JumpStart Inc., located in Cleveland, Ohio; Innovation Works 
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Ann Arbor SPARK, in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan. 
JumpStart Inc. is tasked with increasing the economic impact and 
sustainability of northeast Ohio’s diverse entrepreneurial ecosystem 
(JumpStart 2012). JumpStart delivers vital, focused resources to entre-
preneurs and accelerates the growth of early stage businesses and ideas 
into venture-ready companies with the hope of transforming north-
east Ohio into a nationally recognized area of entrepreneurship and 
innovation. 
JumpStart was modeled after Innovation Works. The mission of 
Innovation Works is to increase growth in the technology economy of 
southwestern Pennsylvania through direct investments and business 
expertise, and its goals are to help hundreds of entrepreneurs, research-
ers, and small manufacturers create new markets through ideas and 
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innovations (Innovation Works 2012a). Innovation Works has a range 
of partners in government, business, investment, research, law, and 
academia. 
Operating in another Rust Belt city, Ann Arbor SPARK is an inter-
mediary in the greater Ann Arbor, Michigan, region aiming to advance 
innovation-based economic development. Ann Arbor SPARK has sev-
eral goals: to be known as a “hot spot” for high-value, knowledge-
intensive, and diverse talent; to build a uniﬁed region working together 
to achieve common economic objectives, without duplication of effort, 
utilizing the Open Source Economic Development concept; to be on a 
“short list” for site selectors and other inﬂuencers as a sought-after loca-
tion; to be known as an innovation hub with access to funding and busi-
ness creation/development support; to have national and international 
brand recognition; and to be recognized as one of the nation’s best 
regions for innovation-based business retention and growth through a 
proactive business development effort (Ann Arbor SPARK 2012a).  
CONCLUSION 
As suggested, the transformation to knowledge-based economies 
has not occurred uniformly across the country. The academic litera-
ture offers plenty of evidence that innovation and entrepreneurship are 
strongly correlated to economic growth. Moreover, regions with high 
levels of research and development, patents, start-ups, and venture cap-
ital develop faster than other areas. The missing link for many regions 
is the component of entrepreneurship; it is the entrepreneur who brings 
fresh ideas forward, commercializes these innovations, and brings them 
to market. 
Economic history and industry specialization differ among regions 
within the United States. In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s entrepre-
neurship developed organically on the East and West Coasts, while it 
stagnated in the Midwest. During the initial development of high-tech 
industries on the two coasts—especially of semiconductor, informa-
tion technology, and bioscience companies—Midwest regions were 
still focusing on large, hierarchical, traditional manufacturing indus-
tries, and neither paying attention to the barriers to entrepreneurship nor 
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Table 9.3  Nonproﬁt Intermediaries: JumpStart, Innovation Works, and Ann Arbor SPARK 
JumpStart, Inc. Innovation Works (IW) Ann Arbor SPARK 
Cleveland, Ohio Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Ann Arbor, Michigan 
Mission and goals Increase the economic impact and 
sustainability of northeast Ohio’s 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
Why established? Established in 2003 by the region’s 
civic, community, and philanthropic 
leaders to address the declining 
economy, employment losses, and 
lack of entrepreneurial growth. 
Services provided: 
entrepreneurial, 
business, and 
funding assistance 
• Providing one-on-one intensive 
assistance to entrepreneurs 
leading high-potential companies 
by experienced and successful 
entrepreneurs.
• Establishing and achieving 
milestones of rapid growth.
• Investing a minimum of $250,000 
in companies with breakthrough 
and protectable technologies in 
high-opportunity markets. The 
portfolio companies are located 
across the region, but must have 
Increase growth in the technology 
economy of southwestern 
Pennsylvania through direct 
investments and business espertise. 
Established in 2000 as part of the 
Benjamin Franklin Technology 
Partners to take Pittsburgh to where 
it was a century ago, when entrepre-
neurs came to start companies, ﬁnd 
investors, and produce goods sold 
worldwide. 
• Investing directly (through 
IW Seed Fund) in early stage 
technology companies focused on 
high-opportunity markets.
• Assisting entrepreneurs in 
developing a business plan, 
researching market opportunities, 
and attracting investment capital.
• Launching (in 2007) a business 
accelerator specializing in 
rapid product development and 
commercialization—AlphaLab. 
Offering a 20-week program to 
Advance innovation-based 
economic development in the 
greater Ann Arbor region. 
Created in 2005 by community 
leaders as a public-private 
partnership (business, government, 
and education to meet the needs 
of innovation-based companies at 
every stage of development. 
• Providing business accelerator 
services that enable companies 
to move quickly through the 
initial stages of business (idea, 
business formation, proof of 
concept, marketability, and 
commercialization).
• Providing SPARK Business 
Accelerator engagement to 
qualifying start-ups. Start-
ups receive up to $50,000 
of consulting and business 
development services. 
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Services provided: 
talent attraction 
less than $5 million in revenues. • Operating inclusion-speciﬁc 
programs for minority, women, 
and inner-city-based entrepreneurs 
offering intensive hands-on 
assistance, access to capital, and 
connection to ﬁ rst clients. 
• Matching entrepreneurial job 
seekers with opportunities in 
start-up companies (advertising 
for opportunities, screening 
applicants, and introducing 
candidates to the start-ups).
• Tranining entrepreneurs on how to 
retain talent. 
launch start-ups in the software, 
entertainment technology, and 
Internet-related industries. 
• Helping accelerate the 
development of alternative 
energy efﬁ ciency technologies 
in universities, national labs, 
and companies. Also provides 
investments and business 
assistance to start and grow 
energy-related companies. 
• Providing manufacturing 
companies with up to $50,000 to 
develop new technologies. 
• Assisting entrepreneurs to ﬁ nd the 
right talent.
• Placing undergraduate engineering 
and MBA studnets as interns in 
early stage technology companies 
and manufacturers. More than half 
of the companies hired or planned 
to hire their interns. 
• Operating the SPARK Regional 
Incubator Network, which 
includes two business incubators 
and one wet lab. Located 
in three different cities, the 
incubators offer physical space, 
business services, and business 
development guidance.
• Administering several state-
funded programs for start-up 
companies in Washtenaw 
County. Grants are available 
to companies from $1,000 to 
$10,000. Microloans are available 
for product development, 
commercialization, and hiring. 
Equity investments of up to 
$250,000 are available through the 
Michigan Pre-Seed Capital Fund 
to fund product commercialization 
and growing the business. 
• Connecting start-ups seeking 
managerial and technical talent 
with job seekers.
• SPARK created a job portal for 
high-value, knowledge-based 
positions, where job seekers 
and employers can post without 
charge. 
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Table 9.3  (continued) 
JumpStart, Inc. Innovation Works (IW) Ann Arbor SPARK 
Cleveland, Ohio Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Ann Arbor, Michigan 
Services provided: 
other 
• Guiding entrepreneurs in the 
development and management of 
their boards 
Mentoring 
• Program established in 2012 was 
created in partnership with MIT’s 
Venture Mentoring Service.  
• Mentors include founders 
and presidents of Fortune 500 
companies, leaders of national 
high-tech companies, and venture 
capitalists. 
Marketing 
• Generating publicity and creating 
marketing materials for start-up 
companies.
• Writing press releases and 
developing relations with media. 
IdeaCrossing 
• Developed and maintained by 
Jumpstart, the Web-based Idea 
Crossing connects and matches 
University-related programs 
• Working with local universities 
to cultivate research ideas and 
help speed commercialization. 
Providing $25,000 grants for 
technology validation, market 
research, prototype development, 
and evaluation of intellectual 
property. 
• Accelerating commercialization 
of technologies developed by 
local universities and small 
businesses through the i6 agile 
innovation system. The program, 
funded by a federal grant, was 
developed in 2010 by IW and 
Carnegie Mellon University. 
The system includes workshops, 
mentors, funding, and space. 
• SPARK issues a weekly Talent 
Search newsletter, featuring new 
postings and career events. 
Entrepreneurial education 
and training 
• Organizing a 2-day Entrepreneur 
Boot Camp, offering advice about 
entrepreneurs’ business model, 
management team, and market 
strategy. 
• Offering a full-day of training on 
how to start a business. 
• Providing one-on-one sessions 
with entrepreneurs.
• Organizing monthly networking 
programs for entrepreneurs, 
investors, and others. 
• Offering a 9-session Business 
Law and Order Legal series.
• Offering 10 monthly marketing 
sessions. 
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Types of industries 
served 
entrepreneurs, investors, mentors, 
and providers of business services. Network Resources 
• Connecting entrepreneurs to 
the Entrepreneurial Network, 
which includes incubators and 
accelerators, seed funds and pre– 
seed funds, venture capital and 
angel funds, educators, advisors, 
and other service providers. 
• Health care 
• Cleantech (advanced materials 
and advanced energy) 
• Information technology
• Electronics 
• Business and consumer products 
• Advanced electronics 
• Consumer electronics 
• Enterprise software
• Network infrastructure 
• Information technology
• Internet 
• Robotics 
• Sensors 
• Advanced energy 
• Biotech and pharmaceuticals
• Health information 
• Life sciences 
• Materials 
• Medical devices 
• Medical diagnosis 
• Information technology
• Cleantech (advanced materials 
and advanced energy) 
• Life sciences 
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Table 9.3  (continued) 
JumpStart, Inc. Innovation Works (IW) Ann Arbor SPARK 
Cleveland, Ohio Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Ann Arbor, Michigan 
Impact From inception in July 2004 through From its inception, Innovation 
June 2012, JumpStart made 98 Works invested over $50 million in 
investments totaling over $26 150 companies, which raised more 
million in 65 companies. These than $1.2 billion in follow-up ﬁ-
companies created and retained nancing. In 2011, IW invested $4.9 
1,305 direct jobs, held 144 patents million in companies that created 
with additional 344 patents pend- and retained 454 high-skilled jobs. 
ing, and raised $495 million in IW assisted its portfolio companies 
follow-up funding. The 2011 eco- to attract $218 million in follow-
nomic impacts of the companies on investment from other sources. 
assisted by JumpStart are: value of Many of the region’s largest tech-
all goods and services produced in nology companies count IW among 
the region rose by $220.5 million, their earlier funders. AlphaLab as-
value added rose by $143.6 mil- sisted in the launching of 45 compa-
lion, household income increased nies and was selected among the top 
by $89.4 million, and 12,640 jobs 15 accelerators in the United States. 
were created. Tax revenues in-
creased by $29.8 million, of which 
$19.5 million was added to the 
federal government and $10.3 mil-
lion to state and local governments. 
JumpStart received awards from 
the State Science and Technology 
Institute, the International Economic 
By the end of the ﬁfth year manag-
ing the Michigan Pre-Seed Capital 
Fund, Ann Arbor SPARK has invest-
ed $15 million in technology start-
ups that are just prior to the com-
mercialization phase. SPARK incu-
bator graduated several companies 
that moved to other locations within 
the region and hired new employees. 
Between 2006 and 2011, companies 
assisted by SPARK created nearly 
11,000 jobs and received $1.3 bil-
lion in new follow-up investments. 
Ann Arbor was in the headlines of 
major media outlets. It received top 
rankings in job growth, education at-
tainment, turnaround city within the 
Midwest, and among the best cities 
to ﬁnd a job. 
Development Council, and the 
Bow
en.indb
237
Bow
en.indb  237
12/16/2013
2:14:30
PM
12/16/2013  2:14:30 PM
 
   
   
 
   237 
Economic Development 
Administration of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce. 
JumpStart and its work were fea-
tured in many national media out-
lets, including Parade Magazine, 
the Chronicle of Philanthropy, 
VentureBeat, Fast Company, and the
New York Times. 
SOURCE: Ann Arbor SPARK (2012); Austrian and Cloose (2012); Encyclopedia of Cleveland History (2012); Innovation Works (2012b). 
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encouraging risk taking in their localities. Due to their history, regional 
economies in the Midwest ranked lower on measures of innovation and 
entrepreneurship and experienced lower rates of growth. As a result, 
many bright and talented people worked for established companies or 
moved to the East or West Coasts, where innovation and starting a com-
pany were encouraged (Cortright 2005). 
Over time, with the understanding that entrepreneurship is a criti-
cal element of economic growth, public policy has shifted from only 
investing in physical capital to also supporting risk capital, mentoring, 
and other support services that entrepreneurs need to foster job growth. 
In the 1990s and 2000s, more regional decision makers began to address 
the barriers to entrepreneurship caused by industrial history and the cul-
ture that discouraged risk taking and starting new businesses. Since the 
economies of the Midwest regions were lagging, state and local public 
policy intervened in the market in order to grow the entrepreneurship 
ecosystem. Many states, including those in the Midwest, instituted tax 
credits for early stage investments in order to create or increase the ﬂow 
of available capital to invest in new companies. 
In addition, many regions supported the formation of nonproﬁt 
intermediaries to promote and support innovative start-ups, providing 
them with access to capital as well as technical assistance and men-
toring to help them accelerate the development of nascent ideas into 
successful companies. JumpStart and Innovation Works are both active 
seed-stage investors in start-up companies located in their respective 
regions. They offer similar programs, including technical assistance, 
mentoring, and talent attraction. JumpStart has a unique focus on inclu-
sion that promotes funding and other services to women- and minority-
owned businesses. Innovation Works has an accelerator that specializes 
in rapid product development and commercialization, working with 
a select group of individuals to launch the next generation of compa-
nies. Ann Arbor SPARK, also offers business accelerator services, but 
does not have its own seed fund. SPARK’s funding activities are con-
ducted as an administrator of several state-funded programs for start-up 
companies. 
All three intermediaries affect their respective regions through the 
companies they mentor and the companies in which they invest, help-
ing to overcome the legacy costs and economic history of their lag-
ging industrial regions. The impacts include establishing new compa-
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nies, creating and retaining jobs, raising follow-on funding from other 
sources, and generating revenues. Moreover, these organizations are 
changing their local entrepreneurial ecosystems by networking and 
referring, promoting new ideas and start-ups, increasing the availability 
of pre–seed capital, recruiting talent and creating a pool of individuals 
who can lead and work in start-up companies, and generally advocating 
for entrepreneurs. Direct impact is already observed, but future research 
will demonstrate whether these intermediaries have had lasting effect 
on their regions’ economic growth. 
Notes 
1. The Leading MSAs include Baltimore-Towson, Maryland; Bridgeport-Stamford-
Norwalk, Connecticut; Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, Connecticut; and 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, Rhode Island-Massachusetts. The selection 
of leading MSAs was based on several criteria, including minimum level of employ-
ment, rank in the top quartile in short-term and long-term growth, and improvement 
in ranking over time. The Midwest MSAs include Cincinnati-Middletown, Ohio-
Kentucky-Indiana; Columbus, Ohio; Indianapolis-Carmel, Indiana; Kansas City, 
Missouri-Kansas; Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, Wisconsin; Minneapolis-
St. Paul-Bloomington, Minnesota-Wisconsin; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and St. 
Louis, Missouri-Illinois. The northeast Ohio MSAs include Akron, Ohio; Canton-
Massillon, Ohio; Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, Ohio; and Youngstown-Warren-
Boardman, Ohio-Pennsylvania. 
2. People become angel investors for different reasons, including ﬁ nancial returns, 
supporting their community, creating and growing companies, making use of their 
expertise, and even for personal enjoyment. 
3. Early stage investment tax credits are tax credits provided by state governments 
to private entities or investment ﬁrms for investing in early stage companies, early 
stage investment funds, angel investment funds, venture capital funds, or other 
investments toward businesses in the initial level. Each state has its own legal 
criteria on what it considers an “early stage investment” and each state has a set a 
cap on the dollar amount it will enumerate toward these investments. 
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Local and regional economic development efforts consisting of 
public subsidies for business and public support for promoting 
increased local consumption are based on the “market failure” 
approach. Such activities are attempts to correct the operation of 
nonfunctioning private markets. This approach, while still widely 
touted and utilized, also presents questions as to its effectiveness, 
especially in Rust Belt cities. 
From the time of the Industrial Revolution through the middle of 
the twentieth century, the enormous capital investments made in cit-
ies such as Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, St. 
Louis, and Detroit helped the industries within them to become pre-
eminently competitive.1 High levels of immigration, to supply their 
demands for largely blue-collar labor, were another contributing factor. 
As a result, these and similar cities became globally dominant indus-
trial powerhouses. Fabulous wealth was created. But as the end of the 
twentieth century unfolded, knowledge and technology advanced, and 
the world economy changed. 
Today these same places have earned reputations as lackluster, Rust 
Belt cities with serious problems. Large numbers of talented people 
have, for the past several decades, steadily out-migrated from them 
for better opportunities elsewhere, leaving behind obsolete produc-
tion facilities built for early to mid twentieth century manufacturing, 
a public infrastructure in poor condition, relatively high taxes, and a 
strongly unionized workforce.2 The large and now deteriorating invest-
ments in capital and infrastructure have become increasingly difﬁ cult to 
245 
Bowen.indb 246  12/16/2013 2:14:32 PM   
 
 
 
  
246 Bowen and Song 
maintain with continuously declining populations and correspondingly 
smaller tax bases. Population loss has also brought reduced capacity 
for local and county government agencies to provide public services, as 
well as lessened representation in national-level political decision pro-
cesses. Figure 10.1 shows the population decline over recent decades. 
The public and to some degree nonproﬁt sectors in these cities 
have responded to the deterioration in part by enacting a range of local 
economic-development initiatives. These include public or quasi-public 
interventions into local markets through various forms of incentives and 
subsidies designed to change the respective city’s local economic growth 
paths. They include industrial parks, tax abatements, enterprise zones, 
aquariums, artist incubators, river walks, casinos, festival marketplaces, 
and many others. There are many examples of these initiatives. 
In Cuyahoga County, Ohio (home of Cleveland), for instance, the 
three county commissioners decided in 2007 to expend well in excess 
of $465 million of taxpayer money for a privately owned and operated 
“Medical Mart” (Nichols 2009). The decision was ostensibly predicated 
on the promise of a one-stop shop in which major medical vendors, 
such as GE, Phillips, and Siemens, would have ﬂoor space upon which 
to sell medical products to hospitals and doctors from around the world 
visiting Cleveland and looking to buy the latest in medical technology 
and cutting-edge equipment. A powerful local coalition of advocates 
alleged that this would attract a steady stream of conferences and con-
ventions, bringing hundreds of thousands of physicians and hospital 
administrators to the city each year, creating a huge number of new 
jobs, generating major new local revenues, and otherwise revitalizing 
the region. 
Insofar as public deliberation occurred at all, it was not widespread 
or robust. It did not include anything vaguely resembling judicious 
consideration of the expected value of returns to the public coffers 
from the expenditure, much less of the research showing that munici-
pal outlays for purposes of attracting conventions in the past have not 
always yielded positive results for local economies (Fenich 1992; 
Hovinen 2002; Isler 2008; Laslo and Judd 2004; Noll and Zimbalist 
1997; Sanders 2004, 2005). To support the mart, the county commis-
sioners, in closed meetings purportedly held to protect the owner opera-
tor’s trade secrets, without a vote of the county’s citizens, and without 
a publicly available cost-beneﬁt analysis, decided to fund the Medi-
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Figure 10.1  Changing Population in Selected Rust Belt Cities, 1990–2010 
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cal Mart from a 20-year $0.0025 sales tax on every dollar spent in the 
county. 
Similarly, throughout the industrial Midwest and beyond, elected 
and other urban authorities have supported and committed public funds 
to construct and operate major sports-related and other facilities that 
would supposedly raise the respective city’s growth paths. Examples 
include stadiums, arenas, and training centers in Buffalo, Cincinnati, 
Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. Virtually all 
were designed and built using public funds, but privately owned and 
operated, ostensibly to stem decline and renew prosperity by creating 
jobs (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). The costs of constructing and running 
these facilities have been funded primarily through broad-based general 
taxes.3 Speciﬁc illustrations of initiatives justiﬁed by local economic 
development objectives include the America’s Center Convention Com-
plex in St. Louis, the Detroit Creative Business Accelerator, the Detroit 
Economic Growth Corporation for Business Retention and Attraction, 
the Team Northeast Ohio (NEO) Minority Business Attraction Initiative 
1990 2000 2010 
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in Cleveland, the National Underground Railroad Freedom Center and 
the Queensgate Terminals in Cincinnati, the Forest Hills Community 
Development Corporation in Pittsburgh, and the Niagara Convention 
Center in Buffalo, among many others. 
Use of local economic development initiatives characteristically 
involves the exercise of public authority and the taxing power to claim 
some portion of the total local resource base for declared purposes of 
economic and job growth. The policies are supposed to affect consumer 
or ﬁrm behavior, or both. Generally, they involve tax abatements or 
public expenditures for the stated goals of providing public beneﬁts 
within the urban or regional economic system.4 They comprise a range 
of public subsidies and direct cash aid for businesses, such as ﬁnan-
cial incentives for branch plant recruitment, capital market programs, 
information and education, export assistance, and centers for business-
related research. The approaches include property and income taxes 
that are reduced or credited to selected private interests. They also con-
sist of public ﬁnancial support for purposes of increasing levels of local 
consumption spending on items such as publicly ﬁnanced tourism and 
art facilities, casinos, and outdoor recreation activities. All constitute 
one form or another of a “nonmarket allocation mechanism” (Arrow 
1985). 
In the following pages we focus speciﬁcally on the market fail-
ure rationale for these and similar local economic development initia-
tives (Bartik 1990). In this line of reasoning, economic development 
initiatives are justiﬁed in terms of standard neoclassical microeconom-
ics by the effort to restore economic efﬁciency. The rationale for them 
assumes that they will have the effect of correcting impediments to the 
formation or operation of private markets. Such obstacles are widely 
considered to include external costs and beneﬁts, imperfect informa-
tion and the existence of various monopolies, such as public utilities. 
On Bartik’s (1990) account, they also consist of involuntary unemploy-
ment and underemployment, imperfect capital markets attributable to 
suboptimal regulation, distorted ﬁ scal beneﬁts, improperly set social 
discount rates, underinvestment in human capital, imperfections in 
knowledge and information markets, and spillovers from research and 
development activities. Each of these forms of market failure has its 
own corresponding means of policy evaluation. The presence of any 
of them within a regional market could justify the use of an economic 
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development initiative. Several forms of market failure may also occur 
simultaneously, in circumstances of multiple market failure. 
We ﬁrst consider some reasons to have reservations with this 
approach, speciﬁcally based on principles espoused by members of the 
Austrian school of economics (Hayek 1944; Ikeda 2004; O’Toole 2004; 
Sautet 2004). As the following pages describe, Austrian economic the-
ory stipulates that competition in free markets is virtually the only real 
way to create local prosperity. Then we consider further reasons for such 
reservations based on the theory of the second best (Wolf 1979). The 
theory of the second best stipulates that, under conditions of multiple 
market failure, the outcomes of economic development initiatives are 
inherently unpredictable. Finally, we assess the implications of these 
considerations for the use of local economic development initiatives to 
renew prosperity in midwestern industrial cities today. 
AUSTRIAN CRITIQUES OF LOCAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES 
The Austrian critiques of local economic development initiatives 
differ markedly from popular knee-jerk misgivings about the growth in 
public spending and taxation that have occurred over the past decades 
(Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000). This is not to say that these popular con-
cerns have no basis in fact. The growth in public spending and taxation 
is real, but the Austrian misgivings are in no way knee-jerk. One way 
to look at the trends within Rust Belt cities is in terms of change in per-
capita locally generated general revenue.5 Figures 10.2 and 10.3 illus-
trate these trends for the ﬁnal decades of the twentieth century vis-a-
vis selected cities from this group. Figure 10.2 indicates that per-capita 
locally generated general revenues incrementally have increased for time 
period 1977–2002. Figure 10.3 shows similar trends on a constant 
income basis, adjusted for the cost of living.6 It may be noted that while 
Detroit is out of sync with the trends in the other cities, it is the only one 
that has recently gone bankrupt. 
The Austrian critiques also differ from scholarly misgivings about 
local economic development initiatives that stem from the mixed and 
largely inconclusive results of analysis from the applied social science 
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Figure 10.2  Locally Generated General General Revenue per Capita in 
Selected Rust Belt Cities, 1977–2002 
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tion for the county containing the central city. A linear regression through these data 
ﬁt well and have positive slopes. The slopes and R2 statistics are ($290.09, 0.7612), 
($215.19, 0.6771), ($244.23, 0.7116), ($174.69, 0.6378), ($23.53, 0.0219), ($105.03, 
0.4520), and ($156.33, 0.6015) for Cleveland, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Detroit, 
Milwaukee, and St. Louis, respectively. 
SOURCE: Population numbers are from the U.S. Census Bureau for 1977, 1982, 1987, 
1992, 1997, and 2002; locally generated general tax revenues are from Annual Survey 
of Governments of the U.S. Census Bureau, which are produced by Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and available at http://www 
.icpsr.umich.edu. 
research community. Some of this social science research shows that 
local economic development initiatives have had at least some short-
term positive effects (Bartik 1991; Reese and Ye 2011). Other studies 
ﬁnd that economic development initiatives have either not induced the 
promised improvements, did not have any discernible effects at all, or 
led to less economic prosperity (Hissong 2003; Ikeda and Staley 2004; 
Peters and Fisher 2003, 2004; Reese and Ye 2011; Swetkis 2009). 
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Figure 10.3  Locally Generated General Revenue per Thousand Dollars 
of Personal Income in Selected Rust Belt Cities, 1977–2002 
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NOTE: General revenues and personal income are all adjusted to constant 2002 dol-
lars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). All cities are based on county-level data 
for the county containing the central city. Locally generated general revenues per 
$1,000 of personal income represent the ﬁnancial burden of county residents to pay 
taxes. Though the regression lines in Figure 10.3 do not all ﬁt as well as do the lines 
in Figure 10.2, with the exception of Detroit the slopes on the regression lines for all 
of the cities remain positive. The slopes and R2 statistics are ($5.10, 0.4835), ($0.96, 
0.0398), ($3.13, 0.2303), ($2.30, 0.1895), (−$1.62, 0.0453), ($0.84, 0.0254), and 
($0.59, 0.0246) for Cleveland, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Detroit, Milwaukee, 
and St. Louis, respectively. 
SOURCE: Locally generated general revenues are from the Annual Survey of Govern-
ments of the U.S. Census Bureau produced by ICPSR, which is available at http:// 
www.icpsr.umich.edu); personal income is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for 
time period 1977–2002 and is available at http://www.bea.gov/regional/index.htm. 
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The Austrian critiques instead are based conceptually in disputes 
over the realism of the assumptions made in neoclassical microeconom-
ics, particularly the supposition that decision makers are rational and in 
possession of complete information (Caplan 1999). Austrian economic 
theorists speciﬁcally reject the realism of any assumption that market 
decision makers can ever act on the basis of anything remotely similar 
to omniscience about their situations. Instead, these theorists maintain 
that all decisions that create wealth and prosperity, or not, including 
those involving local economic development initiatives, are made by 
ordinary people. Accordingly, these people are fallible. They possess 
imperfect knowledge, and seldom if ever make fully rational choices. 
Their characteristics are those of Homo sapiens, not homo economicus. 
When in positions of authority to make public initiative decisions, they 
are at times seriously threatened by moral hazards, misaligned incen-
tives, special interest groups, and political inﬂuences. 
The Concept of Catallaxy 
Much of the Austrian critique centers on the concept of catallaxy. 
This term describes the origin of wealth and prosperity, stipulating spe-
ciﬁcally that they must emanate at least in part from spontaneously aris-
ing circumstances beyond the capacity of any given ﬁnite set of human 
decision makers to design. The concept is rooted in Frederick Hayek’s 
philosophy of social order (Hayek 1944, 1945, 1976a,b). 
Hayek assumed the order that we as humans ﬁnd in the world is 
given to it at least in part by our own minds (Gray 1982). Humans, he 
thought, are active and organic, albeit “constrained” choosers of pur-
poses and means to achieve them (Sowell 1987). We make our choices 
and earn our living in the world not so much on the basis of primarily 
abstract or theoretical knowledge as on the basis of practical knowl-
edge. Hayek used “special knowledge of circumstances” to refer to the 
knowledge with which we do this. Accordingly, special knowledge of 
circumstances is the understanding of concrete situations, local con-
ditions, people, and opportunities. It has both abstract and practical 
dimensions. It is abstract in that all of it is explicitly or otherwise predi-
cated upon assumptions, some of which are explicit but most are tacit, 
for instance, about human nature, language, and reasoning, through the 
relationships among elements of sensory perceptions. At the same time, 
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such knowledge is practical in that it is embodied in habits of thought, 
perception, and behavior that allow us to act so as to survive, adapt 
to our ever-changing circumstances, and achieve our purposes.7 At its 
best, this knowledge allows us to act so as to create wealth and prosper-
ity, primarily through market exchanges. 
The Limitations of Decision Makers 
Because special knowledge of circumstances is always at least in 
part attributable to the active ordering structures of our own minds, it 
is at best limited and idiographic. Social and economic reality, Hayek 
contended, is far too complex to be comprehended by a single mind. 
While any one person or group may possess enough knowledge to suc-
cessfully provide answers for the full range of questions that can be 
asked within the context of a given set of assumptions, only a limited 
range of questions may be asked from within that same set. The knowl-
edge required to make sound decisions about how to improve prosper-
ity for an entire urban economic system exists only in widely disbursed 
form among all of the members of that system, each of whom knows 
his or her own situation and purposes better than does anyone else. This 
information greatly exceeds that available to any single political author-
ity or business leader, economic development planning committee, or 
government agency. 
Accordingly, no decision maker, group of decision makers, or agency 
involved with a local economic development initiative can possibly be 
sufﬁciently well informed and rational to be able to calculate and co-
ordinate all the variables that contribute to the creation of wealth and 
prosperity in an urban economic system. Therefore, it is not feasible 
for them to reliably predict the full range of outcomes from any such 
initiative. When social norms nevertheless routinely accept the use of 
local economic development initiatives as substitutes for market deci-
sions, the likely effects include excessively large and unaccountable 
local governments, untrustworthy urban governance processes, waste 
of resources, retardation of the creation of wealth and the renewal of 
prosperity, and disrespect for the preferences, if not individual liberties, 
of those who are either unwilling or unable to exert political inﬂuence 
on the allocation decisions. 
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The Importance of the Market 
The concept of catallaxy suggests that, in capitalistic markets, social 
and economic order and prosperity emerge from the chaos of myriads of 
human decisions in “the mutual adjustment of many individual econo-
mies in a market” (Hayek 1976b, pp. 108–109). Prosperity arises spon-
taneously through the coordinated interactions and mutual adjustments 
of multitudes of unfettered market exchanges, each of which occurs on 
the basis of price signals and the partial knowledge of the participants, 
not as a result of economic development initiatives. To be sure, some 
participants are more knowledgeable than others, and some are more 
resourceful. But none conduct their exchanges within the context of a 
fully integrated and orchestrated social system known as “the market,” 
especially not one that produces any sort of deﬁnable public interest 
or overall product that local economic development authorities might 
optimize in the manner of a linear program. The idea that the purpose 
of an urban economy is to maximize one form or another of a social 
objective function or total social product, such as the number of new 
jobs, and that local economic development decision makers can make 
reliable decisions to improve or increase it is simply a misconception. 
Following this line of reasoning, the idea that economic develop-
ment decision makers know enough to somehow maximize a social 
objective function for the whole of an urban economy, or even at the 
margin to nudge things in their intended direction, is little more than 
hubris. The limitations on their knowledge imply that they could never 
conceive, much less design and orchestrate, the array of exchange most 
conducive to prosperity within a city of any size with anywhere near the 
degree of balance and nuance as can the market. Instead, the greatest 
feasible degree of decentralized, bottom-up decision making will lead 
to the greatest increases in prosperity. To reliably design and deliver a 
mechanism for changing a midwestern industrial city’s economic path, 
authorities would have to know not only the entire range of relevant 
facts and relations, but also how all individuals would mutually accom-
modate each other as a result of its implementation. Even the very best 
theories of social planning, human behavior, and economics are not 
adequate for the requisite tasks. 
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Implications for the Role of Government 
The concept of catallaxy also has implications for the institutions 
used to govern local market behavior, especially in terms of democratic 
values and individual rights. Hayek, in particular, was concerned about 
the reach of governmental power into economic affairs. He maintained 
that, when governmental power is held and exercised by those who do 
not recognize or care about the limitations of their own knowledge, or 
by those who are intent primarily on further enhancing their own power 
and authority, one of the likely effects is to unduly restrict individual 
freedoms and effectively violate the rights of others. The use of local 
economic development initiatives to change urban economic growth 
paths may thus at times conﬂict with the core values of freedom, equal-
ity, and private property on which the potential renewal of prosperity 
must be judged. Anyone who has gone before a zoning commission or 
an architectural review board, or who has attempted to change the mind 
of a determined county commissioner understands and knows that local 
governments can wield sweeping and at times even seemingly tyranni-
cal powers.8 
In the case of Cleveland’s Medical Mart, by 2011, after project cost 
escalations of over $150 million, and after construction had started, 
it became evident that the concept had failed to attract large, multi-
national or national vendors who wanted to display their products. 
Instead, it was announced that the mart would house primarily local 
vendors, including hospitals, universities, and ﬁrms in the information 
technology, security system, and aromatherapy business (Campbell 
2011). The stated purpose also morphed from the attraction of hun-
dreds of thousands of doctors and hospital administrators from outside 
the region, looking to purchase high-tech medical devices, to a largely 
locally oriented center for continuing medical education (Campbell 
2011; Gomez 2011). Rather than housing major national medical sup-
ply ﬁrms, the main tenants were local and included small medical busi-
nesses, universities, and other medical interests from the area, not out-
side vendors that would attract a steady stream of medical conventions. 
In summary, the Austrian critiques argue that local economic devel-
opment initiatives are no substitute for the verdicts of unfettered capi-
talist markets. There is moreover every reason to believe that private 
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investors placing their own money at risk will make better decisions 
than will economic development authorities. Thus, if a medical mart, 
convention center, stadium, or other local initiative is predicted to gen-
erate net positive revenues for an urban economy, let private markets 
make the full investment and reap the full proﬁts, or take the full losses 
it brings. Only unfettered markets can rationally coordinate the demand 
and supply of land, labor, capital, and technology so as to create wide-
spread prosperity. Had the $465 million or more tax dollars spent on the 
Cleveland Medical Mart otherwise not been taxed, and had the funds 
instead remained in free markets, those dollars would have been used 
in other ways, some of which might have generated genuine prosperity 
for a range of the region’s citizens. 
LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES 
AND THE THEORY OF THE SECOND BEST 
On these conceptual foundations, Austrian economic theorists argue 
that, of all feasible alternatives thus far conceived, the activity of vol-
untary exchange in unfettered capitalist markets alone has the greatest 
potential to generate widespread wealth and prosperity. This process is 
hampered by substituting the purposes and conceptions of imperfectly 
informed and cognitively limited economic development authorities for 
those of the vastly larger number of ﬁrms and individuals who would 
otherwise participate with the same resources in free markets. Insofar as 
such policies are rationalized by market failures attributable to imper-
fect knowledge and information, they may not be so much a solution to 
economic decline as a contributing cause of it. 
Markets fail for reasons other than imperfect information and some-
times for more than one reason at a time. Monopolies, for instance, are 
widely considered to constitute a source of market failure, as are non-
rival and nonexcludable goods and services, market transactions involv-
ing costs and beneﬁts that accrue to third parties not directly involved in 
the transaction, and transactions costs that are so high that markets are 
not economically viable and therefore do not exist (Arrow 1985; Bator 
1985). Setting aside for the moment all considerations about imperfect 
knowledge, it is widely recognized that when instances of any one of 
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these other forms of market failure occur, increases in prosperity cannot 
be properly incentivized by unfettered capitalist market activity alone. 
The concept of catallaxy as a basis for a critique of local economic 
development initiatives applies only to those market failures caused 
speciﬁcally by imperfect knowledge and information; it has very little 
if any direct bearing upon any of these other sources of market failure. 
 Less widely acknowledged, however, is that in instances when 
more than one market failure occurs simultaneously, actions taken to 
improve some of the conditions will not necessarily improve the efﬁ-
ciency of the urban economy as a whole. Indeed, exactly this point— 
that under conditions of multiple market failure the use of any sort of 
public policy intervention will not necessarily improve the efﬁciency 
of an economic system as a whole—was made formally in the general 
theory of the second best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956; Wolf 1988). 
The theory of the second best stipulates that the existence of an efﬁ-
cient market is not possible in the absence of the simultaneous fulﬁll-
ment of a set of preconditions, all of which are jointly required to ensure 
that every participant in the market is a price taker. These preconditions 
speciﬁcally include zero entry and exit barriers, perfect information, 
perfect factor mobility, zero transactions cost, nonincreasing returns to 
scale, and homogeneous products across suppliers (Stigler 1957). Each 
precondition is necessary, because for a market to be efﬁcient it must be 
impossible for any given participant to inﬂuence prices in the market. If 
any one of the preconditions is not fulﬁlled, some market participants 
are apt to become price makers, and market failure is likely to occur. 
Moreover, if in any given market more than one of the preconditions is 
not fulﬁlled, multiple market failure occurs. In turn, when the existence 
of an efﬁcient market is not possible, the best remaining outcome is the 
“second best.” 
The theory of the second best has the important negative corol-
lary that the public policy implications of multiple market failure are 
inherently ambiguous (Wolf 1979). That is, under conditions of mul-
tiple market failure it cannot be determined a priori exactly what the 
second-best outcome would look like or how to attain it. Moreover, a 
situation in which more, but not all, of the preconditions necessary for 
fully efﬁcient markets are satisﬁed is not necessarily better than one 
in which fewer are satisﬁed. The removal of any one of the constitu-
ent failures through a local economic development initiative may affect 
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overall urban economic efﬁciency by raising it, lowering it, or leaving 
it unchanged. But according to the theory of the second best there is no 
theoretically sound and reliable way to tell which. The only thing cer-
tain is that the result will vary on a situation-by-situation basis. Local 
economic development initiatives under multiple market failure condi-
tions may be as likely to have a deleterious effect on the efﬁ ciency of 
the overall urban economy as they are to have a positive one. 
This line of reasoning begs the question: do midwestern industrial 
urban economic systems contain multiple market failures? Certainly, 
pioneering urban economist Wilbur Thompson (1968) thought so, as 
have numerous subsequent urban scholars.9 As an illustration, land use 
decisions in any given urban market are apt to be subject to a combina-
tion of market failures. Some of these failures are attributable to collec-
tive action problems (Foster 2011).10 Others are due to discrimination 
in local housing markets (Herbert and Belsky 2008) and labor markets 
(Brueckner and Zenou 2003), to externalities in local housing markets 
(Dietz and Haurin 2003; Ewing 2008; Odland 1985), to capital market 
imperfections and positive external effects on the local educational sys-
tems (De Fraja 2002), to congestion on nearby roads (Arnott and Small 
1994; Downs 1962; Timilsina and Dulal 2011), to urban air pollution 
(Kahn 2006), and to high information and transactions costs in ﬁnancial 
systems (Levine 1997), among countless other challenges. 
Both the concept of catallaxy and the theory of the second best thus 
lead to a similar general conclusion: the existence of market failure does 
not guarantee that local economic development initiatives designed and 
implemented to correct such a problem will succeed. Decisions to use 
local economic development initiatives in midwestern industrial cities 
may or may not lead to outcomes that include greater prosperity. The 
outcomes of using any given local economic development initiative 
can be assessed only approximately and ideographically on the basis of 
each individual case, and only using carefully designed and analyzed 
empirical evidence. 
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THE GOVERNMENT-FAILURE APPROACH TO LOCAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Uncertainty and unpredictability are not only basic characteristics 
of markets but also fundamental aspects of government failure. By 
deﬁnition, this failure occurs in situations in which government has 
“created inefﬁciencies because it should not have intervened in the ﬁrst 
place or when it could have solved a given problem or set of prob-
lems more efﬁciently” (Winston 2006, pp. 2–3). Government failure 
has to our knowledge not been widely considered in the local economic 
development literature. With this type of failure, the goal of increased 
prosperity would have been better served by analysis and application of 
fundamental economic principles of free markets rather than by leav-
ing decisions to the tacit knowledge of circumstance possessed by local 
economic development authorities. 
Both Austrian economic theory and the theory of the second best 
lead to the inference that local economic development initiatives can-
not as a rule be counted upon to reduce waste or to stimulate wealth 
creation for average citizens. Nor can they be relied on to improve 
efﬁciency in the allocation of resources beyond the level that would 
otherwise have been feasible had the resources remained circulating in 
the market. Accordingly, this provides a theoretical framework within 
which misgivings about these initiatives are rational, logical, and con-
sistent with evidence. The basic consideration is that the full range of 
outcomes is and must remain uncertain and unpredictable until well 
after the go-no-go decision is made with respect to any given local eco-
nomic development initiative. 
Intervention May Not Be the Answer 
It is of signiﬁcance to note that in any situation in which a mar-
ket failure is shown to exist, its presence alone does not necessarily 
imply that intervention into the market can improve the situation. For 
one reason, market failures may correct themselves. For another reason, 
governments can fail, too. This could occur, for instance, in circum-
stances in which the decision to use a nonmarket allocation mechanism 
is based upon ﬂawed or incomplete knowledge and shortsightedness, 
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or when the relevant economic development authority, regardless of 
any conscious intentions, is subjected to the inﬂuences of local growth 
coalitions or other powerful special interests. 
Logically, to be consistent with the market failure approach to eco-
nomic development, decision makers deliberating a proposed initiative 
must ﬁrst establish that a market failure exists. But this is not enough to 
rationally justify the use of a proposed local economic development ini-
tiative. The decision makers must also ensure that all expected beneﬁts 
of the proposal are at least equal to all the expected costs. 
The existence of a market failure means that properly functioning 
price signals are absent. In this situation, markets left alone will not 
yield the most efﬁcient use of resources, and therefore will not gen-
erate the greatest feasible levels of prosperity. Demonstration of the 
existence of a market failure is necessary for a local economic develop-
ment initiative to be rational, because in situations in which there is no 
market failure, reliance upon the unfettered market without government 
intervention is the most likely way to create new wealth or prosperity. 
At the same time, the existence of market failure is not a sufﬁ cient con-
dition for such an initiative to be rationally justiﬁed because of govern-
ment failure. Much as the absence of the preconditions for an efﬁcient 
market accounts for market failure, so the absence of the preconditions 
for sound public sector decision making accounts for government fail-
ure. These preconditions include knowledge and information necessary 
for economic calculation on behalf of economic development authori-
ties, appropriate incentives, adequately conceptualized decision pro-
cesses, no unanticipated behavioral responses, and no abuses of politi-
cal power.11 
If while considering a local economic development initiative deci-
sion makers fail to thoroughly consider both market failure and govern-
ment failure, they cannot possibly tell in advance of its implementation 
whether or not the costs of the initiative will or will not exceed the cor-
responding beneﬁts (Bartik 1997; Peters and Fisher 2004). 
The Need for Beneﬁ t-Cost Analysis 
One of the best known ways to protect against situations in which 
the costs of an initiative exceed the beneﬁts is through careful beneﬁt-
cost analysis. Beneﬁt-cost analysis is an underutilized framework for 
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the planning and appraisal of policies and projects (Little and Mirrlees 
1996). While there is little doubt that this type of analysis is imperfect, 
if it is done properly it nevertheless makes the bases for decisions sys-
tematic and explicit. It thus forces decision makers to think clearly and 
carefully about their choices and to make the rationale for them trans-
parent and subject to wide public scrutiny and discussion. This occurs 
through prescribing a set of steps by which decision makers carefully 
consider all of the possible consequences or outcomes of a decision, 
evaluate them, and determine whether the total beneﬁts promise to out-
weigh the total costs, and for whom. 
Decision makers would, for example, explicitly deﬁne the objec-
tives of a proposed local economic development initiative, specify the 
alternative approaches to achieving the growth objectives, and estimate 
the costs associated with the entire range of outcomes from each of 
the alternative approaches, including all of the capital, operating, and 
intangible factors, such as dislocations, aesthetic alterations, etc. The 
beneﬁts would include any improvements in the efﬁciency of the urban 
economic system, as well as changes in valuation of existing facilities 
or businesses due to shifts in markets. A proposed initiative would be 
undertaken only if its beneﬁts are at least as great as its costs. 
In this light it is notable that neither massive out-migration from 
cities nor the presence of too few jobs to support a population within a 
city in and of itself constitutes evidence of market failure. Rather, even 
in the presence of out-migration, markets may be working perfectly. 
People and ﬁrms may simply be moving to avail themselves of greater 
satisfactions, opportunities, or proﬁts at other locations. People tend to 
migrate their residences to places at which, all else equal, the amenities 
are better, the quality of life is higher, or the present value of increased 
income in the new region is greater than the increased cost of living in 
that area. Similarly, ﬁrms may migrate out of an urban core area to avail 
themselves of greater potential proﬁts attributable to changes in produc-
tion, communication, or transportation technology; relative prices of 
factor inputs; or large-scale shifts in the location of service-consuming 
populations. Observed out-migration only constitutes evidence of mar-
ket failure when it can be shown that in its absence some people would 
be better off without anyone else being made worse off, and that this is 
not happening on its own. Thus, Pﬁster (1985) labeled the use of local 
public policy to stem urban out-migration “pathological.” 
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UNFATHOMABLE AND UNCERTAIN ASPECTS OF LOCAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES 
Some of the decline in twentieth-century midwestern industrial 
cities has undoubtedly been attributable to macro-scale economic and 
geographical change, driven by recent advances in technologies and 
over which urban policymakers have little or no control. Insofar as 
these large-scale shifts were the primary cause of such decline, there is 
no apparent a priori reason to suppose that market failures exist. And 
insofar as no market failures exist, there is no good, theoretically sound 
reason to think that the use of economic development initiatives will in 
any signiﬁcant way stem further decline. Indeed, two causes of decline 
that cannot be altered through local economic development initiatives 
come immediately to mind. 
Changing Preferences Enabled by Technology 
The ﬁrst is that technological progress has made it increasingly 
possible for people to realize their seemingly innate preferences for 
living in places with relatively mild winters and under more satisfac-
tory conditions. As noted by Andrew Thomas in Chapter 7, beginning 
shortly after air conditioning became widely accessible, the population 
of the United States has been steadily migrating from the Northeast 
and Midwest to the South and West (Rappaport 2003). These prefer-
ences, and the associated large-scale migration, have also been enabled 
by the changing composition of industry from heavy manufacturing to 
services, since service industries are freer than manufacturing to locate 
throughout the country. Also, the preferences of relatively afﬂ uent resi-
dents to live under more satisfactory conditions, in conjunction with 
comparatively inexpensive transportation, have led them to suburbs 
and beyond, where the infrastructure and schools are in better condi-
tion, commercial corridors are available, housing stock is adequate, 
and many of the problems of the inner city can be left behind. At least 
insofar as the recent decline of twentieth-century midwestern industrial 
cities has been driven by behaviors based on innate preferences and 
enabled by technology, the use of local economic development initia-
tives is not likely to make much difference. 
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Globalization 
The second is globalization. Technological advancements, together 
with relaxation of legal and other institutional restrictions on interna-
tional trade, have forced ﬁrms in midwestern industrial cities to com-
pete today as never before with businesses in other cities around the 
country and the world (Amendola and Gaffard 1988; Antonelli 2001, 
2003; Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969; Geroski 1995; North 1991; Scotch-
mer 2004; Searle 2005). First and foremost among these cities are 
those in China, as is described by Chieh-Chen Bowen earlier in this 
book. Among other things, newly globalized competition means that 
midwestern industrial cities are inextricably affected by inclusion in 
or exclusion from global networks of information and ﬁ nancial control 
(Cohen 1981; Friedmann 1986; Friedmann and Wolff 1982; Neal 2011; 
Sassen 1996). The levels of wealth and prosperity within these cities 
have thus arguably become closely linked to, if not completely deter-
mined by, their positions in these networks.12 
Moreover, ﬁrms in these cities must vie with companies in places 
that have lower labor, energy, environmental compliance, and other 
costs of production. They must thus compete within the context of vast 
worldwide disparities in factors such as savings rates and rates of return 
on capital investments, population size, wages, levels of migration, nat-
ural endowments, regulatory environments, and investment in research, 
development and education, all of which in part determine the success 
of rivals. Firms in midwestern industrial cities are in many ways at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to similar businesses located in other 
areas around the world. To the extent that the relative decline in the 
preeminence of these cities has been attributable to globalization, the 
use of local economic development initiatives cannot be reasonably 
expected to signiﬁcantly ameliorate the corresponding urban problems. 
It is somewhat easy to recognize and accept that historical and geo-
graphical drivers of change are of a scale that goes beyond anyone’s 
complete comprehension. But we also tend to think that, even when 
focusing only on events within local urban economic systems in the 
Midwest, complete knowledge of the effects of many local economic 
development initiatives is beyond the capacity of the human mind. This 
argument is not only intuitive but it is consistent with considerable 
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research on human psychological limitations and capacities (Kahne-
man, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Miller 1956; Simon 1974; Warﬁeld 
1988). Thus, we ﬁnd ourselves inclined to suppose that the full range of 
the causes of some of the perceived problems in Rust Belt cities is sim-
ply unfathomable. Local economic development initiatives responding 
to these issues would, upon closer examination, be found to be attribut-
able not so much to market failure as to the interests of political and 
economic regimes, in combination with cultural and institutional tradi-
tions in which the intrinsic limitations on human knowledge are not 
recognized. A moment’s reﬂection will reveal that this is not trivial. 
It implies that problems of renewing prosperity are inseparable from 
political and economic aspects of society as well as from human psy-
chological incapacities and biases that characterize virtually all other 
choices made under uncertainty. Decisions to use economic develop-
ment policies are thus tied to the possibility of human error, not to men-
tion undue political inﬂuence. 
The Nature and Incidence of Beneﬁts 
Do local economic development initiatives lead to a greater abun-
dance of resources and a fuller life for average people and whole urban 
populations, or only for a relatively small and exceptionally fortunate 
segment thereof? Given that public revenues are used to fund nonmarket 
allocation mechanisms, one might reasonably suppose that the taxpay-
ers who bear the costs would have some legitimate claim to a commen-
surate portion of the rewards. What constitutes the basis upon which 
legitimate claims to these beneﬁts does and should rest? What is the 
minimally tolerable share of the gains due to any given taxpayer? These 
and similar questions seem to us to be among the most difﬁ cult and 
complex in any serious consideration about using these mechanisms. 
Especially when the levels of public funding for economic develop-
ment initiatives are relatively large, they will have positive effects on 
at least some segment of the local taxpaying population. But what if 
this includes primarily or only a relatively limited subset of the relevant 
taxpaying population, composed of, for instance, local landholders, real 
estate ﬁrms, and companies with business and other ﬁ nancial linkages 
to the particular funding channels through which the public expendi-
tures are provided? 
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It is not always clear exactly who the beneﬁciaries of local eco-
nomic development initiatives are and whether the incidence of the 
beneﬁts reﬂects the incidence of costs. Proponents predictably assert 
that the initiatives are conducive to the renewal of prosperity, but it is 
rarely made clear how the validity of their assertions can be determined, 
and it is rarer still that net beneﬁts over costs are actually demonstrated 
in a thorough and impartial manner through an independent beneﬁt-
cost analysis. Seldom are clear and compelling arguments made that the 
policies will lead to a greater abundance of resources and a fuller life 
for average people within an urban system. Moreover, use of local eco-
nomic development initiatives is not always consistent with the spirit 
and principles of democratic governance, in which individual freedoms 
and rights are core values and great weight is placed on local institu-
tions that exercise public authority, leadership, and representation of 
the interests of all citizens rather than only some (Selznick 1957, 1984). 
Probably the most viable way to renew prosperity in midwestern 
industrial cities is to rely as fully as possible on capitalist markets to 
make allocation decisions. This is not to say that this approach would 
always be wise or equitable. Rather it is to say that such reliance draws 
to the greatest feasible extent on the use of prices for making alloca-
tions, puts the information in the hands of the dispersed individuals 
most directly impacted by the decisions, and puts the proper incentives 
on innovators and entrepreneurs competing in markets. It also provides 
feedback about success and failure. These are all powerful systemic 
factors in renewing prosperity. Moreover, it also puts individuals in sit-
uations in which their choices to participate or not in market exchanges 
are voluntary. 
At times, uncritical use of local economic development initiatives 
has incurred huge costs in situations where no market failure has been 
demonstrated. At other times, when market failures have clearly existed, 
different approaches might have improved resource allocation in a much 
more efﬁ cient manner. This raises the practical difﬁculty of both iden-
tifying circumstances in which the use of local economic development 
initiatives will improve efﬁciency and distinguishing them from those 
in which it will not. Indeed, it may raise this difﬁculty beyond analytical 
tractability. Nevertheless, because resource allocations must be decided 
in some manner, and because the ways they are decided will with vir-
tual certainty affect the renewal of prosperity in these cities, there is 
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no choice but to exercise a value judgment on the matter. Accordingly, 
our preference would be for less uncritical and unevaluated reliance 
on local economic development initiatives, and more performance of 
careful beneﬁ t-cost analysis. Our suspicion is that given such scrutiny, 
many of the policies would be very difﬁcult to justify. 
In light of these considerations we would propose that prosperity 
in midwestern industrial cities would be renewed most effectively by 
establishing local rules and institutional arrangements whereby all pro-
posed new local economic development initiatives must be accompa-
nied by statements indicating their purpose, evidence that their design 
will lead to the fulﬁllment of this purpose at acceptable cost, and a 
clear rationale for why such a policy should be employed. Rather than 
placing excessive reliance on local economic development initiatives 
to renew prosperity in midwestern industrial cities, we would gener-
ally favor directing public funds primarily toward efﬁ ciently supplying 
public goods and services and protecting the rights of individuals. Local 
governments should, in our view, consider investing fewer resources 
in economic development initiatives and more in areas such as estab-
lishing appropriate levels of centralization of authority in the public 
sector, achieving an adequate degree of collective trust in public author-
ity, and deﬁning and enforcing functional ownership arrangements and 
property markets. Efforts to renew prosperity in these cities should be 
directed toward creating and sustaining institutions that encourage the 
fullest possible range of initiative and responsibility on behalf of pri-
vate economic agents acting in pursuit of their own individual purposes. 
Appropriate goals include developing and implementing institutional 
arrangements that provide individuals with the greatest possible discre-
tion about how they will use their private property (and to hold them 
accountable for their choices), incentivizing the formation of competi-
tive markets, ensuring low tax rates, and setting appropriate limitations 
on the use of nonmarket allocation mechanisms. 
Insofar as local governments get involved in renewing prosperity 
past this point, the guiding principle should be to establish the condi-
tions necessary for the operation of efﬁcient markets. These conditions 
notably include adequate schools. Markets alone will not provide for 
the lower strata of society to acquire sufﬁcient levels of the essential 
skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Without these competencies, 
a segment of the population in any urban economy will not be educated 
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enough to make sound political judgments as participants in local dem-
ocratic governance processes. In turn, without a suitably functioning 
democratic system, autonomy, benevolence, trust, and free exchanges 
are more likely to cease; human relations are more apt to assume the 
sort of dominance/subordination relationships that characterize serf-
dom or slavery; and overall prosperity is more likely to decrease than 
to increase. 
CONCLUSION 
Both theory and empirical evidence indicate that markets can fail 
and that sometimes local economic development initiatives conceived 
and implemented in the name of correcting the malfunction actually 
improve efﬁciency. This poses a practical difﬁculty of evaluation in 
that, while the list of market failures is long, the roster of successful 
government interventions taken to correct them is somewhat shorter. 
Moreover, while the difference between these inventories can be dis-
cussed in abstract terms, the effect of government action taken in 
response to a market failure in any given situation can only be assessed 
with empirical evidence. 
But data and evidence alone will not resolve some of the basic pub-
lic policy issues raised in this chapter. On the one hand is a popular 
and widely accepted perspective that local ﬁscal policy should take an 
active role in renewing prosperity, such as through efforts to reverse 
out-migration from central cities, lower unemployment rates, stabilize 
economies, and generally to intervene in markets when doing so argu-
ably leads to improved collective welfare. On the other is an Austrian 
economic perspective in which public ﬁscal policy cannot and should 
not as a rule intervene in the market, and the theory of the second best, 
according to which, under conditions of multiple market failure, the 
outcomes of such intervention are unpredictable. These divergent per-
spectives are not resolvable on the basis of available empirical evidence 
alone, due in large measure to the conceptual and theoretical nature of 
the differences between them. At the same time, until these disagree-
ments are satisfactorily resolved, no a posteriori ways will be available 
to answer the question: what mix of public and private activities is most 
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likely to lead to renewed prosperity in midwestern industrial cities? 
The only remaining viable option is one of trial, error, data acquisition, 
analysis, and adjustment. 
If the use of economic development initiatives is to be consistent 
with the spirit and principles of democratic governance, in which local 
institutions exercise public authority, leadership, and representation of 
the interests of all citizens rather than only some, these questions must 
be considered seriously and at length in public discourse. Decisions 
to use local economic development initiatives are thus not only about 
production and consumption, but also about ethics and values. Is the 
increment to economic output generated by a local economic devel-
opment initiative worth more to society than what it displaces? How 
greatly does the population value democratic governance? These are 
but a couple of the wide range of ethical questions indissolubly tied up 
with the use of these policies. Thus, in our view, the problems involved 
are far too important and complex to be left only to economists of any 
ilk, largely because they involve a great deal more than what is typically 
considered to be “economic.” 
Notes 
1. While Buffalo may not be a midwestern city, it is clearly a Rust Belt city and is 
thus included in the chapter. 
2. Walters (2010) argues that any satisfactory explanation of the decline of U.S. cit-
ies must start with the treatment of capital and the security of property rights 
within them, with particular emphasis on labor unions that reduce the returns to 
capital. 
3. Considerable evidence indicates that the lion’s share of the beneﬁts inure to the 
highly paid players and team owners, concession suppliers, some nearby local 
businesses, and businesses that buy season tickets as a means of increasing their 
own ticket sales. Despite gross overestimates of newly created job numbers con-
tained in promotional studies heavily funded by affected cities or teams, such 
facilities are evidently built only with substantial net economic cost to the public 
(Zimbalist 2006). 
4. Many tax incentives are really public spending in disguise (Toder 2002, p. 66), but 
it is easier to enact ineffective or unnecessary programs in the form of tax incen-
tives than in the form of direct spending. 
5. According to the deﬁnition used by the Census of Governments (2002), locally 
generated general revenues are divided into three categories: 1) local taxes, 2) 
charges, and 3) miscellaneous general revenues. Local taxes contain property, 
individual income, general sales and use, motor fuel, corporate income, other 
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selected sales, vehicle license, utility, and other taxes. Current charges include 
higher education, hospital, sewerage, and other current charges. Miscellaneous 
revenues include interest and other miscellaneous revenues. All were used for this 
study. We did not include taxes on utility revenues such as electricity, water, and 
other utility revenues, and insurance trust revenues. We calculated per-capita rev-
enues by dividing locally generated total revenue in a county by that county’s 
total population. Locally generated general revenue per $1,000 of county personal 
income was calculated by dividing locally generated total revenues by total county 
personal income and multiplying that value by $1,000. The data were from the 
U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
6. According to U.S. Census Bureau data, the 31 percent population loss in Detroit 
between 1990 and 2010 was relatively greater than the population loss in any of 
the other cities (Buffalo, 17 percent; Pittsburgh, 17 percent; St. Louis, 20 percent; 
Cleveland, 22 percent; and Cincinnati, 18 percent). To the extent that this trans-
lated into correspondingly greater losses of property values and other components 
of locally generated general revenues in Detroit vis-à-vis these other cities, this 
would contribute to, if not completely account for, the slightly negative slope in 
Detroit’s trend.  
7. Hayek’s conception of knowledge in its practical aspect is much akin to what we 
have variously heard referred to as “know how,” “tacit knowledge,” or “traditional 
knowledge.” 
8. The circumstances that reﬂect this concern are clearly illustrated in Bolick’s 
(1993) description of the ways both liberals and conservatives miss the central 
point about individual liberties that the framers of the U.S. Constitution had in 
mind in the Bill of Rights as well as in the 9th and 14th Amendments. In providing 
this description he cites speciﬁc examples in which actions of local governments 
have wasted or misused tax dollars, imposed a particular set of social values on 
people who do not subscribe to those values, interfered with voluntary, nonharm-
ful economic activities, violated private property rights, and rearranged “opportu-
nities for the beneﬁt of some and to the detriment of others” (p. 97). 
9. Thompson (1968) argues that urban markets are in many ways profoundly dis-
torted by widespread failure to rely sufﬁciently on price signals. He primarily 
considered collectively consumed public goods, merit goods, and payments to 
redistribute income. 
10. Collective action problems occur when an individual’s contribution to the attain-
ment of a common interest is unlikely to have sufﬁcient impact on the advance-
ment of that interest to warrant the costs of political engagement. These problems 
tend to give way on the demand side to the capture of the governance process by 
special interests or rent seekers. On the supply side, they are associated with short-
termism and the monopoly characteristics of the political market. 
11. The logic of government failure from a decision-making point of view is spelled 
out clearly by Dörner (1996). It stems largely from unintended consequences that 
tend to occur as a result of failure or neglect on behalf of government decision 
makers to fully recognize and adequately consider the complexity involved in 
their decision situations. The general set of circumstances may be described as 
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follows. If two aspects of a given decision situation are interdependent, this means 
that they are correlated. So let us suppose aspects A and B within a given city’s 
economic system are correlated. Let us further suppose that an economic develop-
ment authority wants to alter B to change a city’s growth path. B and C are known 
to have a causal relationship, and B can be manipulated and changed at will. This 
means that by altering the level of B, the ofﬁcial can alter the level of C, thereby 
changing the growth path. But if the decision maker is not aware of the correlation 
between A and B, in manipulating B to alter C she will also unknowingly alter A. 
The change in A is indirect, and may not be recognized until much later, if ever. 
However, the change in A is an unintended consequence of manipulating B to alter 
C. If the consequences of changing A are signiﬁcant in some other aspect of the 
urban economic system, and perhaps even deleterious, the actions taken to change 
the growth path in one way may unintentionally create other, new problems, some 
of which are as serious if not more serious than the original one.
 12. Neal (2011) ﬁnds that the direction of the causal relationship between a city’s posi-
tion in the global urban hierarchy and levels of employment goes from the position 
in the hierarchy to urban employment growth, not vice versa.
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Lost a Step 
The Great Lakes Region and Entrepreneurship 
David R. Elkins 
Cleveland State University 
The Great Lakes region is often synonymous with the Rust Belt. 
Those tracking the vitality of cities such as Buffalo, Chicago, 
Cleveland, Detroit, and Milwaukee see economies and popula-
tions that are now just fractions of what they once were. But is 
this really the case? During the Second Industrial Revolution, the 
Great Lakes region was the focus of intense entrepreneurial activ-
ity. Today, while it has lost some of that earlier dynamism, entre-
preneurs remain a part of the region’s economy. With aggresive 
and thoughtful policy actions, the region may reclaim some of its 
former stature as a region attractive to entrepreneurs. 
“Lost a step” is an adage directed at the older football player who 
misses a well-thrown pass, the tennis player who fails to return a serve 
with the ball just short of her racquet, the athlete who just doesn’t appear 
to be the star he or she once was. A New York Times Magazine article 
ruminated on the nature of the aging athlete, sports, and the New York 
Yankees shortstop Derek Jeter. The article concluded with a quote from 
the Yankees general manager, Brian Cashman, “‘He’s not the same 
player he used to be,’ Cashman said. ‘But I think he’s above average at 
that position, despite his age’” (Sokolove 2011). 
“Lost a step” is apropos to the issue of entrepreneurialism in the 
Great Lakes region, which once produced some of the major indus-
tries and fortunes that fueled the Gilded Age. Today that entrepreneurial 
energy and dynamism appear to have drifted to other regions of the 
United States and the world. For instance, in the high-technology ﬁeld 
the most lionized entrepreneurial activities are associated with the West 
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Coast and not with the industrial Midwest. Today, the entrepreneurial 
image of the Great Lakes region, to the extent it has one, appears worn 
and tattered. Is it an empirical reality that the Great Lakes region lacks 
an entrepreneurial dynamic? 
This is the central research question posed by this chapter, which 
will ﬁrst explore the nature of entrepreneurship and what it means for 
an economy. Next, it will present descriptive evidence tackling the issue 
of whether the Great Lakes region has lost its entrepreneurial vigor. 
Finally, statistical tests are performed to examine whether, controlling 
for critical variables, the Great Lakes region has lost a step. The short 
answer to this ﬁnal question is that it largely depends on how entre-
preneurialism is measured. In one sense, the Great Lakes region has, 
indeed, lost a step. However, like many seasoned athletes, it remains in 
the game and competitive. 
ENTREPRENEURS AND THE ECONOMY 
Who is an entrepreneur and what does the entrepreneur do? Joseph 
Schumpeter (1939) deﬁned the entrepreneur as an individual who car-
ries out innovations. He suggested that an entrepreneur is neither a 
profession nor a social class (p. 104; 1949, p. 78). Schumpeter argued 
that “entrepreneurs come from all classes which at the time of their 
emergence happen to exist” (p. 104). He also contended that entrepre-
neurs do not assume ﬁnancial risk; the entrepreneur risks reputation 
but “loses other people’s money” (p. 104). By contrast, Knight (1921) 
suggested that the assumption of risk and uncertainty was one of the 
deﬁ ning features of the entrepreneur. In fact, Schumpeter’s notion that 
entrepreneurs do not assume risk has been one of the most frequently 
challenged of his contentions (Hébert and Link 1982, pp. 82–84). 
Multiple streams of scholarship have developed in this area, typi-
cally contrasting entrepreneurs with nonentrepreneurs (Lundstrom 
and Stevenson 2005). While at least one scholar suggests that entre-
preneurs share distinct personality pathology (Gartner 2005), another 
stream of literature submits that “special types of individuals create 
entrepreneurship” (Thornton 1999, p. 22). Scholars have found that 
entrepreneurs are motivated by a desire to achieve (McCelland 1961) 
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and by other nonpecuniary beneﬁts of entrepreneurial activity (Evans 
and Leighton 1989; Hamilton 2000) and that they have higher toler-
ances for risk (Brockhaus 1982; Lazear 2004, 2005; Van Praag and 
Cramer 2001). In general, entrepreneurs start their ventures at the point 
at which they have reached maturity in both their careers and their lives. 
Entrepreneurs with professional and educational training opt for such 
training that reﬂects a managerial generalist approach (Lazear 2004, 
2005). Access to capital is important for entrepreneurs, and research has 
shown that individuals with greater access to funding are more likely to 
be not only entrepreneurs but successful ones (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, 
and Rosen 1994). Some work suggests that inheritances are an impor-
tant source of entrepreneurial capital (Branchﬂower and Oswald 1998), 
while other research implies that inherited wealth has a limited effect 
on entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004). Additional exploration 
indicates that, although parental wealth has a positive impact on entre-
preneurial self-employment, it is the parent’s self-employment, partic-
ularly successful parental self-employment, that may be the deﬁning 
feature associated with the adult child’s trend toward entrepreneurial 
self-employment (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000). 
What do entrepreneurs do? The Schumpeterian notion is that the 
entrepreneur is an innovator who brings ideas to markets. However, 
after a lengthy survey of economic literature, economic historians 
Robert F. Hébert and Albert N. Link suggest in their book The Entre-
preneur (1982) that the entrepreneur varies by the theoretical con-
text into which that individual is thrust (Hébert and Link 1982, pp. 
107–110). At its basic level, the entrepreneur is engaged in both the 
assumption of risk and innovation. Stated more simply, Shackle, in his 
introduction to Hébert and Link’s book, notes, “the entrepreneur is a 
man whose characteristic act is a gamble on his imagination” (Shackle 
1982, p. viii). Acs and Armington (2006) suggest that entrepreneurship 
is “what happens at the intersection of history and new technology” 
(p. 7). Baumol (2010) underscores this idea by noting that there are 
innovators and replicators. He deﬁnes the innovative entrepreneur as 
one ﬁtting the Schumpeterian model, whose job is “to locate new ideas 
and to put them into effect” (p. 18). The role of the entrepreneur in 
the economic system is that of a destabilizing catalyst for economic 
growth, who “sparks” the economic system and thereby generates 
economic expansion. The entrepreneur thus acts to transform knowl-
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edge into “economic knowledge that otherwise would have remained 
uncommercialized” (Audretsch and Keilbach 2004, p. 608). 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE GREAT LAKES REGION 
During the Second Industrial Revolution roughly between the 1840s 
and the early part of the twentieth century, the Great Lakes region was 
ﬁlled with entrepreneurial activity. Landes (1969) characterizes this 
period as having been shaped by “electric power and motors; organic 
chemistry and synthetics, the internal-combustion engine and automo-
tive devices, precision manufacture and assembly-line production—a 
cluster of innovations that have earned the name of the Second Indus-
trial Revolution” (p. 235). Schmookler (1966) argues that invention and 
innovation are not the mere happenstance of noneconomic actors but 
that they are central to economic enterprise. Further supporting Schum-
peter’s (1939) argument, Shane’s (1996) empirical analysis prompts 
him to observe that “rates of technological change drive rates of entre-
preneurship” (p. 773). Figure 11.1 illustrates the rapid expansion of 
technological innovation, as shown by the number of U.S. patents per 
100,000 population for each year between 1840 and 20000.1 Around 
1850, coinciding with the start of the Second Industrial Revolution, 
there was a sharp increase in the number of patents, and this level of 
innovative activity remained high for nearly 100 years. While drawing 
ﬁrm conclusions about economic activity from patent data is problem-
atic (Schmookler 1966; Worgman and Nunn 2002), the statistics are 
suggestive of the economic expansion taking place in the United States. 
It just so happens that this surge in invention and innovation coincided 
with a rapid expansion of the population of the Great Lakes region.2 
Figure 11.2 illustrates the scope of the Great Lakes regional popula-
tion expansion. The solid line indicates the decade-to-decade percent-
age change of the total U.S. population, and the dashed line depicts the 
decade-to-decade percentage change in the population for the counties 
containing ﬁve major Great Lakes cities.3 For many decades the decen-
nial growth of these counties far exceeded the growth of the United 
States. According to U.S. Census ﬁ gures, these ﬁve counties had fewer 
than 250,000 persons combined in 1840, but by 1930 they had well over 
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8 million, accounting for over 7 percent of the total U.S. population. 
It is worth noting that prior to 1860, no Great Lakes city was ranked 
in the nation’s top 10 by population. However, beginning in 1860 and 
for decades thereafter, Great Lakes cities would emerge as some of the 
largest in the country (Gibson 1998). McClelland (1961) ﬁnds that the 
Figure 11.1  Patent Rate, 1840–2000 
SOURCE: Wright (2006). 
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surge in his measure of “achievement motivation” coincided with the 
jump in patent issuances. It seems plausible that the growth in popula-
tion, invention and innovation, and the desire to achieve found fertile 
entrepreneurial ground in the Great Lakes region. Certainly, between 
1840 and the start of the Great Depression, cities in the area thrived, 
as did the entrepreneurs who called these places home. Indeed, some 
scholars have compared the dynamism of the Great Lakes region 
to that which occurred during California’s high technology boom 
(Klepper 2009; Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokoloff 2006). 
In recent years, this area has been viewed as home to old manufac-
turing centers enduring steep declines in production and employment 
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(Hill and Negrey 1987). As depicted in Figure 11.2, the decennial per-
Figure 11.2  Percentage Change in Population for the United States and 
Selected Great Lakes Counties, 1850–2000 
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (1996). 
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centage growth for the region either kept pace with or exceeded that of 
the nation for nearly a century. However, since 1960 the trend shows a 
region lagging substantially behind the rest of the nation in population 
growth, a phenomenon that has led some to describe the area as decay-
ing and abandoned. For instance, in 1985 the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago (FRBC) (1985) suggested that too many observers think of 
the Great Lakes states as the “sick old man” of the United States (p. v). 
Still, the FRBC underscored that this was not an entirely accurate image. 
Later, for instance, Negrey and Zickel (1994) noted that the region is 
home to metropolitan areas that are both “stable transition centers” and 
“innovation centers” (p. 35). More recently, Acs and Armington (2006) 
have commented, “The South and the West have the strongest new ﬁrm 
start-up rates, while the Northeast and the Midwest, which were for-
merly characterized by large-scale manufacturing, generally continue 
Bowen.indb 283  12/16/2013 2:14:43 PM   
 
 
 
 
 
  
Lost a Step 283 
to lag behind the rest of the country” (p. 53). Clearly, the region trails 
in many areas. Its population is growing more slowly than is that of 
much of the United States. Many of its central cities have lost signiﬁ-
cant population due to out-migration to either nearby suburban areas or 
other parts of the country. The nature of this long-term decline raises the 
chief question for this chapter: Relative to other regions of the United 
States, is entrepreneurship lagging in the Great Lakes region? 
DATA AND METHODS 
Proximity to the Great Lakes directly affects the region and its 
population. From commerce to leisure, this connection is fundamental. 
For the purposes of this chapter, the Great Lakes region is inclusive 
of both urbanized and rural areas and is deﬁned here as any county 
that is contiguous to one of the Great Lakes and any county bordering 
that county. For example, Wayne County, Michigan, adjoins Lake Erie. 
Wayne County is deﬁned as part of the Great Lakes region, along with 
its two neighboring counties, Oakland County and Washtenaw County. 
In addition, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration pro-
vides a list of counties that are relevant to this list.4 According to the 
deﬁnition used in this chapter, the Great Lakes region consists of 178 
counties across 8 states. For this analysis, however, because of miss-
ing or otherwise unreported data, only 146 of these 178 counties are 
included in this designation.5 
This regional deﬁnition is unambiguously narrow. It is used to iden-
tify the core of the region and to exclude those areas that are geographi-
cally peripheral. This approach avoids some of the pitfalls of deﬁning 
regions by the states that they contain. For instance, if all of New York 
State were included in a deﬁnition of the Great Lakes region, the region 
would include New York City and Buffalo. 
Three measurements of entrepreneurial activity will be used: 1) 
business establishments per 1,000 labor force (business density); 2) per-
cent self-employed individuals (percent self-employed; Branchﬂower 
and Oswald [1998]); and 3) business establishment “births” per 1,000 
labor force (business birth rate; Acs and Armington [2004, 2006]). Each 
method covers some feature of the conceptual notion of entrepreneur-
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ship. For instance, business density provides a generalized notion of 
commercial activity and, perhaps, reﬂects the idea that members of 
the business community perceive opportunity. The number of business 
establishment births provides a direct indicator of entrepreneurial activ-
ity. The ratio of business births to business deaths is not included in 
this analysis because the key issue is an examination of entrepreneurial 
business starts and not entrepreneurial success. Stated another way, this 
chapter explores whether entrepreneurialism occurs and not whether it 
is successful. Finally, percent self-employed provides a measure of the 
degree to which individuals alone are engaged in entrepreneurial activ-
ity. The data for business density and business establishment births are 
derived from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns, and 
the data for self-employed individuals are derived from the U.S. Social 
Security Administration (2011). 
Table 11.1 provides the means and standard deviations for each 
of the three indicators of entrepreneurship. Several points are estab-
lished in the table. First, the regions vary in entrepreneurial activity. 
For instance, the Great Lakes region’s business density has a mean of 
4.71 (standard deviation [sd] = 1.09), which means 4.71 business estab-
lishments per 1,000 members of the labor force. This places the busi-
ness density of the counties of the Great Lakes region above that of 
the counties in the South but below that of every other region. Second, 
the variation among the regions for each of these variables is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant.6 Third, a pattern emerges that places the counties of 
the Great Lakes region at or near the bottom among these measures 
and the West’s counties at either the top or near the top. Finally, the 
Great Lakes’ counties, for every measure, fall below the average for all 
the counties. For example, the Great Lakes’ counties mean for percent 
self-employed is 10.5 (sd = 0.04); however the total for all counties, 
including the Great Lakes’ counties, is 12.4 (sd = 0.05). This snapshot 
of the nature of the Great Lakes region depicts an area that, while still 
engaged in entrepreneurial activity, lags behind the nation as a whole 
and most all other regions. Despite these apparent regional differences, 
it is important to determine, once controlling for variables linked to 
entrepreneurship, whether the Great Lakes region lacks the same degree 
of entrepreneurship as do other regions in the United States. 
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Table 11.1  County Business Density, Percent Self-Employed, and 
Business Birth Rate by Region, 2008 
Region Business density % self-employed Business birth rate 
Great Lakesa 4.71 10.49 3.99 
(n = 146) (1.09) (0.04) (1.19) 
Northeastb 5.03 11.32 4.14 
(n = 183) (1.25) (0.04) (1.28) 
Midwestc 4.80 13.06 3.66 
(n = 509) (1.07) (0.06) (1.06) 
Southd 4.60 12.41 4.15 
(n = 884) (1.37) (0.04) (1.40) 
Weste 5.71 13.03 5.74 
(n = 249) (1.92) (0.05) (2.31) 
Total 4.83 12.41 4.21 
(N = 1,971) (1.40) (0.05) (1.57) 
NOTE: Means are reported, with standard deviations in parentheses. 
a Includes all counties bordering the Great Lakes and their contiguous counties across 
eight states: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
and Wisconsin. 
b Includes all counties in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont. New York and Pennsylvania counties not deﬁned 
as Great Lakes counties are deﬁned as Northeast region counties. 
c Includes all counties in Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, North Dakota, Nebraska, and South 
Dakota. Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin counties not 
deﬁned as Great Lakes counties are deﬁned as Midwest region counties. 
d Includes all counties in the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Geor-
gia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
e Includes all counties in the states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2008); U.S. Social Security Administration (2011).  
Analysis of Entrepreneurship 
Scholars have found a number of variables associated with entre-
preneurship. Age is one of these factors. The notion behind entrepre-
neur’s age is that over time individuals develop knowledge (both for-
mal and experiential), reputations within their ﬁelds, and a degree of 
communication acumen. At a point in life, a person may view a propi-
tious moment to leverage these traits and go into an entrepreneurial 
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venture. By contrast, as individuals become older they are less willing 
to bear risk: “[A]ge has a curvilinear relationship with the exploitation 
of opportunity,” as noted by Shane (2003, p. 95). For the purposes of 
this analysis, it is anticipated that there will be a positive relationship 
between the median age of a county’s population and entrepreneurial 
activity. 
Secondly, most empirical research on entrepreneurs ﬁnds that they 
have relatively extensive formal education. While formal schooling is 
not required to engage in entrepreneurial efforts, those entrepreneurs 
who are successful frequently have higher levels of education (Brüderl, 
Preisendörfer, and Ziegler 1992; Van Praag and Cramer 2001). As part 
of a theoretical approach advocating the importance of human capital, 
education has been linked empirically with measures of U.S. economic 
growth (Hoyman and Faricy 2008). I expect that the proportion of a 
county’s population that is college educated is positively associated 
with entrepreneurial activity and measure the college-educated popula-
tion as the percentage of people aged 25 years or older in a county who 
have at least a bachelor’s degree.7 
A third variable is immigration. A number of scholars have noted that 
some immigrant groups trend toward entrepreneurial self-employment 
and that this is a signiﬁcant feature of the immigrant experience (Bor-
jas 1986). Researchers suggest several reasons immigrants are involved 
in entrepreneurial self-employment. For instance, they may do so 
because of their lack of adequate English language skills, the possibil-
ity to reduce labor costs by recruiting family members as employees, 
the potential absence of host-country recognition for their educational 
credentials, and a more generalized host-country hostility (Bonacich 
1973; Evans 1989; Portes and Jensen 1989; Sanders and Nee 1996; 
Wilson and Portes 1980). While some immigrant groups may be drawn 
toward self-employment, it may also be that as self-selected migrants 
they have a greater degree of entrepreneurial spirit than others. For 
example, Saxenian (2002) ﬁnds that immigrant labor is a vital compo-
nent of the Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurial success. Also, it is not clear 
that immigrants are prompting greater entrepreneurship; immigrants’
location decisions may be driven by a desire to locate in areas of the 
country where they believe they will have the most economic opportu-
nity. Unlike native-born residents, who may have familial obligations 
and attachments that increase domestic relocation costs, immigrants 
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may have comparatively lower costs and be freer to select where to live. 
I anticipate that the percentage of foreign-born population in a county 
will be positively associated with entrepreneurship.8 
Another variable associated with entrepreneurship is taxation. 
There is a debate in the literature regarding taxation’s role in entrepre-
neurial behavior. One stream of research suggests that a higher marginal 
tax rate in a progressive tax system depresses entrepreneurialism (Gen-
try and Hubbard 2000; Shane 2003). Shane (2003) suggests, “Higher 
marginal tax rates make people less willing to accept variable earning, 
thus decreasing the likelihood of self-employment” and they “reduce 
people’s perception of the proﬁtability of exploiting opportunities” 
(p. 153). Additional scholars have found that tax rates affect other fea-
tures of entrepreneurial behavior. For instance, one study suggests that 
when the marginal tax rates of self-employed entrepreneurs increase, 
they are less likely to hire more employees (Carroll et al. 2000, p. 349). 
Bartik (1985) ﬁnds that higher marginal corporate tax rates are linked 
with a slight decline in new manufacturing plants among the states. 
By contrast, a separate stream of literature suggests that higher 
marginal tax rates compel individuals toward self-employment, a mea-
sure of entrepreneurship, to avoid tax obligations (Blau 1987; Bruce 
2000; Schuetze 2000). As Blau (1987) states, “The main effect of 
higher tax rates is expected to be an increase in self-employment due 
to the increased attractiveness of underreporting income at higher tax 
rates and the presumed greater ease of underreporting self-employment 
income relative to wage-salary income” (p. 457). Clearly, to the extent 
that entrepreneurs are less risk averse, pursuing tax avoidance repre-
sents a risk-taking venture. For the purposes of this analysis, no posi-
tion is taken on the underlying theoretical motivations of entrepreneurs 
and taxation. However, the expectation is that taxation will have some 
inﬂuence on the degree of a county’s entrepreneurship. Taxation will be 
measured as a statewide variable of per-capita individual income tax as 
of 2008 (Council of State Governments 2010).9 
An economically related variable is unemployment. Some suggest 
that joblessness may prompt individuals toward self-employment. The 
argument is that should an individual become unemployed, a reason-
able response might be to form a new business (Reynolds 1994). To
that extent, it is anticipated that counties with higher levels of unem-
ployment will see higher levels of entrepreneurial behavior. Still, other 
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research has strongly indicated that capital is a critical element of the 
entrepreneurial effort. To the extent that unemployment suggests a lag-
ging economy, there may simply be less start-up capital available to 
initiate an entrepreneurial venture, no matter how much a potential 
entrepreneur may desire to do so. To that end, an alternative expecta-
tion is that unemployment will be inversely associated with entrepre-
neurialism. The variable used here is the county’s unemployment rate 
for 2008, derived from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics. 
Because many counties have varying degrees of an urban-rural 
split, I include a variable depicting the percentage of rural population 
for each county. The reasoning is that in more rural areas one may ﬁnd 
entrepreneurialism captured by self-ownership of family farms and 
other enterprises. The variable is an eight-year extrapolation between 
the census counts of the years 2000 and 2010 for the percentage of 
urban population. 
Finally, region is measured as a dichotomous dummy variable. For 
instance, the analysis will identify those counties deﬁned as part of the 
Great Lakes region as 1 and all others as 0. This method will be used 
for all other regions as well (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). 
The following ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations examine each 
region separately. If the assumption that the Great Lakes region is lag-
ging in its entrepreneurial activity is correct, it is expected that each 
of the following OLS estimates will be both statistically signiﬁcant 
and negative. Before proceeding to that feature of this analysis, a brief 
examination of the descriptive statistics is in order. 
Reported in Table 11.2 are the summary statistics for the control 
variables by the ﬁve regions. Among the control variables, the North-
east counties have the highest mean value for median age and the West 
has the lowest value. By contrast, the Northeast counties, on average, 
have a high proportion of their populations with bachelor’s degrees. For 
example, among the valid data used for this analysis, nearly one-quarter 
(24.6 percent, n = 45) of Northeast counties have populations where 
one-third has bachelor’s degrees. In comparison, only nine of the Great 
Lakes counties report such a statistic. The counties of the West show 
populations that are nearly as well educated. 
Counties of the West and the Northeast have the greatest propor-
tion of foreign-born population, while the Midwest and the Great Lakes 
Bowen.indb 289  12/16/2013 2:14:44 PM   
 
 
  
Lost a Step 289 
Table 11.2  Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables by Regional Counties 
Great 
Lakes Northeast Midwest South West 
Variables N = 146 N = 183 N = 509 N = 884 N = 249 
Median age, 2008 (est.) 39.20 
(3.14) 
40.14 
(2.73) 
38.54 
(3.85) 
37.41 
(3.69) 
36.89 
(4.91) 
Percent bachelor’s degree, 
2006–2010 
21.04 
(7.74) 
26.97 
(9.73) 
20.18 
(7.90) 
19.21 
(9.10) 
25.15 
(10.37) 
Percent foreign born, 
2006–2010 
3.55 
(3.41) 
7.26 
(8.18) 
2.86 
(3.08) 
4.95 
(5.29) 
9.74 
(7.80) 
Unemployment rate, 2008 7.29 
(1.76) 
5.49 
(1.05) 
5.47 
(1.59) 
5.87 
(1.80) 
6.09 
(2.54) 
State-level per-capita 
income tax, 2008 ($) 
1,009.95 
(416.77) 
1,256.39 
(531.17) 
930.60 
(289.66) 
648.75 
(449.32) 
848.58 
(551.97) 
Percent rural, 2008 (est.) 51.40 
(26.89) 
41.70 
(29.80) 
50.81 
(25.55) 
50.34 
(27.48) 
35.42 
(25.89) 
NOTE: Means are reported with standard deviation (in parentheses). 
SOURCE: Council of State Governments (2010); U.S. Census Bureau (2009, 2011a, 
2012); U.S. Department of Labor (2008). 
counties have the lowest values. To provide some further perspective, 
this variable is divided into three categories. According to 2010 census 
ﬁgures, 12.9 percent of the population is foreign born (Grieco et al. 
2012). Using the 12.9 percent ﬁgure, three foreign-born population cat-
egories were created: 1) 6.5 percent and less (half the 12.9 percent ﬁg-
ure); 2) between 6.5 and 12.9 percent; and 3) 12.9 percent and greater. 
More than 9 out of 10 Midwest counties (90.0 percent, n = 458) have 
less than half the U.S. average for foreign-born population. The propor-
tions are nearly identical for Great Lakes region counties (88.4 percent, 
n = 129). However, over a quarter (26.9 percent, n = 67) of the West 
region counties have proportions of foreign-born populations above the 
national average. 
Turning to economic variables, this cross-sectional analysis depicts 
the Great Lakes region with the highest mean unemployment rate at 
7.28 percent (sd = 1.75). By contrast, the Midwest and Northeast coun-
ties have the lowest mean unemployment rates. Finally, the per-capita 
personal income tax is greatest in the Northeast counties and lowest in 
the South. 
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Regression Findings 
In Tables 11.3, 11.4, and 11.5 the OLS results are presented for each 
of the dependent variables. Table 11.3 depicts the OLS outcomes for 
business density with the control variables and the regional dummy vari-
ables, which conﬁrm many of the ﬁndings of previous scholars studying 
entrepreneurship. The data indicate that counties with higher median 
ages and larger proportions of their populations with bachelor’s degrees 
are positively associated with business density. In addition, the analysis 
suggests that unemployment is inversely associated with the business 
density variable. This offers some support for the notion that economic 
challenges depress entrepreneurship rather than inspiring it. Among the 
regional variables, the Northeast, the South, and the West show statis-
tically signiﬁcant results. The Northeast and the South regions report 
inverse relationships with the business density variable, −0.537 and 
−0.183, respectively. This suggests that these regions’ counties have 
lower business densities than other regions’ counties, all other things 
being equal. By contrast, the West regional variable shows a positive, 
statistically signiﬁcant result (0.937), indicating that this region’s coun-
ties have greater business density. Finally, in the Great Lakes region the 
estimate is negative, but it is not statistically signiﬁcant. 
Table 11.4 illustrates the regression data for the percent self-
employed. As with the business density variable from the previous table, 
the results depicted in Table 11.4 provide support for much of the previ-
ous scholarship in this ﬁeld. Across most categories depicted in Table 
11.4, the control variables are statistically signiﬁ cant. Age and percent 
foreign born are positively associated with percent self-employed. By 
contrast, the unemployment rate and a state’s tax burden are inversely 
associated with percent self-employment. The percent of population 
with bachelor’s degree fails to attain statistical signiﬁ cance. According 
to these ﬁndings, a county’s percent self-employed is independent of 
its population proportion of college educated. Finally, the percent rural 
variable has a positive, statistically signiﬁcant result, indicating that the 
greater the rural proportion of a county, the greater the proportion of 
self-employed residents. 
Table 11.4 indicates that counties in both the Great Lakes and North-
east regions have statistically signiﬁcant, inverse associations with per-
cent self-employed. These results suggest that, in general, a county in 
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Table 11.3  Multivariate Linear Regression Results for Business 
Density, 2008 
Regional analysis 
Control Great 
Variables variables Lakes Northeast Midwest South West 
Constant −0.828*** −0.889*** −1.209*** −0.807** −0.537 −0.798*** 
(0.320) (0.322) (0.325) (0.322) (0.333) (0.310) 
Median age, 2008 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.131*** 0.123*** 0.120*** 0.124*** 
(est.) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Percent bachelor’s 0.062** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 
degree, 2006–2010 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Percent foreign born, 0.009 0.008 0.011** 0.008 0.010 −0.005 
2006–2010 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Unemployment rate, −0.045*** −0.039** −0.046*** −0.046*** −0.048*** −0.061*** 
2008 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
State-level income −0.106 −0.099 0.030 −0.101 −0.163*** −0.093 
tax, 2008 (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.062) (0.057) 
Percent rural, 2008 −0.028 −0.031 −0.035 −0.031 −0.003 −0.005 
(est.) (0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.122) (0.122) (0.118) 
Great Lakes −0.157 
(0.108) 
Northeast −0.537*** 
(0.101) 
Midwest −0.039 
(0.065) 
South −0.183*** 
(0.059) 
West 0.937*** 
(0.083) 
Adjusted R2 0.258 0.259 0.269 0.258 0.262 0.303 
N 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; ** signiﬁcant 
at the 0.05 level; *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. 
SOURCE: Council of State Governments (2010); U.S. Census Bureau (2008, 2009, 
2011a,b, 2012);  U.S. Department of Labor (2008). 
either the Northeast or Great Lakes regions will report nearly 2 percent 
fewer self-employed. By contrast, positive coefﬁcients are associated 
with both the Midwest and West dummy variables. This indicates that 
counties in the Midwest and the West regions are likely to have mod-
erately greater levels of self-employment than are those counties not 
in these regions. While the West dummy variable’s positive coefﬁcient 
is as anticipated, the Midwest variable’s positive relationship is unex-
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Table 11.4  Multivariate Linear Regression Results for Percent Self-
Employed, 2008 
Regional analysis 
Control Great 
Variables variables Lakes Northeast Midwest South West 
Constant −0.015 −0.023* −0.029** −0.020 −0.011 −0.015 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Median age, 2008 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
(est.) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Percent bachelor’s 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
degree, 2006–2010 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Percent foreign born, 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
2006–2010 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment rate, −0.003*** −0.002*** −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.003*** 
2008 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
State-level income −0.009*** −0.008*** −0.006*** −0.010*** −0.009*** −0.008*** 
tax, 2008 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Percent rural, 2008 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 
(est.) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Great Lakes −0.020*** 
(0.004) 
Northeast −0.019*** 
(0.003) 
Midwest 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
South −0.003 
(0.002) 
West 0.015*** 
(0.003) 
Adjusted R2 0.257 0.266 0.266 0.261 0.255 0.265 
N 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; ** signiﬁcant 
at the 0.05 level; *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. 
SOURCE: Council of State Governments (2010); U.S. Census Bureau (2008, 2009, 
2011a,b, 2012);  U.S. Department of Labor (2008). 
pected. To some degree, the prevailing stereotype is that this region 
is not associated with exceptional entrepreneurial activity. Part of this 
result may be explained by the way the Great Lakes dummy variable 
has been created. That is to say, other deﬁnitions of the Midwest region 
frequently include counties of the Great Lakes. The deﬁnition used in 
this chapter creates a discrete Great Lakes counties variable. By exclud-
ing those counties from the Midwest variable designation, the Midwest 
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dummy variable’s results suggest that the drag on the Midwest’s eco-
nomic dynamism may be associated with those counties in and around 
the Great Lakes. The result of the Great Lakes dummy variable does 
support the notion that the counties of this region are lagging in entre-
preneurial activity. 
Table 11.5 depicts the OLS results for the ﬁnal dependent variable, 
the business birth rate. Among the control variables, age, education, 
and foreign-born population are statistically signiﬁcant and positively 
associated with the business birth rate. While the unemployment rate 
is not statistically signiﬁcant in these results, the variable representing 
the tax burden is statistically signiﬁcant with across-the-board negative 
coefﬁcients. As with the percent self-employment dependent variable, 
the percent rural variable’s positive coefﬁcient indicates that the less 
urbanized a county is, the more business births that county is likely to 
experience. The regional variables depict results consistent with previ-
ous analyses. First, the Northeast dummy variable has a negative coefﬁ-
cient with the business birth rate. Second, the West dummy variable has 
a positive coefﬁcient with the business birth rate. Unlike the Midwest 
dummy variable’s positive association with percent self-employment, 
the variable has a statistically signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient with the 
business birth rate. By contrast, the South and the Great Lakes dummy 
variables do not achieve statistical signiﬁcance with the dependent vari-
able. The South dummy variable has a positive but not statistically sig-
niﬁ cant coefﬁcient. The Great Lakes dummy variable is negative, but it 
is not a statistically signiﬁ cant result. 
Table 11.6 provides a summary of the various statistical tests for 
each of the dependent variables. In general, the results depicted in these 
statistical tests conﬁrm much of the scholarship examining entrepre-
neurial activity. The consistent or near-consistent outcomes for many 
of the control variables suggest that in counties with relatively better 
educated and older populations there is greater probability of entrepre-
neurial activity. A relatively larger foreign-born population is also asso-
ciated with entrepreneurial activity, and rural areas report consistent 
degrees of entrepreneurial activity. By contrast, the economic and tax 
burdens can, according to this cross-sectional analysis, depress entre-
preneurial activity. 
Turning to the regional analysis, there are some consistent results 
that comport with both previous research and conventional wisdom. 
Bowen.indb 294  12/16/2013 2:14:45 PM   
 
 
 
  
294 Elkins 
Table 11.5  Multivariate Linear Regression Results for Business Birth 
Rate, 2008 
Regional analysis 
Control Great 
Variables variables Lakes Northeast Midwest South West 
Constant −0.728** −0.805** −1.257*** −0.425 −0.881** −0.682** 
(0.352) (0.355) (0.357) (0.349) (0.367) (0.331) 
Median age, 2008 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.098*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
(est.) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Percent bachelor’s 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.087*** 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.079*** 
degree, 2006–2010 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Percent foreign born, 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.032*** 0.042*** 0.021*** 
2006–2010 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Unemployment rate, 0.002 0.009 0.000 −0.019 0.003 −0.022 
2008 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
State-level income −0.557*** −0.548*** −0.451*** −0.476*** −0.527*** −0.536*** 
tax, 2008 (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.068) (0.061) 
Percent rural, 2008 0.291** 0.287*** 0.281** 0.244 0.277** 0.326*** 
(est.) (0.134) (0.134) (0.133) (0.132) (0.134) (0.126) 
Great Lakes −0.198 
(0.119) 
Northeast −0.744*** 
(0.110) 
Midwest −0.567*** 
(0.070) 
South 0.096 
(0.066) 
West 1.445*** 
(0.089) 
Adjusted R2 0.285 0.286 0.308 0.308 0.286 0.369 
N 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; ** signiﬁcant 
at the 0.05 level; *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. 
SOURCE: Council of State Governments (2010); U.S. Census Bureau (2008, 2009, 
2011a,b, 2012);  U.S. Department of Labor (2008). 
Across all three dependent variables, counties of the West are positively 
associated with business density, self-employment, and business births. 
To the extent that the three dependent variables represent features of 
entrepreneurship, the strong impression is that the West is leading in 
entrepreneurial efforts. By contrast, a different result is apparent for 
Northeast counties. For the Northeast, the evidence indicates that busi-
ness density, self-employment, and business births are relatively lower 
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Table 11.6  Summary Results of Statistical Tests for Business Density 
Rate, Percent Self-Employed, and Business Birth Rate 
Business Percent Business 
Variables density rate self-employed birth rate 
Median age, 2008 (est.) + + + 
Percent bachelor’s degree, + + 
2006–2010 
Percent foreign born, + + 
2006–2010 
Unemployment rate, 2008 − − 
State-level individual − − 
income tax, 2008 
Percent rural, 2008 (est.) + + 
Great Lakes − 
Northeast − − − 
Midwest + − 
South − 
West + + + 
SOURCE: Tables 11.3, 11.4, and 11.5. 
than found in non-Northeast counties. However, the interpretation of 
the results for the counties of the Great Lakes must be guarded. In 
only one of the dependent variables, percent self-employed, does this 
regional variable report statistical signiﬁcance. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL POLICY AND THE GREAT LAKES 
What strategies may be offered given the mixed empirical results 
for the Great Lakes region? As stated by Eisinger (1995), entrepre-
neurial policies, particularly state-based ones, are “designed to fos-
ter indigenous ﬁrms and local entrepreneurial capabilities” (p. 147). 
Eisinger (1988) once argued that entrepreneurial economic develop-
ment policies were emerging as an important feature of a state’s overall 
portfolio of developmental initiatives and as a movement away from 
the strategy of industrial relocation policies. However, a few years after 
making that claim, Eisinger (1995) suggested that as policy learning 
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took place, state development policy evolved in other directions. Saiz 
(2001) argues that the underlying motive for this policy shift was one 
of context. He suggests that states strategically retreated from entrepre-
neurial policies once confronted with the possibility of losing business 
to neighboring states competing for industrial relocation. 
Another reason for this shift among state policymakers is that they 
have few tangible incentives to initiate entrepreneurial policies. As Hart 
(2008) observes, 
[T]he puzzle for political scientists is why entrepreneurial state 
ED [economic development] strategies have caught on. Their eco-
nomic and programmatic promise notwithstanding, their political 
logic seems to contain neither rent seeking nor credit claiming. 
At least at ﬁrst glance, the direct beneﬁciaries of entrepreneurial 
strategies appear to be far more widely diffused and poorly orga-
nized than those of locational strategies. In fact, in the case of 
future start-ups, the individual beneﬁciaries are unknown and the 
corporate beneﬁciaries, nonexistent. Most of the economic gains 
that these beneﬁciaries produce will emerge long after those who 
instigated the policies have left ofﬁce. The credit for this economic 
success, if it can be claimed by any policy makers at all, will not 
accrue to the instigators of the strategy, but rather their successors 
in ofﬁce. (p. 154) 
A full examination of state-based entrepreneurial policies is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. However, one place to start would be to ana-
lyze the degree to which the variables empirically associated with 
entrepreneurship may be used to capture some features of the regions, 
an approach that may help policymakers identify strengths and weak-
nesses they may wish to address. Logistic regression is used, with each 
region deﬁned as a binomial dependent variable. A county is assigned 
to its constituent region, coded one if it is in a region and otherwise a 
zero. Next, each independent variable associated with entrepreneurship 
regression analysis is used to detect regional features. 
As depicted in Table 11.7, the Great Lakes region, in the ﬁ rst col-
umn, indicates with its positive coefﬁcients for median age and educa-
tion that it is presumably well positioned for entrepreneurship. How-
ever, the Great Lakes region is also deﬁned by its unemployment, 
and to that extent unemployment may act as a drag on entrepreneurial 
activities. For policymakers, the inverse coefﬁcient with percent for-
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eign born strongly suggests that the region’s public and private sector 
leaders should attempt to ﬁnd ways to make the area more attractive to 
immigrants. It is clear that some of the region’s leaders are moving to 
address this issue. 
Recently, the city of Chicago passed what its ofﬁ cials call a “Wel-
coming City” ordinance. In addition, Mayor Rahm Emanuel declared 
his desire to make Chicago the most immigrant-friendly city in the 
United States (City of Chicago 2012). The largely symbolic ordinance 
was seen as a response to the anti-immigrant measures being adopted 
in some states (Hufﬁngton Post 2012). Still, the underlying desire on 
the part of ofﬁcials in the Great Lakes region to attract immigrants is to 
be encouraged. For example, the National League of Cities identiﬁ es a 
number of proposals to assist with immigrant integration (Gambetta and 
Gedrimaite 2010). Many of the strategies focus on administrative coor-
dination between and among federal, state, and local authorities. More 
concrete recommendations are targeted toward the creation of mayoral 
Table 11.7  Logistic Regression Results for Regional Variables 
Variables Great Lakes Northeast Midwest South West 
Constant 
Median age, 2008 (est.) 
Percent bachelor’s degree, 
2006–2010 
Percent foreign born, 2006–2010 
Unemployment rate, 2008 
State-level income tax, 2008 
Percent rural, 2008 (est.) 
−2 log likelihood 
Cox and Snell adjusted R2 
N 
−11.180*** 
(1.210) 
0.071*** 
(0.014) 
0.092*** 
(0.014) 
−0.195*** 
(0.034) 
0.609*** 
(0.057 
1.169*** 
(0.231) 
−0.581 
(0.413) 
855.592 
0.087 
1,971 
−13.490*** 
(1.194) 
0.221*** 
(0.027) 
0.044*** 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
−0.053 
(0.062) 
2.085*** 
(0.212) 
−0.686 
(0.365) 
935.928 
0.134 
1,971 
1.294 5.409*** 
(0.700) (0.611) 
−0.008 −0.091*** 
(0.016) (0.014) 
−0.005 −0.042*** 
(0.009) (0.007) 
−0.254*** 0.019 
(0.026) (0.011) 
−0.252*** −0.077*** 
(0.037) (0.029) 
0.934*** −1.512*** 
(0.140) (0.119) 
−0.678*** 0.644*** 
(0.253) (0.225) 
1,974.009 2,373.771 
0.130 0.157 
1,971 1,971 
−2.838*** 
(0.785) 
−0.022 
(0.18) 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
0.079*** 
(0.012) 
0.147*** 
(0.042) 
−0.184 
(0.143) 
−0.467 
(0.318) 
1,343.403 
0.076 
1,971 
NOTE: The values in the table represent logistic regression coefﬁcients, with the stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 
level; *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. 
SOURCE: Council of State Governments (2010); U.S. Census Bureau (2008, 2009, 
2011a,b, 2012);  U.S. Department of Labor (2008). 
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advisory boards and addressing language issues. The National League 
of Cities report identiﬁed 20 cities engaged in meeting the challenges 
of immigrant populations. To be globally competitive in an entrepre-
neurial world, the Great Lakes region must more vigorously engage in 
immigration outreach and support. 
Separately, policymakers may need to address issues related to their 
region’s less-than-competitive tax burden. The statistically signiﬁcant 
positive coefﬁcient in Table 11.7 indicates that the counties of the Great 
Lakes region are characterized, relative to the counties of most other 
regions, as having a relatively higher tax burden. Recently, many of the 
region’s policymakers, most notably led by recently elected conserva-
tive Republican governors, have been moving to adjust their state’s tax 
structures. From the perspective of stimulating entrepreneurial devel-
opment, the challenge for these ofﬁcials is to ﬁnd the means to pro-
vide appropriate entrepreneur-oriented tax relief while not undermining 
the region’s educational advantage. The analysis depicted here clearly 
links an educated population with some forms of entrepreneurial activ-
ity. Cutting state education budgets to provide tax relief may not work 
in the long-term interest of developing an entrepreneurial environment. 
Still, as Hart (2008) observes, providing for a future long-term develop-
mental payoff may be less compelling than a more immediate political 
one. 
Beyond the central focus of this chapter, it is worth brieﬂy com-
menting on the nature of the results relative to the other regional desig-
nations. The counties of the Northeast region are distinctly urban and 
deﬁned by their relatively low rates of unemployment, older popula-
tions, and high percent of foreign born. They are also deﬁned by state-
level tax burdens that may depress entrepreneurialism. The Midwest 
region beneﬁts from its relatively low levels of unemployment, but is 
deﬁned by its very low rates of immigration and its state-level tax bur-
den, which is greater than either the West or South. Indeed, perhaps 
the signature characteristic of the Midwest counties is the low levels of 
foreign born. The Southern counties can be identiﬁed by their relatively 
low tax burdens. However, this region is also deﬁned by its youth and 
relative lack of college-educated adult citizens. Southern policymakers 
continue to struggle with their education systems and making them 
competitive in a global economy. To the extent that education plays 
a signiﬁcant role in entrepreneurship, that region’s policymakers will 
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need to address these issues. Finally, the counties of the West are deﬁned 
by their relatively higher degrees of education and large foreign-born 
populations. Still, the counties of the West lead in entrepreneurialism. 
The challenge public and private actors may need to address is that it 
remains deﬁned by a degree of unemployment. 
CONCLUSION 
Entrepreneurialism is a driver of economic growth. Historically, the 
Great Lakes region has been linked with the entrepreneurial develop-
ment of many major companies in the United States. However, today 
there is a strong sense that this region, like an aging star athlete, has 
lost a step in its entrepreneurial dynamism. The results depicted in this 
analysis support elements of that assumption. To be clear, this analysis 
is a snapshot of a time prior to the enduring economic slump beginning 
in the fall of 2008. The region is still productive and competitive in a 
number of ways, but, in several factors related to self-employment, all 
things being equal, it lags behind other U.S. regions. In addition, this 
analysis is consistent with the current and widely held view of the west-
ern United States as a driver of U.S. entrepreneurial activity. 
For policymakers in the Great Lakes region, some features of their 
locales are signs of hope. They are advantaged by the degree to which 
they have an educated population relative to other places. Given the 
notion that entrepreneurialism links innovation to the market, an edu-
cated workforce is an important asset, particularly in a digital informa-
tion age. However, to the extent that the region is also deﬁned by its 
relatively high tax burdens and its relatively low proportion of foreign 
born, these elements need to be addressed. In the Great Lakes states, 
recently elected Republican governors and Republican-controlled state 
legislatures have made it part of their agenda to address noncompetitive 
features of their states’ tax codes. For the purpose of entrepreneurial 
economic stimulation, this is a worthwhile endeavor. However, these 
groups must use caution not to undermine the quality of their states’
educational institutions. In addition, some regional leaders are mak-
ing strides in ﬁnding methods to make the Great Lakes area a mag-
net for highly educated immigrants. This is important. During the 
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region’s boom years it was a major destination for many migrants and 
immigrants. They brought their energy and inventiveness and spurred 
unprecedented industrial development. 
To the cities and counties that comprise the Great Lakes region, 
this is a marketing opportunity to showcase the advantages of the area’s 
many unique and shared attributes, such as direct access to a stable, nat-
ural fresh-water resource. The communities of this region may wish to 
shape their appeals to educated potential immigrant populations. Such 
a campaign may wish to express that this region offers, for the right 
entrepreneurs, an overlooked opportunity. 
Notes 
1. Figure 11.1 includes data illustrating patents issued to both domestic and foreign 
patent holders. While the potential implications of the growing disparity between 
domestic and foreign patent holders are interesting, they are beyond the scope of 
this chapter to explore more fully. 
2. By contrast, Wilken (1972) places the surge of U.S. economic growth between 
1810 and 1880. 
3. The counties include Cook County (Chicago, Illinois), Cuyahoga County (Cleve-
land, Ohio), Erie County (Buffalo, New York), Milwaukee County (Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin), and Wayne County (Detroit, Michigan). The data for Figure 11.2 are 
derived from U.S. Census Bureau (1996). 
4. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration coastal counties are iden-
tiﬁed in U.S. Census Bureau (2011c). 
5. Missing data occur among all of the regions, with the Northeast and the Great 
Lakes regions having the most valid observations and the Midwest, South, and 
West having many more counties not reporting self-employment data. There are 
3,140 counties among the 50 American states, but because of missing or other-
wise unreported data among the Social Security ﬁgures, the valid number is 1,971 
counties. The vast majority of the missing data come from sparsely populated 
rural counties. For example, the counties with missing self-employment ﬁgures 
have mean estimated 2008 populations of 10,380 persons, with nearly four-ﬁfths 
of their 2000 population deﬁned as rural (mean = 0.79). By contrast, the valid 
data’s 2008 estimated population is 147,735 persons, with over half of these coun-
ties’ populations deﬁned as urbanized (mean = 0.52). 
6. Business establishment rate: F = 35.796, signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level [MSBW= 
65.594 (df=4), MSWI= 1.832 (df=1967)]; percent self-employed: F = 12.42, sig-
niﬁcant at the 0.001 level [MSBW= 0.026 (df=4), MSWI= 0.026 (df=1967)]; 
business birth rate: F = 89.515, signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level [MSBW= 187.695 
(df=4), MSWI= 2.097 (df=1967)]. 
7. This variable is derived from data from the U.S. Census Bureau (2011a). 
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8. The data for this variable are derived from the U.S. Census Bureau (2011b). 
9. It should be stressed that much of the literature relating to taxation and entrepre-
neurial behavior is about the effect the marginal rate has on behavior. This analysis 
uses a far less sensitive measure related to the tax burden. 
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